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Abstract
Harnessing the Masses:
International Conflict and Chinese Public Opinion
Jiahua Yue
2021
My dissertation project (“Harnessing the Masses: International Conflict and Chinese Pub-
lic Opinion”) examines the interaction between Chinese foreign policy and public opin-
ion. It comprises three empirical papers. I generalize theories of international relations
and political economy developed under democratic settings and explore the role of do-
mestic audiences in Chinese foreign policymaking. My main findings are two-fold. On
the one hand, the state holds considerable political resources and plays an influential role
in setting the political agenda. It has the power to mobilize popular nationalism in sup-
port of hawkish policies under favorable circumstances (e.g., territorial disputes). On the
other hand, blind patriotism or passive loyalty to the authoritarian regime does not fully
explain the micro-level dynamics of public opinion. Chinese citizens are sophisticated
and deliberate when processing information about international conflict, which generates
bottom-up pressure and constrains the authoritarian state. My dissertation challenges the
conventional wisdom that the domestic audience is solely driven by state-led nationalism
and that the authoritarian government can garner public support at zero cost.
In the first paper (“External Coercion and Public Support”), I explore the dynamics of
public support in the US–China trade war using two waves of online surveys and large-
scale social media data. In the survey experiments, I randomly assign respondents to
different hypothetical bargaining outcomes based on the real-world interaction between
China and the US. I uncover two main causal mechanisms that explain the variations in
public approval of the government: the state’s reputation for resolve and the economic
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consequences. The relative explanatory power of the two mechanisms is contingent on
individual preferences and situational changes. Additional topic analysis on a large corpus
of social media data collected during the US–China trade war reaffirms the importance
of the two mechanisms and discloses the temporal variation in popular topics, especially
citizens’ increasing economic considerations. I also discover considerable differences be-
tween social media content and official messages, indicating the state’s imperfect control
over the public discourse.
In the second paper (“Does Nationalism Rally Political Support for Authoritarian
States?”), I evaluate the logic of diversionary conflict under the Chinese context. I ex-
amine the change of general political attitudes based on two major conflicts: the 2012
Diaoyu Islands dispute and the 2018–19 US–China trade war. With survey data collected
before and after the outbreak of the two conflicts, I test whether international conflict can
boost domestic support for the authoritarian government. I separate the concept of na-
tionalism into two dimensions: anti-foreign sentiment (negative) and in-group solidarity
(positive). I show that while anti-foreign sentiment was moderately strengthened by in-
ternational conflict, in-group solidarity remained largely stable, and the level of general
political support was unchanged. I conclude that the domestic benefits of international
conflict should not be exaggerated: The temporary spike in anti-foreign sentiment does
not necessarily dampen citizens’ sensitivity to domestic problems or make citizens less
critical of their government.
In the third paper (“Weaponizing the Masses: Popular Nationalism and Chinese Eco-
nomic Statecraft”), I explore the state’s influence on public opinion and its relationship
with economic statecraft. Specifically, I estimate the effect of interstate conflict on eco-
nomic exchanges mediated by state mobilization of popular nationalism. I argue that state-
sponsored nationalism disrupts international economic exchanges and conveys a costly
signal of resolve to the targeted state. One mechanism I highlight is that popular nation-
alism powerfully politicizes economic issues and pressures economic agents to follow the
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red flag. For the empirical analysis, I first examine two sets of cases from 2008 to 2019,
including major conflicts between China and Japan, South Korea and the US respectively,
and two most similar events between China and France and the UK that are expected to
have the so-called “Dalai Lama Effect.” I show that the economic impact of political con-
flict is not homogeneous, and that stronger nationalist activism (as indicated by large-scale
protests and consumer boycotts) is associated with a sharper decline in Chinese imports
from other countries. To make a stronger causal claim, I examine regional variations in
popular nationalism in the 2012 Diaoyu Islands dispute and discover a negative effect
of nationalism on imports and direct investments from Japan using the diff-in-diff (DID)
design.
Taken together, my dissertation unveils a sophisticated picture of Chinese nationalism.
On the one hand, the disruptive effect of popular nationalism on economic exchanges
makes it a coercive tool for state leaders to impose sanctions on foreign actors. On the
other hand, the state’s influence over public opinion should not be exaggerated as citizens
still make sophisticated calculations of the conflict and their support for the government is
not unconditional. Under certain circumstances, public support for hawkish policies may
dwindle and state leaders are incentivized to back down.
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International Conflict and Chinese Public Opinion
A Dissertation
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Paper 1
External Coercion and Public Support
Full Paper Title
External Coercion and Public Support:
The Case of the US–China Trade War
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Abstract
Domestic support is crucial for state leaders facing international challenges. Conventional
wisdom suggests that citizens support their government in its efforts to stand firm against
external coercion. However, it is unclear how strongly citizens would continue to support
hardline policies if the cost of conflict dramatically increases. This paper examines public
support for the Chinese government during the US–China trade war. With a two-wave
survey of Chinese citizens, we explore the impact of the government’s strategy on public
approval through two causal mechanisms: the state’s reputation for resolve and economic
consequences. We show that respondents’ support for standing firm relative to backing
down was strengthened by gains in the state’s reputation for resolve but attenuated by
economic losses. We also show respondents’ growing sensitivity to economic losses as
the situation escalated. With social media data, we uncover supplementary evidence for
growing economic concerns among the Chinese public.
Key words: Nationalism, Public Opinion, Survey Experiment, Text Analysis
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Introduction
What determines public approval of a government’s response to coercion by foreign states?
One approach focuses on the emotions instigated by external threats, such as fear, anger,
hope, pride, and humiliation (Hall, 2015; Markwica, 2018). Emotional citizens impul-
sively interpret coercive threats from foreign adversaries as provocative and pressure the
government to respond forcibly. When nationalist sentiments take hold of public opin-
ion, reaching a negotiated settlement is difficult for state leaders since it entails unpleasant
concessions (Weiss, 2014). Hawkish leaders can also tap into blind patriotism and rally
support for hardline policies (Baker and Oneal, 2001; Mansfield and Snyder, 2007).
In contrast, the rationalist approach argues that citizens make sophisticated calcula-
tions of costs and benefits and deliberate on national interests (Baum and Potter, 2008;
Colaresi, 2007). On the one hand, citizens are in favor of the government’s standing
firm. One reason is citizens’ concerns about the state’s reputation for resolve (Brutger
and Kertzer, 2018; Dafoe, Renshon and Huth, 2014; Tingley and Walter, 2011; Weisiger
and Yarhi-Milo, 2015). State leaders who fail to stand firm incur reputational costs and
are perceived as incompetent by domestic audiences. Another reason is citizens’ concerns
about the “intrinsic interests” related to the issues under dispute (Jervis, 1976). Citizens
oppose reconciliation with a distrusted adversary due to adverse policy outcomes (Mattes
and Weeks, 2019; Snyder and Borghard, 2011). On the other hand, citizens may prefer
the government to back down if the cost of a prolonged conflict becomes intolerable and
outweighs the disputed issue’s intrinsic interests. As more information becomes available,
citizens gradually discern the true merits of a costly conflict (Baum and Groeling, 2010).
The rationalist approach reveals opposing forces that shape public opinion under ex-
ternal coercion. Which one dominates and how different contextual factors like situational
changes and individual preferences affect their relative strength remain debatable ques-
tions. While existing research focuses on public opinion during international crises in
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democracies, there is a paucity of comparable research in authoritarian contexts. To fill
this gap, this paper examines Chinese public opinion during the US–China trade war, a
major conflict that has influenced billions of dollars in trade and investment as well as the
global economic order (Amiti, Redding and Weinstein, 2019; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020).
Conventional wisdom depicts highly nationalistic audiences in China (Weiss, 2014;
Weiss and Dafoe, 2019). Therefore, the US–China trade war poses a hard test of the
rationalist approach, and the answers would deepen our understanding of interstate bar-
gaining and domestic audiences. We argue that Chinese citizens do not simply embrace
blind patriotism against US coercion. Instead, they critically assess government policy in
two aspects of rational thinking: the state’s reputation for resolve and economic interests.
Reputational concerns strengthen their support for government standing firm, while per-
ceptions of economic losses have the opposite effect. Furthermore, the salience of these
two aspects varies in predictable ways across time and individuals.
We tested the theoretical expectations in a two-wave survey experiment fielded in Au-
gust 2018 and January 2019 to over 3, 000 Chinese citizens. We used an illustrative bar-
gaining model to capture key elements of the US–China trade war and designed the cor-
responding experimental vignettes stemming from real-world conflict. Then we estimated
the parameters in the bargaining model and explored the sources of public support for the
Chinese government’s strategy with the causal mediation analysis.
We present three main findings from the survey data. First, respondents valued the
gains in China’s reputation for resolve and thereby increased their approval of government
standing firm relative to backing down. Second, respondents noticed the economic losses
caused by US tariffs and thereby decreased their approval of government standing firm
relative to backing down. Third, situational changes and individual preferences affected
the relative importance of these two competing mechanisms. Economic losses played a
limited role at the early stages of the trade war: its mediation effect relative to that of rep-
utational concerns ranged from 0 to 0.2, indicating that it had less than 20 percent of the
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weight respondents put on China’s reputation. After the trade war fully escalated, respon-
dents’ approval of government standing firm declined due to their growing concerns about
economic losses, and the ratio of these two mediation effects (economic losses relative to
reputation for resolve) increased to around 0.5. This change was especially strong among
doves who viewed the US more positively: the ratio was close to 1, indicating that doves
weighed economic losses and the state’s reputation equally.
We present supplementary evidence from social media data including over 500, 000
Weibo posts. The distribution of top topics justifies our theorization of Chinese public
opinion using reputational concerns and economic considerations. Furthermore, some
temporal changes in popular topics show that as the trade war escalated, people’s fo-
cus shifted from China’s resolute stance against US coercion to economic issues and the
prospect of a negotiated settlement with the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first review theories on international
conflict and domestic audiences and propose hypotheses about citizens’ evaluations of the
Chinese government’s strategies in the trade war. Next, we introduce the research design
and the data collection process for empirical analysis. Finally, we present the empirical
results and discuss their substantive implications. The paper finishes with concluding
remarks.
International Conflict and Domestic Audiences
Engaging in international conflict poses high risks to state actors and is often compared to
taking a costly gamble. Aside from the external value of the disputed issues, state leaders’
international ambitions are strongly tied to their domestic objectives (Debs and Goemans,
2010; Pickering and Kisangani, 2010; Tomz, Weeks and Yarhi-Milo, 2018). Insecure lead-
ers have incentives to demonstrate their competency and to rally public support by solving
international crises (Gelpi and Grieco, 2015; Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). Authoritar-
ian leaders exploit foreign threats to mobilize ideological resources and to deter domestic
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challengers (Di Lonardo, Sun and Tyson, 2020).
Despite the potential benefits, appealing to domestic audiences constrains a govern-
ment’s ability to engage in interstate bargaining (Fearon, 1994, 1997). Scholars have ar-
gued that the Chinese government exploits nationalist credentials to enhance its public rep-
utation (Shirk, 2007; Tang, 2016). However, an increase in nationalist sentiments can dis-
rupt the domestic order, and pressure from powerful nationalists may tie the hands of state
leaders and limit the scope of viable strategic options at critical junctures (Weiss, 2014).
A recent literature investigates the linkage between popular nationalism and China’s as-
sertive diplomacy (Johnston, 2017; Zhang, Liu and Wen, 2018), and some research seeks
to quantify the political costs of contravening a nationalist audience (Quek and Johnston,
2018).
Prior discussions of Chinese public opinion and international conflict have mostly fo-
cused on territorial disputes (Fang and Li, 2020; Mattingly et al., 2020; Quek and Johnston,
2018; Weiss and Dafoe, 2019). The US–China trade war has a comparably high degree of
issue salience. It poses new challenges to the Chinese government, whose legitimacy de-
pends on people’s confidence in its performance (Tang, 2016). Anecdotal evidence shows
that people’s confidence in the party leadership stumbled when the trade war escalated (Li,
2018). Since 2018, Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized the “Six Stabilities” (liu wen) of
employment, finance, foreign trade, foreign investment, domestic investment, and market
expectations on various occasions, and has delivered what he calls “anxiety pills” (ding xin
wan) to boost the confidence of private entrepreneurs (Xinhua, 2018a,b). US politicians
have also paid close attention to the negative public sentiment in China and interpreted it
as a signal of the regime’s fragility (Bradsher and Myers, 2018).
We present two main strands of theoretical arguments about the public approval of the
government under external coercion. First, we summarize the political cost of backing
down and propose the first hypothesis on citizens’ concerns about the state’s reputation for
resolve. Second, we discuss the economic cost of standing firm and propose the second
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hypothesis on citizens’ concerns about economic consequences. Additionally, we discuss
how the strength of these two mechanisms varies conditional on situational changes and
individual preferences.
The political cost of backing down
A government’s overt capitulation to external coercion risks provoking a broad public
backlash. Apart from the emotional repulsion of being coerced by foreign adversaries,
citizens’ frustration with the government’s backing down can be understood from the ra-
tionalist perspective.
The audience cost theory argues that the cost of backing down originates from a dis-
connect between words and deeds; citizens punish state leaders for publicly committing
to fight but backing down afterward (Fearon, 1994, 1997; Schelling, 1960). Given the in-
formation asymmetry associated with interstate bargaining, state leaders have incentives
to bluff and to misrepresent their intentions. However, leaving public commitments unful-
filled harms public approval. Domestic audiences – consisting of voters in democracies
(Tomz, 2007) or elites in autocracies (Weeks, 2008) – loathe hollow threats that undermine
the state’s credibility, honor, and reputation. Citizens also raise their expectations of pay-
offs because of the updated “reference points” after the government has explicitly issued
threats, and are disappointed if it backs down (Acharya and Grillo, 2019).
The main criticism of the canonical audience cost theory is that it focuses too narrowly
on whether state leaders have publicly committed to stand firm before backing down (Sny-
der and Borghard, 2011; Trachtenberg, 2012). There is a noticeable gap between the au-
dience cost of leaving public commitments unfulfilled and the political cost of failing to
stand up to external coercion. For instance, nationalistic citizens are likely to detest any
form of concessions to a hostile foreign power – irrespective of any public commitment
made by the state leader beforehand.
Recent variants of the audience cost theory highlight the contextual information of
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the bargaining process, citizens’ preferences, and substantive policy outcomes (Acharya
and Grillo, 2019; Chaudoin, 2014; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Trager and Vavreck, 2011).
As Smith (1998), Gelpi and Grieco (2015), and Debs and Weiss (2016) have suggested,
scholars may profitably view the conventional concept of audience cost as a subset of
competency cost in foreign affairs. Citizens may take inconsistency as a signal of incom-
petency. They may also consider substantive policy outcomes, such as defending national
interests under disadvantageous circumstances and resisting external coercion. Among
other factors, we underscore citizens’ concerns about the state’s reputation for resolve.
Citizens’ reputational concerns connect consistency and competency. A classical inter-
pretation of the audience cost theory is that citizens dislike the government’s inconsistency
because it sullies the country’s reputation for resolve and undermines its bargaining posi-
tion in the future (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016). Alternatively,
one may argue that citizens are broadly aware of the reputational losses that occur when
state leaders make concessions to foreign countries, irrespective of whether this entails
reneging on public commitments to stand firm (Snyder and Borghard, 2011). The latter
interpretation suggests that citizens are most concerned about the substantive bargaining
outcomes and how they disclose information about state leaders’ competency, rather than
sheer inconsistency between state leaders’ words and deeds.
Although citizens’ reputational concerns can be naturally tied to their emotional re-
pulsion for capitulation, they also have a rationalist basis. Scholars associate the external
benefits of standing firm with building a reputation for resolve among external observers
(Dafoe, Renshon and Huth, 2014; Sechser, 2018; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015; Wu and
Wolford, 2018). A state’s reputation is influenced by observers’ assessments of its disposi-
tion and character based on its past behavior, and can be used to predict its future behavior
(Brutger and Kertzer, 2018). Therefore, rational actors in repeated bargaining games are
incentivized to invest in reputation building and to establish an image of toughness (Tin-
gley and Walter, 2011). Capitulating to an opponent’s coercive demands reveals critical
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information about the limits of the state’s resolve in the dispute and puts the state at a
disadvantageous bargaining position.
We disaggregate the political cost of backing down into two parts of a complete causal
path: relative to capitulating (with or without prior public commitments), standing firm
enhances the state’s reputation for resolve, which subsequently improves public approval
of the government’s strategy. It leads to the following hypothesis:
H1 (Reputational Concerns) Self-perceived gains in the state’s reputation for resolve
increase public approval when the government stands firm.
The economic cost of standing firm
The above discussion on the political cost of backing down postulates that citizens gen-
uinely support their government for its prompt and consistent actions against hostile for-
eign forces. Policies of appeasement are interpreted by domestic audiences as evidence of
incompetency, and one important reason is citizens’ reputational concerns about the state’s
resolve. However, it possibly oversimplifies how citizens deliberate on major international
events. From the rationalist perspective, citizens’ assessments of the government’s com-
petency hinge on its ability to deliver desirable policy outcomes that maximize citizens’
utility. Competing mechanisms may affect citizens’ calculations of cost and benefit simul-
taneously.
In a prolonged conflict, while resisting coercion has positive effects on the state’s repu-
tation for resolve, it also brings about adverse economic consequences that may outweigh
the value of the disputed issue. Citizens punish the government for making concessions
under favorable circumstances of fighting, i.e., where low costs are paired with high stakes
(Debs and Weiss, 2016). However, the high costs of sanctions can also outweigh the
expected benefits of standing firm and reduce rational actors’ propensity to fight (Mor-
row, 1999; Whang, McLean and Kuberski, 2013). The extent to which citizens prioritize
their calculations of economic costs and benefits is debatable (Berinsky, 2007; Tomz and
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Weeks, 2013). Research on public opinion in Israel and Russia presents suggestive ev-
idence of citizens’ sensitivity to foreign sanctions (Frye, 2019; Grossman, Manekin and
Margalit, 2018). Quek and Johnston (2018) show that Chinese citizens are more likely to
approve of conciliatory policies that avoid devastating economic consequences, although
backing down under US coercion may be an important exception.
Similar to H1, we disaggregate the economic cost of standing firm into two parts: rel-
ative to capitulating, standing firm enhances perceptions of economic losses, which sub-
sequently decreases public approval of the government’s strategy. It leads to the following
hypothesis:
H2 (Economic Consequences) Self-perceived economic losses decrease public ap-
proval when the government stands firm.
To make sense of H2, one may argue that the government’s standing firm against US
coercion does not necessarily intensify people’s perceptions of economic losses, i.e., the
first part of the causal path does not hold. Citizens may sincerely believe in the intrin-
sic value of standing firm (e.g., preserving the favorable status quo in case that the US
eventually backs down and China wins the trade war) such that the net benefit remains
positive after deducting the cost of fighting. The effect of standing firm on people’s per-
ceptions of economic consequences is therefore positive and boosts public approval via
this causal path. Conversely, if US coercion is credible and has devastating consequences
for China’s economic development, the direction of causal effects mediated through this
economic channel will be negative, leading to lower levels of public support for standing
firm as H2 suggests. We hold no prior belief against the alternative hypothesis to H2 and
accommodate the test of both theoretical predictions in the research design.
Taken together, H1 and H2 present two causal mechanisms that shape citizens’ eval-
uations of the government in opposite directions and pose a possible strategic dilemma to
state leaders who care about their public approval. On the one hand, citizens care about
preserving the state’s reputation for resolve and approve of government standing firm.
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On the other hand, they care about economic consequences and applaud government at-
tempts to minimize the costs by making concessions and backing down. Zhang (2019)
has developed a similar analytical framework to explain China’s coercive diplomacy. The
overlapping arguments about reputational concerns and economic considerations suggest
a common ground of rational thinking that applies to both elites and masses.
Situational changes and individual preferences
How H1 and H2 jointly determine public approval depends on their relative influence on
people’s thinking, which is contingent on other contextual factors. The first factor we
consider is citizens’ recalculations based on new information about situational changes.
There are practical obstacles to the efficacy of new information. In democratic contexts,
elite cues distort reality and make citizens’ interpretation of facts elastic (Baum and Groel-
ing, 2010; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017). This issue is arguably severer in authoritarian
contexts, where the government holds tighter control over the media and internet. At one
extreme, citizens may be fooled by their government’s optimistic messages and not real-
ize the cost of the trade war. Under less extreme circumstances, difficulty in reality may
gradually assert itself and have an impact on public opinion.
For two main reasons, we anticipate that relative to their reputational concerns, Chi-
nese citizens would become more sensitive to the economic losses over time. First, the
disruptive effect of the trade war on people’s lives may directly change their perceptions
of economic losses despite the government’s efforts to stabilize the economy. Second,
some objective developments of the trade war may further strengthen citizens’ sense of
economic losses. One example is that the US maintained its pressure on China and carried
out its plan of tariff spikes. Another is that the Chinese government sought to reach a deal
with the US and toned down its rhetoric following US tariffs. We propose the following
hypothesis:
H3 (Dynamic Considerations) The reputation for resolve is more important at the
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early stage of the trade war, and the concern about economic losses is more important
after the trade war has escalated.
The second factor is the distribution of hawks and doves among domestic audiences.
Scholars argue that hawks and doves differ in their beliefs about the use of military means
to achieve foreign policy ends (Kertzer and Brutger, 2016). We extend this argument to
the trade war: hawks (those who are more hostile to the US) have a stronger preference
for investing in China’s reputation for resolve against the US, and that doves (those who
are less hostile to the US) have a stronger preference for avoiding the cost of fighting the
US. This is because individuals with more hostility to the US may be more cynical about
the prospect of a negotiated settlement and prefer to invest in China’s image of toughness,
while individuals with less hostility may view the US as a potential economic partner and
prefer concessions to a prolonged conflict. We propose the following hypothesis:
H4 (Heterogeneous Preferences) The reputation for resolve is more important for
hawks than for doves, and the concern about economic losses is more important for doves
than for hawks.
Method and Data
In this section, we introduce empirical methods and provide information about data from
two sources, namely, two waves of online surveys and social media data from Weibo
(Chinese Twitter). The design of survey experiments is theoretically motivated and tests
citizens’ response to hypothetical bargaining outcomes of the US–China trade war. The
social media data provides an additional angle to how citizens talked about the trade war
and what their substantive interests were. We acknowledge some important limitations of
empirical methods and data sources and include caveats in the discussion.
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Survey design and mediation analysis
We briefly revisit the context of the US–China trade war. US President Donald Trump
repeatedly complained about China’s “unfair” trade practices during his 2016 presidential
campaign and pressured China to make concessions after being elected. The situation dra-
matically escalated in March 2018 following the release of the Section 301 investigation
report by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The first round
of the negotiation in May 2018 failed to settle the dispute. The US imposed two main
tranches of tariffs in July and September 2018 and placed sanctions on Chinese high-tech
giants including ZTE and Huawei. The two countries restarted the negotiation after the
G20 meeting between Trump and Xi in December 2018. The US agreed to halt additional
tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese products (from 10% to 25% tariffs) until March 2019.
Leveraging real-world changes, we conducted two waves of online surveys in August
2018 and January 2019. The timing of the two surveys corresponded to different stages of
the trade war: the period of escalation between July and September 2018 and the period
of de-escalation and renegotiation after December 2018. It availed us to test the possible
impact of situational changes on citizens’ deliberate reasoning and their support for the
government to stand firm relative to back down under US coercion.
We contracted with a commercial survey company and implemented the same sam-
pling frame of Chinese internet users across the two waves. It yielded 2, 110 and 1, 398
valid responses, respectively, and 1, 012 respondents from the August wave were success-
fully revisited in the January wave.1 Understandably, our online samples are strongly
biased toward urban residents who are relatively rich and have stable internet access, al-
though the distributions of age and gender are more balanced. We argue that this group is
more theoretically relevant, for they tend to have higher stakes in government policy and
1Attrition is a common problem for longitudinal surveys. One common practice is to replenish it with
new respondents from the same sampling frame. It has been used, e.g., in the biennial China Labor Force
Dynamics Survey. Balance checks in the Online Appendix show that respondents in both waves exhibited
similar demographic attributes and pretreatment political attitudes.
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are more politically attentive. We provide additional information about sample quality and
representativeness in the Online Appendix.
The survey flow is standard. Respondents received the invitation link via email and
were redirected to the survey website hosted by the authors’ university.2 Respondents were
first informed of the survey’s main objectives and asked for their permission to collect data
for academic use. After answering questions about demographic information and political
attitudes, respondents started the experimental module on the US–China trade war.
Fig. 1.1: A Crisis–Bargaining Model of the US–China Trade War
We embedded the crisis-bargaining model illustrated in Figure 1.1 into experimental
vignettes. First, to avoid trivial findings, we excluded the two terminal nodes (colored in
gray) in which the US backed down first; people would simply celebrate China’s victory
(reinforcing the reputation for resolve and retaining the favorable status quo). Based on
the hypothesized causal mechanisms, we decomposed individual payoffs into two com-
ponents: reputational concerns and economic considerations. The intrinsic value of the
2We presented ourselves as a group of international relations scholars from China and the US. To build
interpersonal trust, we included the principal investigator’s contact information for Tencent QQ and WeChat
(popular instant messaging services) for further inquiry.
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status quo is denoted as vCN (China continued to enjoy a large trade surplus and made no
concessions to the US), and the payoff is normalized to 0 if the government directly capitu-
lated to US demands (Node I). The government would incur audience costs if it committed
to stand firm but backed down (Nodes II and III), which are denoted as α and αs respec-
tively.3 The disutility caused by US tariffs is denoted as s. If China eventually stood firm
(Node IV), the payoff is the sum of the utility of increasing the reputation for resolve r,
the disutility of tariffs s, and the expected utility of infinitely fighting the trade war as a
function of the intrinsic value of the status quo f(vCN). A simple example of f(vCN) is
the gamble of conflict: p ∗ vCN − cCN , where p denotes the probability of winning the
trade war and cCN denotes the cost of fighting.
Assuming that respondents’ approval of the government’s strategy is determined by
their payoffs at terminal nodes, the parameters in Figure 1.1 represent the indirect treat-
ment effects of bargaining outcomes on respondents’ approval through the mediator vari-
ables. For estimation, we adopted the generalized causal mediation approach and focused
on the average causal mediation effects (ACMEs) (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010). The
ACME is defined as the expected difference in the outcome when the mediator took the
value realized under the treatment as opposed to the control without changing the actual
treatment status. We relegate discussions on nonparametric models and mediation effects
to the Online Appendix and examined the conventional structural equation model (SEM)
as a special case of linearity.
The survey experiment in the August wave was executed as follows. First, respondents
were given identical background information on the ongoing trade war. They also read the
following information: “The future direction of the US–China trade war has many uncer-
tainties. According to the latest news, before imposing additional tariffs on $200 billion
of Chinese goods, China and the US may still resolve the disputes through a new round
3The magnitude of audience costs is arguably an increasing function of the level of escalation (Fearon,
1994), suggesting that as < a (both are negative).
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of negotiation.”4 Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the following hypothet-
ical scenarios (which correspond to the order of the terminal nodes in Figure 1.1): (1)
China did not publicly committed to stand firm and made concessions in the negotiation;
(2) China publicly committed to stand firm but made concessions in the negotiation; (3)
China publicly committed to stand firm, walked away from the bargaining table and was
affected by tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods, but eventually made concessions; or
(4) China publicly committed to stand firm, walked away from the bargaining table and
was affected by tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods, and stood firm in the end. In
the three scenarios in which China backed down (1–3), we described the outcome as “The
US is very satisfied with China’s concessions and fully stops additional tariffs on Chinese
goods.” In the scenario in which China stood firm (4), we described the outcome as “The
US is very angry with China’s resistance and keeps additional tariffs on Chinese goods.”
In the January wave, corresponding to the situational changes in the real world, we
focused on Nodes III and IV and adopted the following revisions. All respondents first
read an updated summary of events including the tariff spikes, the G20 meeting, and the
ongoing renegotiation between China and the US. Then we randomly presented one of
the following hypothetical scenarios to each respondent: (1) China made concessions to
US demands and the US was satisfied, stopping tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods;5
(2) China rejected US demands and the US fully implemented tariffs on $200 billion of
Chinese goods; or (3) China rejected US demands and the US fully implemented tariffs
on $200 billion of Chinese goods and planned tariffs on all Chinese goods (around $500
billion in total).
Here we stress the comparability of some scenarios across the two waves. Scenarios
4Trade talks at the vice-ministerial level took place in late August 2018 after the August wave. Additional
trade talks were scheduled but canceled due to US tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods in September.
5We assume that China would still incur audience costs αs in scenario (1). Different from the August
wave, we did not explicitly prime respondents with the commitments China had made but relied solely
on their perceptions of inconsistency between China’s stance in reality and its strategy in the experimental
vignettes.
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(3) and (4) in the August wave and scenarios (1) and (2) in the January wave similarly
depicted Nodes III and IV in Figure 1.1: China backed down and the US withdrew the
tariffs (Node III), and China stood firm and the US maintained the tariffs (Node IV). We
added scenario (3) to the January wave as the worst-case scenario for Node IV in which
the trade war became extremely intense. Scenario (3) also matched the actual development
of the US–China trade war. In May 2020, the US unilaterally rolled out this scheme of
tariffs on the remaining $300 billion of Chinese goods after the renegotiation failed.
We measured respondents’ posttreatment attitudes on a conventional 5-point Likert
scale. We used the following question to measure respondents’ perceptions of China’s
reputation for resolve: “In your opinion, what image did the Chinese government present
to the foreign observers?” Respondents chose from “very compliant” (1) to “very tough”
(5). We also asked respondents to assess the overall impact of the US–China interactions
in the vignette on the Chinese economy from “very negative” (1) to “very positive” (5).
Finally, we measured respondents’ overall approval of the government’s strategy in the
vignette from “very unsatisfied” (1) to “very satisfied” (5).
Notwithstanding the randomization of the experimental vignettes, the causal media-
tion analysis raises additional identification problems (Bullock, Green and Ha, 2010). The
sequential ignorability assumption is the key to identifying the ACME (Imai, Keele and
Tingley, 2010; Imai et al., 2011). In the Online Appendix, we propose two strands of
tests that may mitigate concerns about biased estimates due to the serious violation of
this assumption. First, we show that the main findings do not substantively change after
controlling for a large set of pretreatment variables (including attitudes toward the author-
itarian rule, self-perceived importance of US products, and general nationalist sentiment)
under different functional forms. Second, we implement the sensitivity test for unmea-
sured pretreatment confounders suggested by Imai and Yamamoto (2013). This test shows
highly robust results even though the strong assumption of sequential ignorability does not
hold.
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Social media analysis
We obtained over 500, 000 Weibo posts on the US–China trade war from January 1 to
December 6, 2018, using Weibo’s search API of the keyword “the trade war” (maoyizhan
in Chinese).6 Figure 1.2 plots the temporal distribution of the posts; the spikes correspond
to the milestone events of the US–China trade war. We used the Structural Topic Model
(STM) to study the temporal changes in important topics (Roberts et al., 2014). As an
unsupervised approach, the STM computes the clustering of keywords under top topics.
It makes few demands of prior knowledge about the texts and avoids possible biases in
supervised methods, e.g., manually labeling a training data set.
USTR Report
 Mar 22, 2018
Tariff Started
 Jul 6, 2018
G20 Meeting





















Fig. 1.2: The Temporal Distribution of Social Media Posts
We preprocess the original data in the following steps. First, we removed institutional
accounts (e.g., government, media, and corporation) and automation accounts. Second,
6This API restricts the maximal number of posts returned for each hour to 50 pages, or 750 posts in total.
Due to this restriction, our data set automatically downweights Weibo posts at the peak of public attention,
which contain a large volume of repetitive information.
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we parsed the Chinese sentences into phrases using the Jieba Parser, removed stop words
and common phrases, and excluded short posts with fewer than five phrases. Third, we
removed rare phrases that appeared in fewer than 0.05% of the posts to filter out random
noise.
Making inferences about public opinion with social media data raises concerns about
generalizability and biases. Some issues are common to different political contexts, e.g.,
the representativeness of active social media users (Barberá and Rivero, 2015). People who
publicly talk about politics on the internet are arguably more attentive to political news and
more interested in the issues at stake. They hardly represent the average internet user or
the general population. Other issues primarily apply to the authoritarian context, such as
government censorship and propaganda (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013, 2017; Shirk, 2011).
State intervention in public discourse may bias observable social media content in favor of
the government.
These issues force us to adopt a conservative view of the findings derived from social
media data. When presenting the results, we highlight the common characteristics and
trends displayed in social media data as supportive evidence of the survey findings. To
analyze the possible influences of government propaganda and assess the independent
value of social media posts, we collect text data from official outlets and make comparisons
between the two sources.
Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results in three parts. First, we examine the average
treatment effects of experimental vignettes on citizens’ perceptions of the state’s reputa-
tion for resolve, the economic impact, and their approval of the government’s strategy.
Second, we explore the sources of political support for the government and evaluate the
hypotheses using the causal mediation analysis. Third, with social media data, we analyze
the distribution of top topics on Chinese social media and link the results to the survey
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findings.
Average treatment effects
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot the average treatment effects (ATEs) on respondents’ posttreat-
ment attitudes, i.e., the hypothesized mediator and outcome variables. The coefficients are
estimated using a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with demographic con-
trols and provincial dummies.7 The confidence intervals (95% and 99% unless otherwise
noted) are estimated with the Huber-White standard errors. The values of the baseline
group are set to zero (the dashed line). For the August wave (Figure 1.3), we use the
scenario in which China backed down directly without making a public commitment to
stand firm as the baseline group. For the January wave (Figure 1.4), we use the scenario
in which China backed down in the renegotiation that started in December 2018 after the
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Fig. 1.3: ATEs on Posttreatment Attitudes, August Wave
The ATEs in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that Chinese leaders faced high political costs
7The set of demographic controls includes age, gender, education, party membership, employment type
(public/government vs. private), and residence (rural vs. urban). We use the same set of demographic
controls without provincial dummies for the causal mediation analysis.
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Fig. 1.4: ATEs on Posttreatment Attitudes, January Wave
of backing down. Citizens displayed significantly higher approval of government standing
firm in both waves, which was also associated with changing perceptions of the state’s rep-
utation for resolve (positive) and economic influence (negative). However, some results
are inconsistent with the conventional audience cost theory. Figure 1.3 shows that the con-
sequence of blatantly violating public commitments as if they constituted mere cheap talk
is mostly innocuous. Relative to those in the baseline group, respondents exposed to the
government’s cheap talk had a slightly higher level of overall approval of the government
(ATE = 0.09, p < 0.14). Additionally, respondents who received the cheap talk treatment
displayed significantly stronger perceptions of China’s reputation for resolve (ATE = 0.20,
p < 0.01), and did not change their assessments of the economic impact. One interpre-
tation is that respondents were partially fooled by the government’s unfulfilled hawkish
rhetoric, which had a “face value.” In the Online Appendix, we extend this interpretation
using evidence from a separate conjoint experiment.
We also observe some significant variations in the magnitude of the public backlash
against the government’s backing down. In the August wave, respondents showed the
lowest level of approval if China initially walked away from the negotiation but eventually
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surrendered after the imposition of US tariffs. The average approval was −0.63 (p < 0.01)
less than the scenario in which China stood firm throughout the bargaining and −0.14
(p < 0.05) less than the scenario in which China backed down directly. It indicates that
respondents were very dissatisfied with the government for talking tough but incurring
extra economic losses before backing down.
In the January wave, the political costs of backing down were considerably smaller in
comparable scenarios after the proposed tariffs had been imposed after more than three
months. Respondents who were told that China conceded to the US in the renegotiation
still exhibited significantly stronger disapproval, but the difference between backing down
and standing firm dropped to −0.40 (p < 0.01). We also find that the US threat of tariffs
on all Chinese goods had no additive effect on respondents’ approval; it only had a small
effect on respondents’ perceptions of economic losses (ATE = −0.10, p < 0.12). We
interpret it as the decreasing marginal effect of economic sanctions; respondents were less
sensitive to the differences between astronomical numbers like 200 billion and 500 billion.
The significant differences in the hypothesized mediator variables (reputation for re-
solve and economic influence) justify further tests of causal mechanisms described in H1
and H2, since the causal mediation analysis requires that the treatment has significant ef-
fects on mediators as if they were the outcome variable. Moreover, our discussions on the
ATEs do not explain the variations in public approval. There are different types of costs:
reputational costs of backing down, economic costs of tariffs, and economic costs of no
agreement. How they affect public approval is addressed by the causal mediation analysis.
Sources of public support: A causal mediation analysis
We estimate the ACMEs using 2000 simulations with the heteroskedasticity-consistent
correction for the percentile confidence intervals (Tingley et al., 2014). Table 1.1 presents
the causal mediation analysis based on the whole sample. In each row, we examine differ-
ences in overall approval between two experimental groups. Parameters in the bargaining
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model (Columns 1 and 4) indicate the hypothesized mediation effect. The positive (nega-
tive) value of the ACME (Columns 2 and 5) indicates the positive (negative) effect on the
approval of the government’s strategy caused by the treatment and passed through the me-
diator. The proportion mediated (PM, Columns 3 and 6) suggests the explanatory power of
mediators; PMs can be larger than 1 if two important causal mechanisms move in opposite
directions with their sum less than 1.
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.095∗∗ 108.0 0 -0.017 -13.4
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.015 -8.9 s -0.133∗∗ 88.5∗
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.441∗∗ 92.9∗∗ s+ f(vCN) -0.088∗∗ -18.5∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.470∗∗ 76.0∗∗ f(vCN) 0.014 2.2
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.390∗∗ 106.9∗∗ f(vCN) -0.218∗∗ -59.9∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.484∗∗ 118.7∗∗ f(vCN) -0.197∗∗ -48.4∗∗
Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the ACME and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table 1.1: Causal Mediation Analysis, The Whole Sample
First, we discuss the ACMEs related to the respondents’ reputational concerns (H1).
As Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show, respondents had significantly stronger perceptions of the
state’s reputation for resolve if China stood firm throughout the bargaining. In Table 1.1,
the causal mediation analysis of the August wave (parameters r and r−αs) and the January
wave (parameter r−αs) shows that this increase in respondents’ perceptions of the state’s
reputation for resolve contributed to a significantly higher approval of the government.8
The ACMEs are stable in comparable scenarios across both waves (standing firm vs. giv-
ing in after tariffs, parameter r−αs) and range from 0.39 to 0.48. The large PMs show the
strength of reputational concerns. To sum up, the causal mediation results support H1 and
8As additional evidence against the audience cost theory, the government’s unfilled commitments did not
negatively affect respondents’ approval via their reputational concerns (parameters α and αs). Parameter α
is positive and significant, and parameter αs is very small.
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reveal that respondents’ support for the government’s standing firm was strongly driven by
their reputational concerns about China’s resolve.
Second, we discuss the ACMEs related to the respondents’ economic calculations
(H2). As Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show, respondents were sensitive to the negative economic
consequences when China refused to make concessions and the US increased tariffs. In
Table 1.1, the causal mediation analysis shows how respondents’ economic considerations
affected their approval of the government. In the August wave, we find that respondents
were most sensitive to the shock of additional tariffs, yet the cost of the prolonged trade
war (China stood firm throughout the bargaining) did not further increase their perceptions
of economic losses. Respondents’ perceived losses caused by the tariffs subsequently low-
ered their approval of the government (parameter s).9 However, in the January wave, we
find that respondents held a much more pessimistic view about continuing the trade war
after the tariffs had already been in place. Respondents’ stronger perceptions of trade war
losses drove a larger decrease in their approval of the government (parameter f(vCN)).10
Although respondents still preferred the government to stand firm than to back down, the
weight of economic considerations is roughly half of that of reputational concerns in terms
of the ACMEs.
The above discussions are in line with H1 and H2: citizens’ support for the govern-
ment’s strategy was powerfully explained by their reputational concerns and economic
considerations. Besides, respondents’ economic concerns were more important in the
January wave, supporting H3. H4 suggests possible heterogeneity of mediation effects
conditional on respondents’ hostility to the US. Using four questions about individual atti-
tudes toward the US, we implement the principal component analysis (PCA) for dimension
reduction and create a composite indicator of anti-Americanism using the first principal
9Manually deducting s (−0.133) from s+ f(vCN ) (−0.088) yields f(vCN ) = 0.045 > 0, which means
that respondents in the August wave expected some economic benefits of the prolonged trade war and thereby
slightly increased their approval of the government’s standing firm. The direct estimation of f(vCN ) using
vignettes of standing firm and backing down after tariffs is 0.014, which is also small but positive.
10In the January wave, the imposed tariffs became sunk costs, and parameter s was cancelled out.
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component.11 For each wave, we divide the sample into two subgroups of equal size, label
those with stronger (weaker) anti-American sentiment as hawks (doves), and analyze the
two subgroups. To save space, we focus on the ACMEs reported in Table 1.2 and relegate
the ATEs on the posttreatment attitudes to the Online Appendix.
Panel A: The Subgroup of Hawks
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.053 35.2 0 -0.004 -4.4
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.011 2.7 s -0.115∗∗ 76.5
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.554∗∗ 77.1∗∗ s+ f(vCN) -0.047∗ -6.4∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.578∗∗ 69.0∗∗ f(vCN) 0.032 3.6
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.589∗∗ 82.3∗∗ f(vCN) -0.139∗∗ -18.8∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.753∗∗ 106.1∗∗ f(vCN) -0.120∗ -16.8∗
Panel B: The Subgroup of Doves
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.100∗∗ 24.3 0 -0.026 9.7
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.007 -3.2 s -0.147∗∗ 76.0∗
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.307∗∗ 137.2∗∗ s+ f(vCN) -0.134∗∗ -59.6∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.342∗∗ 86.2∗∗ f(vCN) -0.004 -0.9
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.217∗∗ 172.8 f(vCN) -0.293∗∗ -230.7
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.247∗∗ 157.9 f(vCN) -0.245∗∗ -155.9
Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the ACME and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table 1.2: Causal Mediation Analysis, Hawks vs. Doves
Consistent with previous results on the whole sample, we find that for both hawks
and doves, reputational concerns about the state’s resolve led to the higher approval of
the government, while perceptions of economic losses had the opposite effect. The re-
11We relegate the descriptive statistics and PCA analysis to the Online Appendix. People’s latent attitudes
toward the US were generally stable, and on average respondents in the January sample held slightly more
positive attitudes toward the US.
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sults support H4: Compared to doves, hawks consistently showed stronger reputational
concerns but weaker concerns about economic losses when evaluating the government’s
strategy. In the August wave, hawks placed more weight on the state’s reputation for re-
solve than doves (∼ 0.55 vs. ∼ 0.30, parameters r and r − αs). Hawks and doves agreed
on the immediate consequences of US tariffs (−0.11 vs. −0.14, parameter s), but hawks
were moderately less sensitive to the total economic losses of standing firm in a prolonged
trade war (−0.05 vs. −0.13, parameter s+f(vCN)). In the January wave, hawks still cared
more about the state’s reputation for resolve (0.59 and 0.75, parameter r − αs) than about
economic losses of continuing the trade war (∼ −0.13, parameter f(vCN)). By contrast,
doves held roughly equal concerns about China’s reputation and the economy (between
0.2 and 0.3 in terms of the magnitude, parameters r − αs and f(vCN)), which explains
their equal support for the government’s standing firm and backing down.
Table 1.2 offers additional evidence in support of H3. In the August wave, for hawks
and doves alike, reputational concerns drove their support for the government’s standing
firm, while economic considerations had a lesser influence in the opposite direction. Be-
sides, the net costs of continuing the trade war had no impact on respondents’ approval
of the government (parameter f(vCN)). In the January wave, there were some noticeable
changes in respondents’ calculations. Doves and hawks had growing concerns about eco-
nomic repercussions despite differences in the magnitude of mediation effects. Due to the
prominence of reputational concerns compared to economic considerations (the ratio of
the two ACMEs is roughly 5 : 1), hawks still showed higher approval of the government’s
standing firm. But doves no longer viewed standing firm more favorably: The negative
mediation effect driven by their sense of economic losses fully canceled out the positive
mediation effect motivated by reputational concerns.
We underscore the explanatory power of the two hypothesized causal mechanisms.
Notwithstanding the large indirect effects and PMs, some significant direct effects are still
unexplained. We report the results in the Online Appendix using the conventional SEM
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that allows multiple mediators in the outcome equation. Here we discuss two possible rea-
sons for the unexplained direct effects. One is factors that did not directly go into respon-
dents’ rational thinking, such as impulsive emotions against external coercion, instinctive
preferences for fairness, and entrenched suspicion of negotiation with the US. As indepen-
dent mechanisms, they do not challenge the validity of the main results. Psychology and
rationality are not opposites (Brutger and Kertzer, 2018).
A second reason is the misspecification of (generalized) linear models, which assume
no interactive effects between mediators. For instance, why citizens particularly dislike
the scenario of giving in after tariffs (Node III in Figure 1.1) may be caused by an interac-
tive effect between as and s that shows the government’s unskillfulness, even though as is
found to be insignificant (Table 1.1). We propose two remedies in the Online Appendix.
First, we find that at the individual level, citizens’ reputational concerns and assessments
of economic consequences were largely independent, making it difficult to theorize re-
spondents’ higher-order thinking of their interactive effects. Second, we manually add the
interaction terms of mediators into the outcome equation of the SEM and find very small
coefficients.
Temporal changes of topics on Weibo
The survey results show that Chinese citizens made deliberate reasoning of the US–China
trade war and critically assessed the government’s performance. As supplementary evi-
dence, we present information about social media topics and their temporal changes. For
simplicity, we choose five out of the ten top topics, which are directly related to the state’s
reputation and economic influence. We present their relative proportions in five main bar-
gaining stages in Figure 1.5 and use the pre-ZTE-ban period (before April 16) as the base-
line. To avoid over-interpreting the random noise of the large-scale text data, we focus on
large coefficients (> 3%) that indicate significant changes in the proportion of topics (col-
ored in black). We relegate the full results to the Online Appendix. As a robustness check,
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99.9% CI. Selected Topics: Chinese Economy (T3), Stock Market (T7), High-tech and Private Firms (T8),
Negotiation and Compromise (T9), Resolve and Non-compromise (T10)
Fig. 1.5: Dynamic Changes in Proportions of Selected Topics
We draw three main findings. First, in support of H1 and H2, we identify citizens’
strong interests in Chinese economy (T3, T7, and T8) and China’s reputation for resolve
(T9 and T10). Second, in partial support of H3, we capture an upward trend of some
economic topics as the trade war escalated. The proportion of T3 on Chinese economy
(including keywords such as investment, consumption, and the financial market) increased
significantly over the baseline during and after the first round of bilateral negotiations
in May. Likewise, the proportion of T8 on Chinese high-tech firms increased after the
ZTE ban in April and regained public attention after the start of tariffs in July. Third, we
find malleability regarding public reputational concerns, which were somewhat in decline.
Two related topics featured the opposite sentiments: The dovish topic on negotiation,
compromise, and reaching consensus (T9), and the hawkish topic on resolve, retaliation,
and anger toward US bullying of China (T10). There were two jumps in the proportion
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of the dovish topic: One was during the first-round negotiations between May and July,
and the other was after the official announcement of the G20 meeting between Trump and
Xi in late October. The hawkish topic’s proportion was equal to or lower than during the
pre-ZTE-ban period when the Chinese government responded vehemently to US initial
threats in March.
We acknowledge that social media analysis is possibly biased due to government cen-
sorship and propaganda. In the Online Appendix, we analyze government statements (For-
eign Ministry spokesperson’s remarks) and official media commentaries (Global Times
editorials). We uncover some similar dynamics, especially the sharp decrease in hawkish
rhetoric as the trade war escalated. We also uncover noticeable differences between offi-
cial outlets and social media content in the substance of the texts, indicating limited state
influence on public discourse.
Concluding Remarks
Donald Trump once claimed that trade wars are good and easy to win. In addition to bold
optimism, this statement reveals the strategic dilemma that Trump has encountered, i.e.,
demonstrating his competency through major international victories while downplaying
the negative impact of trade wars on the US economy. Evidence shows that US voters
punished him for the economic losses caused by the trade war (Blanchard, Bown and
Chor, 2019).
Autocracies insulate citizens from the formal policy-making process. However, au-
thoritarian leaders who depend on public support may face a similar tradeoff between
fighting hard for victories in the international arena and alleviating economic pains. In
particular, handling the US–China trade war is important for Chinese leaders who rely on
both nationalistic credentials and economic accomplishments. In this paper, we use orig-
inal survey and social media data to evaluate Chinese citizens’ reputational concerns and
economic considerations and to explore the sources of political support in China. We show
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that Chinese citizens were not fooled by blind patriotism or government rhetoric. Instead,
they made calculated responses to external coercion.
We acknowledge that the US–China trade war presents a unique case in which China’s
future development has been gravely dimmed by its economic decoupling from the US.
Neither the Diaoyu Island dispute (2012) nor the South China Sea standoff (2016) had such
a profound impact. One may question the generalizability of our conclusions. We argue
that since international conflicts are generally considered costly gambles, the results offer
a possible starting point for theorizing about public opinion during international crises. As
the Japan–South Korea trade dispute (2019-20) and the China–India border clash (2020)
illustrate, economic cooperation is vulnerable to political competition. How citizens react
to economic disturbances caused by interstate conflict, e.g., unemployment, disruptions to
foreign investment, and trade diversion, awaits future research.
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A1 Summary Statistics and Data Quality
Online survey experiments have become increasingly popular in political science. For the
generalizability of causal effects, existing evidence suggests a considerable similarity between
internet samples and representative population-based samples (Mullinix et al., 2015). To
our knowledge, a large volume of research on China uses similar online samples provided by
commercial firms, including: Chilton, Milner and Tingley (2020); Fang and Li (2020); Huang
(2015, 2018); Mattingly et al. (2020); Weiss and Dafoe (2019). Li, Shi and Zhu (2018) make
discussions on the comparability between the internet and representative survey samples in
the Chinese context.
Acknowledging possible concerns about data quality and representativeness, we present
a comprehensive review of the two-wave survey data and perform a special test of data
quality. We show the summary statistics in Table A.1 and the sample balance in Table
A.2. We also plot the histograms of age and family income in Figures A.1 and A.2. As
Table A.2 suggests, the samples of two waves are highly similar in terms of demographics
and pretreatment political attitudes. Respondents in the January wave were less likely to be
party members, were slightly less opposed to the government censorship, and held a slightly
more positive opinion of the US. However, the differences in sample means are considerably
small. In the January wave, respondents’ slightly improving attitudes toward the US may
be explained by the temporary easing situation after the G20 meeting between Trump and
Xi and the restart of bilateral negotiation in December 2018.
We briefly discuss how similar online samples are compared to the Chinese population
in terms of age and income. We show the median age from the 2010 National Census in
Figure A.1 (the red dashed line, 35.2). To improve data quality and avoid respondents’
concerns about personal privacy, we only asked respondents to report their age cohort (e.g.,
18-24, 25-29, 30-34, etc.) and income levels (e.g., below 10,000, 60,001-90,000) instead of
precise numbers. It can still be observed that the average age of the online sample is only
slightly younger than that of the census data. And according to the National Bureau of
Statistics, the median income per capita in 2018 is 24, 336 RMB (36, 413 RMB for urban
residents). Multiplying the number by 3 or 4 (as the approximate size of households) suggests
the median household income is between 75, 000 and 100, 000 RMB, and the distribution in
Figure A.2 is higher compared to that of the national population. It uncovers the fact that
respondents having stable online connections are more concentrated in urban areas and tend
to have higher incomes.
A-1
Variable n Min x̃ Max ￿x s
Panel A: August Wave
Age 2110 1.000 4.000 9.000 4.134 2.142
Male 2110 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.539 0.499
Party Member 2110 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.220 0.414
SOE or Government Employee 2110 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.308 0.462
Family Income (2017) 2087 1.000 6.000 8.000 5.730 1.602
Edu: Bachelor Degree 2110 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.643 0.479
Edu: Master Degree or Above 2110 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.092 0.290
Important US Products 2110 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.176 0.381
US-Led Order & System is Beneficial 2110 1.000 3.000 5.000 2.922 1.110
Territory Hardcore 2110 1.000 5.000 5.000 4.508 0.741
Rather be Chinese Citizen 2110 1.000 5.000 5.000 4.227 0.966
Oppose Challenging Government 2110 1.000 3.000 5.000 2.834 1.151
Oppose Government Censorship 2110 1.000 4.000 5.000 4.069 0.773
Lower Tariff 2110 1.000 3.000 5.000 3.367 0.954
China–US Power Balance 2110 1.000 2.000 5.000 2.175 1.042
Anti-Americanism (PC1) 2110 -4.385 -0.016 3.000 0.000 1.588
Nationalism (PC1) 2110 -6.949 -0.039 3.969 0.000 1.765
Panel B: January Wave
Age 1398 1.000 4.000 9.000 4.075 2.145
Male 1398 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.557 0.497
Party Member 1398 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.191 0.393
SOE or Government Employee 1398 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.304 0.460
Family Income (2018) 1378 1.000 6.000 8.000 5.784 1.535
Edu: Bachelor 1398 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.680 0.467
Edu: Graduate or Above 1398 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.077 0.267
Important US Products 1398 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.190 0.393
US-Led Order & System is Beneficial 1398 1.000 3.000 5.000 2.979 1.061
Territory Hardcore 1398 1.000 5.000 5.000 4.496 0.749
Rather Be Chinese Citizen 1398 1.000 4.000 5.000 4.212 0.948
Oppose Challenging the Government 1398 1.000 3.000 5.000 2.817 1.117
Oppose Government Censorship 1398 1.000 4.000 5.000 4.013 0.786
Lower Tariff 1398 1.000 3.000 5.000 3.406 0.936
China–US Power Balance 1398 1.000 2.000 5.000 2.193 1.043
Anti-Americanism (PC1) 1398 -4.152 -0.149 3.151 0.000 1.562
Nationalism (PC1) 1398 -6.822 0.039 4.196 0.000 1.755
Table A.1: Summary Statistics of the Two Waves
A-2
August Wave (2018) January Wave (2019) p-value
Age 4.14 (2.14) 4.10 (2.13) 0.428
Male 0.54 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.297
Party Member 0.22 (0.42) 0.19 (0.39) 0.037
SOE or Government Employee 0.31 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.799
Household Income 5.73 (1.60) 5.78 (1.54) 0.324
Edu: Bachelor 0.65 (0.48) 0.68 (0.47) 0.025
Edu: Graduate or Above 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.27) 0.112
Important US Products 0.18 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39) 0.297
US-Led Order & System is Beneficial 2.92 (1.11) 2.98 (1.06) 0.123
Territory Hardcore 4.51 (0.74) 4.50 (0.75) 0.651
Rather Be Chinese Citizen 4.23 (0.97) 4.21 (0.95) 0.658
Oppose Challenging Government 2.84 (1.15) 2.82 (1.12) 0.667
Oppose Government Censorship 4.08 (0.77) 4.02 (0.78) 0.037
Lower Tariff 3.37 (0.96) 3.41 (0.94) 0.234
China–US Power Balance 2.17 (1.04) 2.18 (1.04) 0.621
Americans: Peaceful 2.79 (1.06) 2.89 (1.04) 0.003
Americans: Rule of Law 3.02 (1.16) 3.13 (1.17) 0.008
Americans: Words Match Deeds 2.58 (1.06) 2.66 (1.07) 0.041
Americans: Fear China’s Rise 4.11 (0.94) 4.10 (0.95) 0.677
Note: Only respondents that reported their family income are included.
The numbers represent sample mean (sample sd).
Table A.2: Sample Balance Between the Two Waves
Fig. A.1: The Distribution of Age
A-3
Fig. A.2: The Distribution of Family Income Level (Yuan)
In Table A.3, we show the logistic regression on the probability of being revisited in the
January wave, using demographical factors and political attitudes reported in the August
wave as explanatory variables. It shows that elders and urban residents were more likely to be
revisited in January. And we find no evidence that individual political attitudes (collected
in the August wave before any treatments) had any significant impact on the chance of
being revisited. Furthermore, the treatment status in the August wave did not influence the
probability of being revisited.
Compared to face-to-face interviews, a well-known issue with online surveys is the relia-
bility of survey responses under no direct oversight, as respondents have no strong incentives
to give honest answers. We exploit the two-wave data (for the revisited respondents) and
examine data quality by comparing self-reported demographics that should be highly stable
if respondents always give honest answers. Another issue with online surveys is that pro-
fessional survey takers may have multiple accounts and repeatedly fill out the same survey
with random information to maximize their cash returns in minimum time. Based on our
previous experience, we expect that self-reported demographics would be poorly matched if
either issue emerges. As Tables A.4 - A.8 show, over 90% responses are matched on gender,
party membership and types of employment. There are more variations in terms of age
and family income, but the responses are still highly concentrated along the diagonal line.
Although data quality is not perfect, we conclude that the respondents in our sample tended




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.487∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.485∗∗ 0.486∗∗
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Age2 −0.032∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.032∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Male 0.145 0.147 0.147 0.145
(0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094)
Some College 0.137 0.136 0.136 0.136
(0.198) (0.198) (0.199) (0.198)
Bachelor 0.062 0.058 0.058 0.062
(0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
Master or Above −0.277 −0.282 −0.275 −0.280
(0.246) (0.246) (0.246) (0.246)
Regime Insider 0.024 0.025 0.019 0.022
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107)
Party −0.089 −0.086 −0.092 −0.090
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Childhood Residence: Small City −0.058 −0.070 −0.061 −0.058
(0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.147)
Childhood Residence: Metropolitan 0.228 0.214 0.229 0.229
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154)
Current Residence: Small City 1.093∗∗ 1.103∗∗ 1.113∗∗ 1.090∗∗
(0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.398)
Current Residence: Metropolitan 1.237∗∗ 1.246∗∗ 1.252∗∗ 1.228∗∗
(0.405) (0.404) (0.405) (0.405)
Income 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.047
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)




Oppose Challenging Government −0.004 −0.003 −0.005 −0.004
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Oppose Censorship −0.037 −0.043 −0.040 −0.036
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Cheap Talk 0.167
(0.129)




Media Report Only −0.059
(0.112)
Media Report and Protest −0.065
(0.111)
Constant −2.894∗∗ −2.871∗∗ −2.956∗∗ −2.853∗∗
(0.497) (0.497) (0.502) (0.502)
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01




Jan Wave Female 420 9Male 13 570
Table A.4: Responses of Two Waves: Gender
Aug Wave
Non-member Member
Jan Wave Non-Member 758 35Member 57 162
Table A.5: Responses of Two Waves: Party Membership
Aug Wave
Non-SOE/Gov Employee SOE/Gov Employee
Jan Wave Non-SOE/Gov Employee 637 41SOE/Gov Employee 33 301
Table A.6: Responses of Two Waves: SOE or Government Employee
Aug Wave
Jan Wave
18-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60 or Above
18-24 32 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
25-29 1 104 17 5 2 0 0 0 0
30-34 1 8 147 18 4 3 0 0 0
35-39 0 3 12 166 12 3 1 1 0
40-44 0 1 1 3 131 12 0 1 0
45-49 1 0 0 4 2 106 13 0 0
50-54 1 1 2 2 3 3 60 7 0
55-59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 0
60 or Above 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 63
Table A.7: Responses of Two Waves: Age
Aug Wave
Jan Wave
Less than 10,001- 30,001- 60,001- 90,001- 120,001- 200,001- More than
10,000 -30,000 -60,000 -90,000 -120,000 -200,000 -300,000 300,000
Less than 10,000 4 3 0 1 0 1 0 0
10,001-30,000 0 6 3 1 2 5 5 0
30,001-60,000 1 2 21 13 2 2 2 1
60,001-90,000 2 2 7 51 22 6 0 0
90,001-120,000 1 4 2 14 85 53 7 1
120,001-200,000 0 3 2 9 40 219 44 11
200,001-300,000 0 0 0 3 6 41 158 23
More than 300,000 0 0 0 0 0 10 17 87
Table A.8: Responses of Two Waves: Past-year Family Income Level (Yuan)
A-6
A2 Experimental Modules in the Two Waves
In this section, we provide details on the experimental modules of the trade war in the two
waves with the corresponding English translation in italics (including questions and choices).
A2.1 August Wave (2018)
第四部分：中美贸易战的情景分析 Part IV: Vignette Analysis of the China–US Trade War
[Page 1 Background Information for All Respondents]
本模块是调查的最后一部分，共有三个部分：中国政府的舆论导向策略（4 个问题），中
国政府的行动策略（4 个问题），以及可能的谈判结果（4 组 8 个问题）。三个部分出现的
次序是随机的，一共需要 10 分钟完成。
This module is the final part of the survey and contains three parts: The Chinese govern-
ment’s management of the public opinion (4 questions), the Chinese government’s strategy
in response to US demands (3 questions), and hypothetical scenarios of bargaining outcomes




Please note that the questions are based on independent hypothetical information and
represent only one possible choice of policy makers. We hope to understand your true
opinions towardthe US–China trade war.
背景介绍（供您参考的事实）：
目前，中美经贸谈判陷入了僵局。7 月 6 号，中国和美国开始互相对价值 500 亿美元的
进口商品加征 25% 关税。美国政府宣称，如果中国政府不能在美方指控的“不公平贸易”行
为上做出实质性让步，美国政府将进一步对价值 2000 亿美元的中国商品加征额外关税。
Background information for your reference:
Currently, China and the US have entered a stalemate over trade issues. From July 6th,
China and the US simultaneously started to impose a 25% tariff on each other’s imported
goods worthy of 50 billion US dollars. The US government claimed that if China does not
make substantive concessions on the “unfair” trade issue accused by the US, the US would
continue to impose additional tariffs on Chinese goods worthy of 200 US billion dollars.
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E 接来下，我们为您简略概括了中国政府下一步可能采取的一种舆论导向策略。
In the following, we summarize a possible strategy of public opinion management adopted
by the Chinese government in the next step.
[One randomized vignette is displayed here and each sentence takes a line.]
Ev1 中国政府要求主流媒体减少对中美贸易战的报道，淡化中国与美国的对抗和冲突。
同时，为了保持国内社会稳定，中国政府禁止了民众自发组织的抵制美货和反美示威游行。
Ev1 The Chinese government demands that the mainstream media decreases the coverage
of the US–China trade war and plays down the confrontation between China and the US.
Meanwhile, to maintain domestic social stability, the Chinese government prohibits citizens’
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spontaneous boycott of the US goods and anti-US protests.
Ev2 中国政府要求主流媒体增多对中美贸易战的报道，强调中国与美国的对抗和冲突。
同时，为了保持国内社会稳定，中国政府禁止了民众自发组织的抵制美货和反美示威游行。
Ev2 The Chinese government demands that the mainstream media increases the coverage
of the US–China trade war and emphasizes the confrontation between China and the US.
Meanwhile, to maintain domestic social stability, the Chinese government prohibits citizens’




Ev3 The Chinese government demands that the mainstream media increases the coverage
of the US–China trade war and emphasizes the confrontation between China and the US.
Meanwhile, to respond to popular nationalism, the Chinese government gives tacit consent




E1 Based on the government’s management strategy, do you agree with the spontaneous
boycotts of the US goods and other anti-US activities organized by the Chinese citizens?
强烈赞同 (5), 赞同 (4), 既不赞同也不反对 (3), 反对 (2), 强烈反对 (1)
Strongly agree (5), Somewhat agree(4), Neither agree nor disagree (3), Somewhat disagree
(2), Strongly disagree (1)
E2 根据政府的舆论导向策略，您认为未来发生大规模民众抗议和抵制美国产品的可能
性有多大？0 代表完全不可能发生，10 代表一定会有大规模反美运动。
E2 How would you rate the possibility of massive popular protests and consumer boycotts




E3 Based on the government’s management of public opinion, to what extent do you think
China is willing to risk the full-scale economic confrontation against the US, on the scale of
0 to 10? 0 represents China does not want to confront the US at all and 10 represents China
is very willing to take the risk and confront the US.
E4 您对政府的舆论导向策略怎么看？
E4 How would you evaluate the government’s strategy of managing the public opinion?
非常满意 (5), 比较满意 (4), 介于满意与不满意之间 (3), 比较不满意 (2), 非常不满意
(1)
Very satisfied (5), Somewhat satisfied (4), Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied (3), Somewhat






The future direction of the US–China trade war has lots of uncertainties. According to the
latest news, before the final imposition of tariffs on the additional 200 billion USD of Chinese
goods, China and the US may still resolve the dispute through a new round of negotiation.
在此，我们为您简略地概括了一种可能的中美双方互动的过程和结果。请您基于这一信
息，分享您对中方行动策略的看法。
In the following, we summarize a possible scenario of interactions between China and the
US and the eventual outcome. Please share your opinions regarding China’s strategy based
on the information.




Fv1 Before the negotiation, China does not openly respond to US demands. In the
negotiation, China makes concessions to most of US demands. The US is very satisfied with




Fv2 Before the negotiation, China openly claims that most of US demands have exceeded
China’s bottom line and China will not make any concession. In the negotiation, China makes
concessions to most of US demands. The US is very satisfied with China’s concessions and






Fv3 Before the negotiation, China openly claims that most of US demands have exceeded
China’s bottom line and China will not make any concession. In the negotiation, China
rejects all the US demands. The US starts to impose 25% tariffs on the 200-billion in
Chinese products. Incurring domestic economic losses, China eventually makes concessions
to most of US demands. The US is very satisfied with China’s concessions and fully stops





Fv4 Before the negotiation, China openly claims that most of US demands have exceeded
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China’s bottom line and China will not make any concession. In the negotiation, China
rejects all the US demands. The US starts to impose 25% tariffs on the 200-billion in
Chinese products. Incurring domestic economic losses, China eventually stands firm and
refuses to make concessions to any of US demands. The US is very angry with China’s
resistance and continues imposing tariffs on Chinese products.
[Posttreatment Questions]
F1 基于上述中美互动的过程，您认为中国经济会受到怎样的影响？
F1 Based on the above interaction between China and the US, what influence will it have
on the Chinese economy?
非常正面的影响 (5), 比较正面的影响 (4), 介于负面和正面之间的影响 (3), 比较负面的
影响 (2), 非常负面的影响 (1)
Very positive influence (5), Somewhat positive influence (4), Neither positive nor negative
influence (3), Somewhat negative influence (2), Very negative influence (1)
F2 基于上述中美互动的过程，您认为中国政府对外展示的形象是：
F2 Based on the above interaction between China and the US, in your opinion, what image
did the Chinese government present to the foreign observers?
非常强硬 (5), 比较强硬 (4), 介于妥协和强硬之间 (3), 比较妥协 (2), 非常妥协 (1)
Very tough (5), Somewhat tough (4), Neither tough nor compliant (3), Somewhat com-
pliant (2), Very compliant (1)
F3 基于上述中美互动的过程，您认为未来美国进一步在其他议题上（例如：朝核问题、
南海问题）迫使中国让步的可能性有多高？0 表示完全不可能，10 代表非常可能。
F3 Based on the above interaction between China and the US, how likely would the US
force China to make concessions on other issues (e.g., North Korea nuclear weapons and the
South China Sea Dispute) in the future? Choose from 0 (Totally Impossible) to 10 (Highly
Possible).
F4 总的来说，您对上述中国政府的策略怎么看？
F4 Overall, how would you evaluate the government’s strategy described above?
非常满意 (5), 比较满意 (4), 介于满意与不满意之间 (3), 比较不满意 (2), 非常不满意
(1)
Very satisfied (5), Somewhat satisfied (4), Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied (3), Somewhat
unsatisfied (2), Very unsatisfied (1)




Now, let’s talk about the possible changes brought by the US–China trade war. You will be
presented with 4 bundles of policy changes, and each group contains two possible combinations.
Although it is difficult to make direct comparisons between different bundles of policy changes,
please select the more preferred one and rate the two policy changes respectively.
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[Policy combinations are filled with one random value for each attribute.]
[The order of attributes is randomized for each respondent.]
中国对美国商品的税率 Attribute 1 China’s Tariffs on the US Goods
(1) 提高 25% (2) 维持目前税率 (3) 降低 25%
(1) Increase by 25% (2) Status Quo (3) Decrease by 25%
美国对中国商品的税率 Attribute 2 US Tariffs on the Chinese Goods
(1) 提高 25% (2) 维持目前税率 (3) 降低 25%
(1) Increase by 25% (2) Status Quo (3) Decrease by 25%
中国的市场准入限制 Attribute 3 China’s Market Access
(1) 中国不对美国企业设置任何市场准入限制 (2) 中国要求美国企业通过合资和技术转
让以换取市场准入
(1) No restriction (2) China requires US firm to exchange joint ventures and technology
transfer for market access
中国的产业补贴政策 Attribute 4 China’s Industrial Policy of High-tech Industry and
Indigenous Innovation
(1) 中国增大对高科技产业和自主创新的补贴力度 (2) 中国维持现有对高科技产业和自
主创新的补贴力度 (3) 中国减少对高科技产业和自主创新的补贴力度
China (1) increases (2) maintains (3) decreases subsidies to high-tech industries and
self-innovation.
中国的知识产权保护 Attribute 5 China’s Protection of Intellectual Property (IP)
(1) 中国使用国内法律处理知识产权问题 (2) 中国在 WTO 框架下多边协商处理知识产
权问题 (3) 中国与美国建立双边工作机制处理知识产权问题
(1) China addresses IP issues using the domestic laws. (2) China addresses IP issues
using the multilateral WTO framework. (3) China addresses IP issues using the bilateral
framework with the US.
敏感领域 (如金融，高科技产业) 的投资限制 Attribute 6 Investment Restriction in
Sensitive Sectors
(1) 中美双方都不开放投资 (2) 美国单方面对中国投资开放 (3) 中国单方面对美国投资
开放 (4) 中美双方对等开放投资
(1) China and the US both close investment. (2) The US unilaterally opens to China. (3)
China unilaterally opens to US. (4) China and the US adopts reciprocal openness.
中国采购美国的商品与服务 Attribute 7 Purchase of the US products and services
(1) 中国政府不鼓励任何采购 (2) 中国政府鼓励采购农产品和能源 (3) 中国政府鼓励采
购互联网服务（搜索、社交、云计算等）(4) 中国政府鼓励采购高科技产品和专利技术
(1)The Chinese government makes no promotion. (2) The Chinese government promotes
agricultural products and energy. (3) The Chinese government promotes internet service
(e.g., searching, social media, and cloud computing). (4) The Chinese government promotes




M1 Comparatively, which combination of policy changes do you prefer?
M2 请分别评价两个政策。1 颗星代表您完全不希望这一政策得到实施，5 颗星代表您
非常希望这一政策得到实施。
M2 Please rate the two combinations of policy changes respectively from 1 to 5.
A2.2 January Wave (2019)
第四部分：中美贸易战 Part IV: The US–China Trade War
[Page 1 Background Information for All Respondents]
欢迎您来到调查的最后一部分。本部分包含三个小节，共有 18 个问题，内容涉及中美
贸易战。
Welcome to the final part of the survey. The part has three sections and 18 questions on
the US–China trade war.
我们在下面总结了 2018 年 7 月份到现在的关键节点和重大突发事件供您参考：
We summarize the key events since July 2018 for your reference.
美国政府在 7 月 6 日生效的对 500 亿美元中国商品加征 25% 关税的基础上，从 9 月 24
日开始对 2000 亿美元中国商品加征 10% 关税，并计划在 2019 年 1 月 1 日从 10% 提升至
25%。
Building on the 25% tariff on $50 billion of Chinese imports since July 6th, the US
government has imposed an additional 10% tariff on $200 billion of Chinese imports since
September 24th and planned to increase the tariff from 10% to 25% on January 1st, 2019.
中国政府的回击包括：7 月 6 日开始，对 500 亿美元美国商品加征 25% 的关税，以及
9 月 24 日开始对 600 亿美元美国商品加征 5% 或 10% 的关税。
The retaliation of the Chinese government includes the 25% tariff on $50 billion of US
imports from July 6th, and the 5%-10% tariff on $60 billion of US imports from September
24th.
12 月 1 日，习近平主席与特朗普总统在阿根廷 G20 峰会上会面。中美双方同意举行为
期 3 个月的谈判以解决双方分歧。在谈判期间，美国政府同意暂缓原定于 2019 年 1 月 1
日对 2000 亿美元中国商品进一步加征关税（10% 提升至 25%）的行动。
On December 1st, President Xi and President Trump met in the G20 Summit in Argentina.
The two sides agreed to hold a three-month negotiation to resolve the dispute. During the
negotiation, the US government agreed to put the planned tariff hike (the additional tariff on
$200 billion in Chinese imports starting from January 1st) on hold.
1 月 7 日到 9 日，中国与美国结束了新一轮副部长级磋商。
Between January 7th and 9th, China and the US completed another round of vice-





F1 After the multiple rounds of strategic interaction between China and the US, up to
now what influence did the trade war have on China’s economy?
非常正面的影响 (5), 比较正面的影响 (4), 介于负面和正面之间的影响 (3), 比较负面的
影响 (2), 非常负面的影响 (1)
Very positive influence (5), Somewhat positive influence (4), Neither positive nor negative
influence (3), Somewhat negative influence (2), Very negative influence (1)
F2 在中美的多次交锋和博弈之后，您认为中国政府对外展示的形象是：
F2 After the multiple rounds of strategic interaction between China and the US, in your
opinion, what image did the Chinese government present to the foreign observers?
非常强硬 (5), 比较强硬 (4), 介于妥协和强硬之间 (3), 比较妥协 (2), 非常妥协 (1)
Very tough (5), Somewhat tough (4), Neither tough nor compliant (3), Somewhat com-
pliant (2), Very compliant (1)
F4 总的来说，目前为止，您对中国政府的策略怎么看？
F4 How would you evaluate the government’s strategy?
非常满意 (5), 比较满意 (4), 介于满意与不满意之间 (3), 比较不满意 (2), 非常不满意
(1)
Very satisfied (5), Somewhat satisfied (4), Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied (3), Somewhat
unsatisfied (2), Very unsatisfied (1)
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G 目前，中美 90 天的贸易战休战期已经过半。接下来，中国将与美国进行更高层次
的谈判。美国的要求是，中国需要在涉及经济体制的结构性改革上做出让步，最终达成的
协议必须是可核查、可执行的，并有具体的时间表。如果双方不能达成协议，美国将会对
2000 亿美元中国商品进一步加征关税（10% 提升至 25%），并可能采取其他惩罚措施。
Now, more than half of the 90-day truce between China and the US has passed and China
is going to negotiate with the US at higher levels. US demands are that China shall make
concessions on issues related to the structural reform of the economic system, and the final
deal needs to be verifiable and enforceable and has specific time tables. If the two sides failed
to reach the deal, the US will impose additional tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods (from
10% to 25%) and may adopt other punishments.
设想下面一种谈判结果：Suppose a possible scenario of negotiation:
[One randomized vignette is displayed here and each sentence takes a line.]
Gv1 谈判中，中方对美方的大多数要求做出了一定让步。美方对中方的让步表示非常
满意，因此完全停止了对 2000 亿美元中国商品加征关税的行动。
Gv1 In the negotiation, China makes concessions to most of US demands. The US is
very satisfied with China’s concessions and fully stops imposing additional tariffs on $200




Gv2 In the negotiation, China refuses to make concessions to any of US demands. The





Gv3 In the negotiation, China refuses to make concessions to any of US demands. The
US is very angry with China’s resistance and continues imposing tariffs on $200 billion of the
Chinese products. In addition, the US prepares for more tariffs on all the Chinese products
(approximately $500 billion in total).
[Posttreatment Questions]
G1 基于上面的谈判结果，您预计中国经济将会受到怎样的影响？
G1 Based on the above scenario, what influence would it have on the Chinese economy?
非常正面的影响 (5), 比较正面的影响 (4), 介于负面和正面之间的影响 (3), 比较负面的
影响 (2), 非常负面的影响 (1)
Very positive influence (5), Somewhat positive influence (4), Neither positive nor negative
influence (3), Somewhat negative influence (2), Very negative influence (1)
G2 基于上面的谈判结果，您认为中国政府对外展示的形象是？
G2 Based on the above scenario, in your opinion, what image did the Chinese government
present to the foreign observers?
非常强硬 (5), 比较强硬 (4), 介于妥协和强硬之间 (3), 比较妥协 (2), 非常妥协 (1)
Very tough (5), Somewhat tough (4), Neither tough nor compliant (3), Somewhat com-
pliant (2), Very compliant (1)
G3 基于上面的谈判结果，您对中国政府的策略怎么看？
G3 Based on the above scenario, how do you evaluate the government’s strategy?
非常满意 (5), 比较满意 (4), 介于满意与不满意之间 (3), 比较不满意 (2), 非常不满意
(1)
Very satisfied (5), Somewhat satisfied (4), Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied (3), Somewhat
unsatisfied (2), Very unsatisfied (1)
[Page 4 -7, Repeated 4 Tasks of Conjoint Experiment]




In this section, you will evaluate four groups of China’s possible strategies in the next
step, and each group contains two possible combinations. Although it may be difficult to
make direct comparisons, please try your best to compare the two combinations and tell us
your evaluation.
[Policy combinations are filled with one random value for each attribute.]
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[The order of attributes is randomized for each respondent.]
官方声明 Attribute 1 Official Statements
(1) 中国政府不公开发表声明 (2) 中国政府发表声明强调会坚定捍卫中国的核心利益
(1) The Chinese government does not make any public announcement. (2) The Chinese
government makes the public announcement, emphasizing the resolve to defend China’s core
interests.
对国内公众反美情绪的回应 Attribute 2 Response to the Domestic Anti-US Sentiment
(1) 鼓励或默许民众对美国商品的抵制和反美抗议活动 (2) 限制或禁止民众对美国商品
的抵制和反美抗议活动
(1) Encourage or give tacit consent to people’s boycott of US products and anti-American
protests (2) Restrict or ban people’s boycott of US products and anti-American protests
（如果谈判破裂）对美国商品的反制措施 Attribute 3 (If the Negotiation Failed) Counter-
measures against the US Products
(1) 不采取惩罚性措施 (2) 对美国的农产品和能源产品征收高额关税 (3) 对美国的高科
技产品和消费品征收高额关税
(1) No punishment (2) Tariffs on agricultural and energy products (3) Tariffs on high-tech
and consumer products
（如果谈判破裂）对美国在华投资的反制措施 Attribute 4 (If the Negotiation Failed)
Countermeasures against the US Investment in China
(1) 不采取惩罚性措施 (2) 限制美国在华投资高科技产业 (3) 限制美国在华投资服务业
(1) No punishment (2) Restriction on high-tech industry (3) Restriction on service indus-
try
中方承诺的结构性改革 Attribute 5 Structural Reform Commitments
(1) 重申改革开放的总体性目标，不提出具体承诺 (2) 降低对外商在华投资的股权和技
术转让要求并认可美方的监督权利 (3) 减少对国内高科技产业和自主创新的补贴力度并认
可美方的监督权利 (4) 增加金融、互联网等服务产业的开放程度并认可美方的监督权利
(1) Reiterating the objectives of Open and Reform without making specific promises (2)
Cut joint venture and technology transfer requirements on FDI and acknowledge the US
oversight (3) Reduce the subsidies to domestic firms and acknowledge the US oversight (4)




E1 Comparatively, which bargaining strategy above shows a more resolved posture of
China?
E2 您对以上两个假定的谈判策略怎么看？1 颗星代表非常不满意，5 颗星代表非常满
意。 
E2 Please rate the two bargaining strategies respectively from 1 to 5.
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A3 The Balance Table of Treatment Conditions
We present additional balance checks on the randomization of vignette treatments. Overall,
there is no systematic difference between any two treatment groups in either wave. P-values
are calculated using the one-way ANOVA test, and any significant difference between the
two groups is captured by the corresponding p-value (below 0.05/0.01). Standard errors are
reported in the parentheses under the group mean. Section A4 presents details on the PCA
analysis and creation of composite indicators (anti-Americanism and nationalism).
Giving-In-Directly Cheap-Talk Giving-In-After-Tariff Standing-Firm
Variable (N = 522) (N = 526) (N = 521) (N = 526) p-value
Age 4.057 4.152 4.111 4.198 0.746
(2.141) (2.164) (2.146) (2.084)
Male 0.538 0.519 0.553 0.549 0.690
(0.499) (0.500) (0.498) (0.498)
Party Member 0.201 0.221 0.217 0.245 0.386
(0.401) (0.415) (0.413) (0.431)
SOE or Gov Employee 0.284 0.340 0.307 0.302 0.249
(0.451) (0.474) (0.462) (0.460)
Income 5.665 5.799 5.734 5.748 0.604
(1.655) (1.561) (1.573) (1.609)
Edu: Bachelor 0.634 0.671 0.639 0.633 0.526
(0.482) (0.470) (0.481) (0.482)
Edu: Graduate or Above 0.092 0.074 0.100 0.106 0.304
(0.289) (0.262) (0.300) (0.309)
Oppose Challenging Government 2.864 2.865 2.810 2.800 0.704
(1.188) (1.185) (1.087) (1.146)
Oppose Government Censorship 4.046 4.125 4.054 4.049 0.284
(0.782) (0.785) (0.734) (0.791)
China–US Power Balance 2.264 2.186 2.098 2.156 0.074
(1.074) (1.099) (0.981) (1.008)
Important US Products 0.155 0.186 0.182 0.183 0.526
(0.362) (0.390) (0.386) (0.387)
Anti-Americanism 0.019 -0.125 0.043 0.078 0.176
(1.599) (1.548) (1.608) (1.596)
Nationalism 0.023 -0.147 0.040 0.101 0.125
(1.725) (1.724) (1.795) (1.805)
Interests in Political News -0.026 0.036 0.052 -0.031 0.761
(1.553) (1.577) (1.485) (1.625)
Table A.9: Balance Table, August Wave
Giving-In-After-Tariff Standing-Firm Standing-Firm All Tariffed
Variable (N = 465) (N = 464) (N = 469) p-value
Age 4.073 3.942 4.209 0.164
(2.139) (2.103) (2.187)
Male 0.576 0.543 0.552 0.574
(0.495) (0.499) (0.498)
Party Member 0.198 0.198 0.177 0.639
(0.399) (0.399) (0.382)
SOE or Gov Employee 0.316 0.302 0.294 0.762
(0.465) (0.460) (0.456)
Income 5.731 5.786 5.833 0.605
(1.601) (1.509) (1.495)
Edu: Bachelor 0.690 0.677 0.672 0.819
(0.463) (0.468) (0.470)
Edu: Graduate or Above 0.071 0.084 0.077 0.756
(0.257) (0.278) (0.266)
Oppose Challenging Government 2.804 2.787 2.859 0.585
(1.117) (1.084) (1.150)
Oppose Government Censorship 4.011 4.028 4.000 0.860
(0.778) (0.765) (0.816)
China–US Power Balance 2.232 2.239 2.109 0.099
(1.092) (1.025) (1.008)
Important US Products 0.196 0.174 0.200 0.565
(0.397) (0.380) (0.401)
Anti-Americanism -0.120 0.147 -0.027 0.031∗
(1.578) (1.525) (1.573)
Nationalism -0.098 0.151 -0.052 0.071
(1.844) (1.704) (1.709)
Interests in Political News 0.041 -0.099 0.058 0.212
(1.433) (1.568) (1.463)
Table A.10: Balance Table, January Wave
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A4 Composite Indicators of Anti-Americanism and Nationalism
As mentioned in the main text, we use respondents’ latent attitudes toward the US (pre-
treatment) to extrapolate their heterogeneous preferences for the government’s bargaining
strategy in the trade war (posttreatment). In the subgroup analysis, we label those who
showed relatively strong anti-American sentiment as hawks (who would prefer to stand firm
and to resist US demands) and those who showed relatively weak anti-American sentiment
as doves (who would prefer to de-escalate and to cooperate with the US). In this section, we
provide details about the composite indicator.
Upper Graph: August Wave, Lower Graph: January Wave
Fig. A.3: Attitudes toward the US (Ordered by Positive Ratios)
Figure A.3 shows the distribution of respondents’ attitudes toward Americans in the set
of four questions used for the principal component analysis (identical for the August and
January waves). As Figure A.3 suggests, there are some significant variations in responses,
and only in one question (“Americans are fearful of China’s rise”), respondents displayed
overwhelmingly unfavorable views toward Americans (79% negative).
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As mentioned in the main text, we use the principal component analysis (PCA) to extract
a single composite indicator for respondents’ latent attitudes toward the US (i.e., dimension
reduction). Before implementing the PCA, the original data is rescaled and re-centered
such that all variables have zero mean and unit variance. In Table A.11, we present the
main PCA outputs for August and January wave respectively (function prcomp in R). PC
stands for the principal components, and we list three primary PCs represented by their
eigenvectors of loadings respectively. The PCs are in unit normalization and the sum of the
squared loadings is equal to 1 for each column/PC. A larger value (could be either positive
or negative) suggests that the variable contributes more to the corresponding column/PC.
Aug Wave Jan Wave
Variable (Question) PC1 PC2 PC3 PC1 PC2 PC3
Q1 (Americans: Words Match Deeds) -0.533 -0.170 0.829 -0.544 0.143 -0.816
Q2 (Americans: Love Peace) -0.547 -0.268 -0.415 -0.555 0.252 0.297
Q3 (Americans: Abiding by Rules) -0.561 -0.114 -0.376 -0.563 0.091 0.495
Q4 (Americans: Fearful of China’s Rise) 0.320 -0.942 0.014 0.283 0.953 -0.003
PC: Principal component. The original variables are rescaled and centered at 0.

























































Left: August Wave, Right: January Wave
Fig. A.4: Percentage of Variances Explained by PCs
In Figure A.4 (the scree plot), we can observe that the first PC (PC1) is very powerful
and explains about 60% of the total variance, while the second PC (PC2) explains only
20% (PC3 and PC4 explain around 10% respectively). Given the explanatory power of
PC1, we use PC1 to extract a single composite indicator that represents respondents’ la-
tent anti-American sentiment.1 As Table A.11 shows, the direction of loadings of PC1 is
intuitive: Respondents who gave affirmative answers to the favorable impressions of Amer-
icans (Q1-Q3) and negative answers to the unfavorable impressions of Americans (Q4) had
1Another rule of thumb (the Kaiser-Harris Principle) is to keep PCs having eigenvalues greater than 1,
and we again find that only PC1’s eigenvalue is stably greater than 1.
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weaker anti-American sentiment.2. We multiply the loadings of PC1 with the re-centered
and rescaled variables and calculate the corresponding PC scores (the composite indicator)
for each respondent. We further dichotomize the composite indicator (a continuous variable)
by its sample mean and create two subgroups of hawks and doves respectively. One thing to
note is that the classification of hawks and doves is merely based on respondent’s attitudes
relative to the sample mean of the August/January wave respectively.
Upper Graph: August Wave, Lower Graph: January Wave
Fig. A.5: Additional Questions related to Nationalism (Ordered by Positive Ratios)
We also combine anti-Americanist sentiment with other facets of political attitudes to-
ward fee trade, territory, the pride of national identity, and the evaluation of the US-led
international order & system to create a broader indicator of nationalism. The composition
of the indicator manifests the common perception that nationalism has positive (pride in
the national identity, defense of territorial integrity, and protection of domestic market)
2The reverse-coded Q4 suggests that respondents tried to understand all the items and gave replies
consistent with their latent preferences.
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Aug Wave Jan Wave
Variable (Question) PC1 PC2 PC3 PC1 PC2 PC3
Q1 (Americans: Words Match Deeds) -0.435 0.257 0.276 -0.440 0.276 -0.183
Q2 (Americans: Love Peace) -0.459 0.201 0.253 -0.444 0.275 -0.232
Q3 (Americans: Abiding by Rules) -0.477 0.181 0.214 -0.470 0.191 -0.182
Q4 (Americans: Fearful of China’s Rise) 0.304 0.230 -0.005 0.291 0.358 0.028
Q5 (US-Led Intl’ Order & System: Beneficial) -0.273 0.275 -0.459 -0.308 0.205 0.231
Q6 (Lower Tariffs on Imports) 0.287 0.583 0.099 0.280 0.574 0.061
Q7 (Rather Be Chinese) 0.273 0.604 0.062 0.283 0.548 -0.072
Q8 (Territory: Core National Interests) -0.220 0.167 -0.768 -0.223 0.107 0.904
PC: Principal component. The original variables are rescaled and centered at 0.
Table A.12: PCA Analysis: Nationalism
and negative aspects (distrust and antipathy toward outsiders). Figure A.5 shows the dis-
tribution of responses to additional questions. Table A.12 shows the PCA outputs, and
Figure A.6 is the corresponding scree plot. Although the explanatory power of the first PC
is comparatively much lower (around 40%), we still view it as providing the most important
information about the nationalist preference in the single dimension. We plot the composite
indicators of anti-Americanism/nationalism for each respondent in Figure A.7 and find a
strong positive correlation. To test for the robustness of empirical findings, we use the mea-
surement of nationalism in the supplementary part of survey analysis and present additional



































































Left: August Wave, Right: January Wave
Fig. A.6: Percentage of Variances Explained by PCs
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Fig. A.7: Scatter Plots of Individual Nationalism and Anti-Americanism
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A5 Supplementary Analysis of Survey Data
In this section, we provide supplementary information about survey analysis and robustness
checks as follows. First, we show the ATEs on the posttreatment attitudes for subgroups
(hawks vs. doves). Second, we present full regression results on respondents’ approval of the
government conditional on hypothetical bargaining scenarios. Supplementary to the sub-
group analysis, we also add interaction terms between the treatment and individual political
attitudes (e.g., anti-Americanism/nationalism) and re-examine the heterogeneous treatment
effects. Third, we discuss model assumptions of causal mediation analysis and re-estimate
the mediation effects using the conventional Structural Equation Model (SEM). Fourth, we
examine the core identifying assumption of causal mediation analysis, including robustness
to additional controls and sensitivity tests of pretreatment confounders, the independence of
causal mechanisms, and alternative mediation channels. Fifth, we examine the sensitivity of
results to different non-linear functions. Sixth, we replicate the main results using the sub-
group of revisited respondents across the two waves and re-examine the temporal changes
in public attitudes. Seventh, we analyze respondents’ attitudes toward the state’s cheap
talk and control of media reports and nationalist activism during the trade war. Eighth,
we present additional information about respondents’ preferences for bargaining outcomes
in the August wave (2018) using the conjoint experimental design.
A5.1 ATEs on Posttreatment Attitudes (Doves vs. Hawks)
We present the average treatment effects on posttreatment attitudes in Figures A.8 and A.9
for the subgroups of hawks and doves respectively. The error bars represent the 95% and
99% confidence intervals.
In the main text, we test the heterogeneous mediation effects (H4) based on the expec-
tation that hawks (doves) were more (less) supportive of the government’s standing firm.
Consistent with the mediation analysis in Table 2 in the main text, Figures A.8 and A.9
show that relative to hawks, doves were more sensitive to the negative economic impact when
the trade war escalated yet showed lesser concerns about the state’s reputation for resolve
when China backed down. In the January wave, doves valued the reputation for resolve but
recognized the negative economic consequences. Taking into account the two causal mecha-
nisms, we find that doves showed no difference in their approval between the government’s
standing firm (with and without information about additional tariffs on all Chinese goods)
and backing down. The ATEs reaffirm the findings based on the causal mediation analysis
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Hawks (N = 674) and Doves (N = 724)
Fig. A.9: ATE on Posttreatment Attitudes (January Wave)
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A5.2 Full Regression Results on Public Approval of the Government
We present the full regression results of the ATEs on the approval of the government’s
strategy in Tables A.13 and A.14. We use the same baseline group for each set of regressions
(giving-in-directly in the August wave and backing-down-after-tariffs in the January wave).
Column 1 of Tables A.13 and A.14 shows the ATEs (Figures 3 and 4 in the main text).
In Column 2, we add two additional pretreatment variables of political attitudes: How
strongly respondents opposed citizens’ actions challenging the government’s authority, and
how strongly respondents opposed government censorship should major social events hap-
pen.3 Intuitively, respondents who more strongly opposed challenging the authoritarian rule
(pretreatment) tended to express much stronger approval of the government’s strategy in
the trade war (posttreatment) irrespective of their treatment assignment. Including the two
variables does not substantively change the results but improves R2. Furthermore, it does
not change the ACMEs if the two variables are included in the causal mediation analysis
as control variables (also see the discussions in Section A5.4 and Table A.17). As for other
covariates, we find suggestive evidence that female respondents and party members tended
to display a higher degree of approval, and more educated respondents tended to display a
lower degree of approval.
From Column 3 to 6, we add full interaction terms and examine the heterogeneous treat-
ment effect conditional on anti-Americanism, nationalism, and self-perceived importance of
US imports.4 Section A4 presents the creation of composite indicators of anti-Americanism
and nationalism. In Column 3, we use the anti-American sentiment as the moderator and
find that respondents holding strong anti-American sentiment displayed significantly higher
approval if China stood firm. In Column 4, we use the dichotomous indicator of respondents’
self-reported importance of US imports as the moderator. It appears that respondents who
valued the US products more displayed lower approval if China stood firm. In Column 5,
we add the two interaction terms together into the model and have consistent results. Some
coefficients of interaction terms are less significant as a result of multicollinearity (e.g., peo-
ple who distrust the US would also deem US products as unimportant). And in Column
6, we use the alternative measurement of nationalism and still find that more nationalistic
respondents showed stronger support for the government when China stood firm.
3The two statements are framed as follows: “As the government generally turns out to be right about
things, citizens’ criticism or oversight of the government’s policies are not helpful but rather create social
disorder. (政府做出的决定通常是正确的，公民批评或是监督政府的决策是没有帮助的，反而会造成社会混
乱。)” and “When major social events concerning public interests take place, the government should open
the floor to the public discussion instead of repressing all the negative views. (在发生涉及公众利益的重
大社会事件时，政府应该放开民众讨论而非一味压制负面意见。)” Respondents then chose from ”Strongly
agree” to ”Strongly disagree” on the 5-point scale. There are noticeable overlaps between the two questions
as both are related to the individual preference for transparency and government accountability. Adding one
indicator alone in the regression increases the significance of coefficients without changing their direction.
4The question about the self-perceived importance of US products is framed as follows: “Suppose that
due to certain reasons, you cannot purchase US products. What kind of impact would it have on your daily
life? (如果由于某些原因，您不能购买美国企业生产的商品。您认为这会对您的生活产生怎样的影响？)”




Approval of the Government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cheap Talk 0.095 0.097 0.095 0.138∗ 0.128+ 0.128∗
(0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
Giving In After Tariffs −0.144∗ −0.132∗ −0.134∗ −0.083 −0.088 −0.086
(0.065) (0.063) (0.062) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
Standing Firm 0.484∗∗ 0.498∗∗ 0.483∗∗ 0.573∗∗ 0.521∗∗ 0.493∗∗





Important US Products 0.201+ 0.157 0.180
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119)
Cheap Talk X Anti-Americanism 0.050 0.036
(0.040) (0.041)
Giving In After Tariffs X Anti-Americanism 0.037 0.018
(0.042) (0.042)
Standing Firm X Anti-Americanism 0.204∗∗ 0.188∗∗
(0.038) (0.038)
Cheap Talk X Nationalism 0.037
(0.038)
Giving In After Tariffs X Nationalism 0.006
(0.040)
Standing Firm X Nationalism 0.215∗∗
(0.034)
Cheap Talk X Important US Products −0.255 −0.204 −0.198
(0.163) (0.164) (0.164)
Giving In After Tariffs X Important US Products −0.298+ −0.272 −0.286+
(0.163) (0.166) (0.168)
Standing Firm X Important US Products −0.438∗∗ −0.226 −0.125
(0.164) (0.156) (0.151)
Oppose Challenging Government 0.222∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.222∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.217∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Oppose Censorship −0.053+ −0.044 −0.050+ −0.043 −0.038
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Age −0.022 −0.041 −0.045 −0.046 −0.049 −0.047
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Age-sq −0.00004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male −0.165∗∗ −0.120∗∗ −0.119∗∗ −0.120∗∗ −0.122∗∗ −0.124∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Edu: Associate Degree −0.135 −0.093 −0.085 −0.086 −0.080 −0.073
(0.095) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Edu: Bachelor Degree −0.244∗∗ −0.181∗ −0.162+ −0.171+ −0.155+ −0.140
(0.091) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088)
Edu: Master Degree or Above −0.182 −0.109 −0.081 −0.094 −0.071 −0.058
(0.116) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113)
Regime Insider 0.071 0.045 0.052 0.042 0.052 0.053
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
Party Member 0.256∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
Childhood Residence: Small City −0.092 −0.114 −0.112 −0.119+ −0.115+ −0.105
(0.071) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069)
Childhood Residence: Metropolitan −0.003 −0.056 −0.054 −0.058 −0.055 −0.038
(0.074) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
Current Residence: Small City −0.320∗ −0.301∗ −0.299∗ −0.293∗ −0.299∗ −0.323∗
(0.143) (0.140) (0.144) (0.142) (0.145) (0.143)
Current Residence: Metropolitan −0.325∗ −0.292∗ −0.287∗ −0.286∗ −0.289∗ −0.314∗
(0.146) (0.142) (0.145) (0.144) (0.146) (0.145)
Income 0.018 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant 3.820∗∗ 3.285∗∗ 3.238∗∗ 3.216∗∗ 3.204∗∗ 3.202∗∗
(0.216) (0.240) (0.240) (0.242) (0.241) (0.238)
No. Obs 2072 2072 2072 2072 2072 2072
Adj R2 0.083 0.146 0.162 0.148 0.162 0.177
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Provincial dummies are omitted for simplicity.
Table A.13: Treatment Effects on Overall Approval (August Wave)
In the replication files attached to the Online Appendix, we include other pretreatment
variables, e.g., respondents’ attentiveness to political news, perceptions of the US-China
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Outcome variable:
Approval of the Government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standing Firm 0.405∗∗ 0.411∗∗ 0.401∗∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.455∗∗ 0.430∗∗
(0.066) (0.064) (0.063) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
Standing Firm (All Goods Tariffed) 0.364∗∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.365∗∗ 0.418∗∗ 0.387∗∗ 0.366∗∗





Important US Products 0.031 −0.082 −0.074
(0.121) (0.123) (0.124)
Standing Firm X Anti-Americanism 0.223∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.046) (0.047)
Standing Firm (All Goods Tariffed) X Anti-Americanism 0.221∗∗ 0.216∗∗
(0.046) (0.047)
Standing Firm X Nationalism 0.210∗∗
(0.042)
Standing Firm (All Goods Tariffed) X Nationalism 0.251∗∗
(0.041)
Standing Firm X Important US Products −0.513∗∗ −0.293 −0.215
(0.174) (0.178) (0.178)
Standing Firm (All Goods Tariffed) X Important US Products −0.314+ −0.096 0.014
(0.171) (0.168) (0.166)
Oppose Challenging Government 0.201∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.196∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Oppose Censorship −0.080∗ −0.077∗ −0.074∗ −0.071∗ −0.062+
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Age −0.153∗∗ −0.175∗∗ −0.191∗∗ −0.189∗∗ −0.196∗∗ −0.199∗∗
(0.054) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049)
Age-sq 0.014∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male −0.083 −0.048 −0.067 −0.039 −0.058 −0.067
(0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Edu: Associate Degree −0.093 −0.068 −0.103 −0.088 −0.109 −0.113
(0.122) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Edu: Bachelor Degree −0.116 −0.080 −0.060 −0.080 −0.063 −0.052
(0.116) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111)
Edu: Master Degree or Above −0.264+ −0.198 −0.183 −0.201 −0.186 −0.185
(0.150) (0.152) (0.150) (0.151) (0.149) (0.149)
Regime Insider −0.037 −0.039 −0.016 −0.040 −0.021 −0.013
(0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)
Party Member 0.183∗ 0.133+ 0.115+ 0.129+ 0.114+ 0.107
(0.072) (0.071) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068)
Childhood Residence: Small City −0.123 −0.140 −0.121 −0.121 −0.109 −0.100
(0.092) (0.090) (0.089) (0.090) (0.088) (0.087)
Childhood Residence: Metropolitan −0.145+ −0.179∗ −0.187∗ −0.167+ −0.177∗ −0.159+
(0.088) (0.086) (0.084) (0.085) (0.083) (0.082)
Current Residence: Small City 0.277 0.256 0.266 0.282 0.284 0.270
(0.204) (0.197) (0.203) (0.195) (0.202) (0.198)
Current Residence: Metropolitan 0.372+ 0.376+ 0.406∗ 0.405∗ 0.425∗ 0.405∗
(0.203) (0.194) (0.200) (0.192) (0.199) (0.194)
Income 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.017 0.017
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant 3.469∗∗ 3.243∗∗ 3.193∗∗ 3.174∗∗ 3.169∗∗ 3.153∗∗
(0.309) (0.325) (0.327) (0.326) (0.327) (0.324)
No. Obs 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378
Adj R2 0.034 0.090 0.121 0.104 0.127 0.153
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Provincial dummies are omitted for simplicity.
Table A.14: Treatment Effects on Overall Approval (January Wave)
power balance, and types of occupations (some are more vulnerable to US sanctions). Adding
these variables (including interaction terms with the treatment dummies) into regression
models does not substantively change the results displayed in Tables A.13 and A.14.
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A5.3 Non-parametric Assumption, Structural Equation Model, and In-
teractive Effect of Mediators
In the main text, we estimate the ACMEs under the non-parametric framework (Imai, Keele
and Tingley, 2010; Imai, Keele and Yamamoto, 2010). The causal mediation effect is defined
as:
δi(t) = Yi(t,Mi(1)) − Yi(t,Mi(0)) (1)
for t = 0, 1. δi(t) is the change of outcome variable if one changes the mediator from the
value that would be realized under the control condition Mi(0) to the value that would be
observed under the treatment condition Mi(1), while holding the treatment status constant
at t. The parameters we focus on are the average causal mediation effects (ACMEs):
δ(t) = E[δi(t)] = E[Yi(t,Mi(1)) − Yi(t,Mi(0))] (2)
Given the Sequential Ignorability Assumption,5 the distribution function of f(M |t) and
f(Y |M, t) can be identified. One may construct counterfactuals and estimate the ACMEs
(Eq. 2). The non-parametric framework can be extended to a multitude of functional forms.
As the special (and the simplest) case, one may write the potential outcome under the Linear
Structural Equation Model (LSEM) as the following system of linear equations (Ti denotes
the treatment status, and Xi denotes pretreatment covariates):
Yi = α1 + β1Ti + θ1Xi + ϵi1
Mi = α2 + β2Ti + θ2Xi + ϵi2
Yi = α3 + β3Ti + γMi + θ3Xi + ϵi3
(3)
For the LSEM, mean-zero error terms representing the cumulative effects of omitted
variables should satisfy the condition: cov(ϵ2, ϵ3) = 0, i.e., no unobserved variable affects
both M and Y (Bullock, Green and Ha, 2010).6 As proved by Imai, Keele and Yamamoto
(2010), the Sequential Ignorability Assumption enables the identification of the ACME under
the LSEM. With the linearity and no-interaction assumptions implied by the standard LSEM
equations along with sequential ignorability, one may calculate the causal mediation effect
using the conventional LSEM estimator, i.e., the product of coefficients:
δ(t) = E[Yi(t,Mi(1)) − Yi(t,Mi(0))] = β2γ (4)
For comparison, in Table A.15 we replicate the main results (Table 1 in the main text)
with the conventional LSEM estimators using the R package lavaan. The SEM function in
the lavaan package allows the inclusion of multiple mediators in a single model. Same with
the previous mediation analysis, we report the indirect treatment effect transmitted via the
5The assumption has two parts: 1) The treatment assignment is ignorable given observed pretreatment
confounders (usually guaranteed by the randomization of treatments), and 2) The mediator is ignorable
given the treatment and observed pretreatment confounders (a strong assumption that cannot be directly
tested and may not hold in randomized experiments).
6Using the Baron-Kenny procedure, the estimator of β3 is β3 − β2 cov(ϵi2,ϵi3)var(ϵi2) and the estimator of γ is
γ + cov(ϵi2,ϵi3)var(ϵi2) . Both are biased if cov(ϵ2, ϵ3) ̸= 0.
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mediator to the outcome (approval of the government’s strategy) and manually calculate
the proportion being mediated by dividing the indirect effect by the total effect. The same
set of demographic controls in the causal mediation analysis is also included, and we can
observe that the new estimates using the conventional LSEM tools do not substantively
vary from the main results. In the replication document, we include additional controls for
pretreatment political attitudes (e.g., opposing the authoritarian government and censor-
ship, nationalist sentiment, self-perceived importance of US products), which do not make
substantive differences under the LSEM framework (see discussions in Section A5.4).
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter IE PM (%) Parameter IE PM (%) DE
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.088∗∗ 131.3 0 -0.013 -19.9 -0.008
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.016 -10.5 s -0.086∗∗ 56.6 -0.082
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.417∗∗ 88.2 s + f(vCN) -0.070∗∗ -14.8 0.126∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.440∗∗ 70.8 f(vCN) 0.009 1.4 0.171∗∗
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter IE PM (%) Parameter IE PM (%) DE
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.342∗∗ 92.7 f(vCN) -0.191∗∗ -51.8 0.217∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.403∗∗ 98.8 f(vCN) -0.155∗∗ -38.0 0.160∗∗
Note: Huber-White standard errors, + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the indirect effect (IE) and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table A.15: Causal Mediation Analysis, SEM
One advantage of the conventional LSEM is that it allows multiple mediators in the same
outcome equation and we can calculate the Direct Effects (DE) conditional on multiple
causal mechanisms. In Column 7 of Table A.15, we report DEs after including the two
mediators. To recap, Total Effect = DE + IE. The magnitude of DEs is mostly smaller
than or equal to that of IEs through the mediators. The direction of DEs also suggests
that respondents strongly disfavored backing down to standing firm. In the main text, we
discussed possible explanations based on emotional motives rooted in respondents’ instincts:
they held entrenched distrust of the US and impulsively detested backing down under US
coercion. If this explanation is powerful, we should observe respondents’ tendency to oppose
backing down despite possible situational changes. This is exactly what the results in Table
A.15 show: when comparing scenarios between standing firm throughout the bargaining and
giving in after US tariffs, the DEs are between 0.16 and 0.22 and consistently significant
across the August and January waves.
In the main text, we propose that a second reason for large direct effects is the misspec-
ification of the linear model. There are possible interactive effects between respondents’
reputational concerns and economic losses. We present additional tests of the interdepen-
dence of the two mechanisms in Section A5.5, and we argue that it is difficult to imagine
that respondent made some sophisticated higher-order thinking of the interactive effects.
With the SEM, we propose an empirical approach (an example is shown below). In the
outcome equation, we include an additional interaction term between these two mediators.
We define the mediation effect through this interaction term: multiplying the coefficients
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of the treatment effect in the two mediation equations and the coefficient of the interaction
term in the outcome equation. We find that the mediation effects through the interaction
terms are small and insignificant, while the mediation effects of the two main mediators do
not substantively change. We relegate the results to the replication materials and conclude
that the original linear models are highly robust.
A simple example of a two-mediator model with interactive effects using R lavaan:
‘
outcome ∼ b1 * mediator1 + b2 * mediator2 + int1 * mediator1:mediator2 + c * treatment
mediator1 ∼ a1 * treatment
mediator2 ∼ a2 * treatment
indirect1 := a1 * b1
indirect2 := a2 * b2
direct := c
interactive : = int1 * a1 * a2
total := c + (a1 * b1) + (a2 * b2) + int1 * a1 * a2
mediator1 ∼∼ mediator2
’
A5.4 Pretreatment Controls and Sensitivity Analysis for Pretreatment
Confounders
We discuss the sensitivity of results to pretreatment confounders. To facilitate comparisons,
we repeat Table 1 in the main text as Table A.16. To begin with, we re-run the causal
mediation analysis with an additional set of pretreatment variables in the mediation and
outcome equations, including the nationalist sentiment, the self-perceived importance of US
products, and the propensity to challenge the government and to oppose censorship (also
see Tables A.13 and A.14, Section A5.2). The results are in Tables A.17. The inclusion of
additional variables does not substantively change the main results, and the ACMEs and
PMs are highly stable. We also replicate the subgroup analysis in Table A.18 (corresponding
to Table 2 in the main text) with additional control variables and the results are still stable.
This test is valid as there are still heterogeneities within hawks and doves (differentiated
by a dummy indicator of anti-American sentiment) in terms of their pretreatment political
attitudes.
In the replication documents, we include additional pretreatment variables, including
attention to political news, perceptions of the US–China power balance, and types of occu-
pations and find highly robust results.
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August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.095∗∗ 108.0 0 -0.017 -13.4
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.015 -8.9 s -0.133∗∗ 88.5∗
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.441∗∗ 92.9∗∗ s + f(vCN) -0.088∗∗ -18.5∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.470∗∗ 76.0∗∗ f(vCN) 0.014 2.2
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.390∗∗ 106.9∗∗ f(vCN) -0.218∗∗ -59.9∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.484∗∗ 118.7∗∗ f(vCN) -0.197∗∗ -48.4∗∗
Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the ACME and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table A.16: Causal Mediation Analysis, The Whole Sample (Table 1 in the Main Text)
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.094∗∗ 108.0 0 -0.019 -16.1
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.021 -14.7 s -0.119∗∗ 87.4∗
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.419∗∗ 87.6∗∗ s + f(vCN) -0.080∗∗ -16.7∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.448∗∗ 73.1∗∗ f(vCN) 0.013 2.0
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.371∗∗ 106.7∗∗ f(vCN) -0.210∗∗ -59.4∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.458∗∗ 113.9∗∗ f(vCN) -0.185∗∗ -46.5∗∗
Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the ACME and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table A.17: Causal Mediation Analysis, The Whole Sample with Additional Controls
A common critique of observational research is that the selection of control variables can
be arbitrary and cause biases due to other unmeasured pretreatment confounders. As an
alternative approach, we examine the original findings based on the sensitivity test proposed
by Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010). We use the function medsens from the R mediation
package (Tingley et al., 2014). The sensitivity test examines the parameter ρ ≡ corr(ϵi2, ϵi3);
here ϵi2 and ϵi3 represent the residuals of the mediator and the outcome regressions respec-
tively (also see discussions in Section A5.3). If the assumption of sequential ignorability
holds, all related pretreatment confounders are conditioned on, and ρ = 0. If the assump-
tion is violated, then ρ ̸= 0, and the estimated ACME is unreliable. Intuitively, observing
stable ACMEs even if ρ greatly deviates from zero suggests that the results are robust to
serious violations of the sequential ignorability assumption.
The graphs below (from Figure A.10 to Figure A.15) visualize the sensitivity tests corre-
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sponding to each row in Table A.16, with the left plot for the state’s reputation for resolve
(Column 1-3 in Table A.16) and the right plot for economic considerations (Column 4-6 in
Table A.16). The dashed line shows the original ACMEs, the solid curve (different from the
horizontal and vertical lines) shows the estimated function of ACMEs conditional on ρ, and
the shaded area around the solid line represents the confidence intervals (95%).
We first examine the sensitivity tests for the August wave (from Figure A.10 to Figure
A.13). For all the large ACMEs in Table A.16 (significant at 0.05), the sensitivity tests
provide strong supportive evidence for the robustness of results. The absolute values of
ρ under which the estimated function intersects with 0 are considerably large (0.3 − 0.5)
compared to previous studies (Imai and Yamamoto, 2013). The confidence intervals are also















































































































































































































Fig. A.13: Standing Firm - Give In After Tariffs, Aug Wave
We also examine the sensitivity tests for the January wave (Figure A.14 and Figure A.15).
Although the sample size is smaller, we find even more robust results for the ACMEs of eco-
nomic considerations (right) as the estimated function crosses zero when ρ is around 0.5. The
ACMEs of reputational concerns are also highly robust (left). Comparatively, the confidence
intervals of the estimated ACMEs of economic considerations (right) conditional on ρ are
wider when the sensitivity parameter ρ approaches 1 and −1 (indicating perfect correlations),





































































































Fig. A.15: Standing Firm - Giving In After Tariffs, Jan Wave
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Table A.18 replicates Table 2 in the main text with additional controls for pretreatment
political attitudes described above. It is also robust to the sensitivity test for parameter ρ,
and the details are available in the replication documents.
Panel A: The Subgroup of Hawks
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.047 36.2 0 -0.006 -2.1
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.013 2.3 s -0.107∗∗ 70.3
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.535∗∗ 76.1∗∗ s + f(vCN) -0.044∗ -6.0∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.575∗∗ 68.3∗∗ f(vCN) 0.031 3.6
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.587∗∗ 81.7∗∗ f(vCN) -0.136∗∗ -18.6∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.742∗∗ 101.8∗∗ f(vCN) -0.113∗∗ -15.4∗∗
Panel B: The Subgroup of Doves
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.093∗∗ 79.1 0 -0.028 2.0
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.015 -7.1 s -0.145∗∗ 86.2∗
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.279∗∗ 110.7∗∗ s + f(vCN) -0.127∗∗ -49.5∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.307∗∗ 79.5∗∗ f(vCN) -0.003 -0.9
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.185∗∗ 163.5 f(vCN) -0.262∗∗ -209.9
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.213∗∗ 164.8 f(vCN) -0.228∗∗ -171.1
Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the ACME and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table A.18: Causal Mediation Analysis, Hawks vs. Doves with Additional Controls
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A5.5 Testing the Assumption of Independent Causal Mechanisms
One issue with the identification of causal mechanisms is that we assume the two medi-
ators (reputation for resolve and economic impacts) as independent. Readers may worry
about the validity of the assumption, as the costly signaling theory suggests that the two
processes are strongly intercorrelated: People update their belief of resolve based on others’
costly actions. However, even though at the group level the two mechanisms walk in tandem
(individuals increase their perceptions of economic costs while updating the belief of the
state actors’ resolve), at the individual level, perceptional changes may not be positively
correlated and not invalidate the assumption of independence.7 We have shown that doves
were more sensitive to economic losses and that hawks were more sensitive to reputational
losses (Section A5.1; also see the mediation analysis in the main text). One needs to deter-
mine whether the correlation between mediators is due to the treatment (not a violation) or
inherent interdependence between mediators (a violation).
We propose a testable assumption of independent causal mechanisms at the individual
level: Ei,t1 − Ei,t0 ⊥ Ri,t1 − Ri,t0. Here Ei,t0 and Ri,t0 denote respondents’ pretreatment per-
ceptions of the “current state” of the trade war, while Ei,t1 and Ri,t1 denote respondents’ new
assessments based on their updated belief after receiving different treatments of hypothetical
bargaining outcomes. To empirically test the assumption, in the January wave, we asked
respondents to answer pretreatment questions of economic impacts, China’s reputation for
resolve, and evaluation of the government’s strategy immediately before reading hypothet-
ical vignettes of bargaining outcomes (after a brief introduction of the actual situation in
January 2019; see Section A2). With balance tests similar to Table A.10, we reaffirm the
balance of pretreatment perceptions across three treatment groups in the January wave.8
And by taking differences, we find no relationship between Ei,t1 −Ei,t0 and Ri,t1 −Ri,t0: The
Pearson Coefficient is −0.03. It suggests that the changes in respondents’ perceptions of the
reputation for resolve and the economic consequences have no correlation at the individual
level, although aggregately the two mediators are positively associated due to the treatment.
Furthermore, we use the statistical method suggested by Imai and Yamamoto (2013) to
examine the sensitivity of results with supposedly dependent mechanisms (function mul-
timed in R mediate package). The method is used when posttreatment mediator-outcome
confounders (i.e., alternative mediators causally preceding the mediator of interest) exist in
the hypothesized causal mechanisms. The function estimates the ACMEs (indirect effects)
and the average direct effects under the homogeneous interaction assumption based on a
varying coefficient linear structural equation model. Again, we find that the main results
presented in the main text are not very sensitive to correlated causal mechanisms. We also
run sensitivity tests that relax the assumption of homogeneous interaction. The details are
included in the replication documents.
7Reversely, if at the individual level mediation channels are correlated, we should also observe correlated
changes at the group level.
8Cautious readers may find that the balance of pretreatment perceptions also ensures that the revisited
respondents in the January wave showed no significant differences because of their earlier exposure to different
vignettes in the August wave. Notwithstanding the evidence, we emphasize that information contamination
across the two waves would be hard to imagine given the 5-month interval.
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A5.6 Testing Additional Mediation Channels: Future US Coercion
The identification of causal mechanisms can be difficult as numerous mediation paths may
link the treatment and the outcome (Bullock, Green and Ha, 2010; Imai and Yamamoto,
2013). We theorize the state’s reputation for resolve and economic consequences as two
main channels and find that the mediation effects are generally large and significant. To
reiterate, alternative mediators do not cause biased estimates of the ACMEs as long as
they are independent of the two main mechanisms, whose importance is supported by large
ACMEs and PMs. In this section, we present additional tests on one mediator that may be
correlated with the reputation for resolve: the likelihood of future US coercion.
In the August wave, we asked one question about respondents’ calculation of the long-term
consequences of China’s backing down: “Based on the above interactions between China and
the US, how likely in your opinion would the US force China to make concessions on other
issues (e.g., the North Korea nuclear issue and the South China Sea Dispute) in the future?”
(Question F3 in Section A2.1) Respondents reported their self-perceived likelihood of future
US coercion from 0 to 10. This question focuses on the likelihood of future US coercion,
not the likelihood of China’s concessions. To construct the full causal path, we expect that
people generally detest external coercion (the mediator), and a decrease in the expectations
of future US coercion should have a positive effect on citizens’ approval of the government
(the outcome). Here we discuss how China’s bargaining strategies (the treatment) may
influence people’s assessments of future coercion.
The long-term consequence of backing down is related to the state’s reputation for resolve.
Reputation, as general beliefs or opinions held by others, is usually dependent on observers’
assessments of a series of past actions and does not vanish over time (Dafoe, Renshon and
Huth, 2014; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015). In addition, building the reputation for tough-
ness can prevent future coercion (Sechser, 2018; Tingley and Walter, 2011). Therefore, if
China failed to stand firm in the trade war, the damage on its reputation for resolve would
possibly embolden the US to forcibly extract more concessions from China in issues unre-
lated to the trade dispute. Foreseeing future US coercion, respondents may decrease their
approval of the government’s strategy if it conceded to the US in the trade war.
While acknowledging the importance of reputational motives, we propose two alternative
channels that may also shape people’s assessments of future US coercion. One extrapolation
from the commercial peace thesis (Gartzke, 2007) is that if China capitulated to the US in
the trade war, respondents would predict increasing economic cooperation between the US
and China, making future US coercion less frequent. A reverse extrapolation is that if China
stood firm in the trade war, China’s economic power would decline, and the US would adopt
a containment strategy to keep up the pressure on China by making more coercive demands.
To summarize, we may come up with mixed expectations for the treatment effect on this
mediator as well as the overall direction of mediation effects.
We report the overall distribution of the self-reported likelihood of future US coercion in
Figure A.16 and the ATEs on the mediator in Figure A.17 (the giving-in-directly group as
the reference group). Overall, Figure A.16 shows that respondents were not very optimistic
and had strong expectations of future US coercion, with the mean at 6.25 (on the scale
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Fig. A.16: The Histogram of the Self-reported Likelihood
presented in the main text, indicating some limited effects of backing down in the trade war
on respondents’ predictions of future US coercion.9 Although the direction of coefficients is
expected (standing firm results in less future coercion), we only find significant differences
between the giving-in-after-tariffs and standing-firm groups (p < 0.05). And citizens exposed
to the information about China’s standing firm throughout the bargaining reported the
lowest likelihood of future US coercion (−0.286 compared to the giving-in-directly group,
p < 0.09).
August Wave (2018)
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs
(1) (2)
Mediator ACME PM (%)
Reputation for Resolve (r − αs) 0.470∗∗ 76.0∗∗
Economic Losses (f(vCN)) 0.014 2.2
Future US Coercion 0.027∗ 4.2∗
Note: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.19: Comparison of Mechanisms Explaining Difference in Public Approval
We calculate the ACMEs for the two groups of respondents that showed a significant dif-
ference in the mediator (the giving-in-after-tariffs and standing-firm groups). In Table A.19,
we make comparisons with the ACMEs of the two main mediators. The ACME (0.027, Col-
9In addition to the mixed predictions regarding the direction of treatment effects, one possibility is that












Fig. A.17: ATEs on Individual Perceptions of Future US Coercion (Aug Wave)
umn 1, Row 3) suggests that the decrease in respondents’ perceptions of future US coercion
only slightly boosted their approval of the government’s standing firm although the p-value
(around 0.02) suggests a highly significant mediation effect. This ACME is likely to be bi-
ased, since respondents’ predictions of future US coercion were likely to be correlated with
their reputational concerns and calculations of China’s economic status. Despite possible
biases, one may still capture the large gap between the ACME of reputational concerns and
that of future US coercion. To summarize, this third mediator (future US coercion) does not
have strong explanatory power.
Like other observational studies, it is a difficult balance to strike between taking into
account as many plausible causal mechanisms as possible and making the theory simple yet
powerful. Among all the competing hypotheses, mediators that have stronger explanatory
power and are correlated with the two main mediators in this paper pose the most serious
challenge to the robustness of ACMEs. However, the above tests of a plausible mediator
suggest that the main findings are highly robust.
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A5.7 Replicated Results with Non-linear Models
In this section, we examine the robustness of the main results under two alternative functional
forms. First, we convert the outcome variable into a dummy indicator (= 1 if strongly
satisfied or satisfied with the government’s strategy, = 0 otherwise) and use the logistic
model for the outcome equation. Second, we use the ordered response model for the mediator
equation (the ordered response model is not used for the outcome equation due to difficult
interpretations). As Tables A.20 and A.21 show, the ACMEs are highly stable in terms of
the proportion mediated (Column 3 and 6). Including additional controls for pretreatment
political attitudes does not substantively change the results (also see Section A5.4).
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy (Dummy) Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.039∗∗ 97.9 0 -0.006 -8.3
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.005 -6.8 s -0.051∗∗ 82.2∗
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.175∗∗ 94.1∗∗ s + f(vCN) -0.033∗∗ -17.2∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.184∗∗ 75.4∗∗ f(vCN) 0.004 1.7
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy (Dummy) Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.158∗∗ 137.6∗∗ f(vCN) -0.081∗∗ -65.6∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.189∗∗ 124.1∗∗ f(vCN) -0.072∗∗ -44.9∗∗
Note: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the ACME and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table A.20: Causal Mediation Analysis, Binary (Outcome Equation)
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.097∗∗ 112.9 0 -0.014 -7.4
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs 0.007 -3.6 s -0.138∗∗ 95.0∗
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.438∗∗ 92.4∗∗ s + f(vCN) -0.082∗∗ -16.6∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.461∗∗ 74.6∗∗ f(vCN) 0.019 3.0
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.388∗∗ 107.6∗∗ f(vCN) -0.220∗∗ -63.1∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.464∗∗ 116.8∗∗ f(vCN) -0.202∗∗ -54.4∗∗
Note: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the ACME and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table A.21: Causal Mediation Analysis, Ordered Response (Mediation Equation)
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A5.8 Replicated Results with the Subsample of Revisited Respondents
As additional robustness checks for the temporal dynamics of public attitudes (H3), we repli-
cate the main results using the subsample of revisited respondents across the two waves in
Table A.22. As aforementioned (Section A1), respondents’ political attitudes reported in the
August wave did not significantly change their probability of being revisited in January. All
other model specifications are identical, and we report the same set of parameters/ACMEs.
Comparing Table A.22 to Table 1 in the main text, we find that the estimations of ACMEs
are generally stable after limiting the pool of observations to the revisited respondents only
(N = 1, 012). Respondents’ reputational concerns about resolve (r and r−αs) were similarly
strong. Respondents assessments of the economic consequences caused by continuing the
costly trade war (parameter f(vCN)) also became much more pessimistic in the January
wave, reducing their approval of the government’s standing firm relative to backing down.
The parameter of audience costs (parameter α) in the August wave is not very robust (0.076
and insignificant, Column 2) though the PM is still considerably large (66.5%, Column
3). Including additional controls for pretreatment political attitudes does not substantively
change the results (also see Section A5.4).
August Wave (2018)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Cheap Talk − Giving In Directly α 0.076 66.5 0 0.013 16.6
Giving In After Tariffs − Giving In Directly αs -0.040 26.0 s -0.105∗∗ 58.8+
Standing Firm − Giving In Directly r 0.428∗∗ 83.4∗∗ s + f(vCN) -0.077∗∗ -14.8∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.500∗∗ 71.4∗∗ f(vCN) 0.014 2.0
January Wave (2019)
Reputation for Resolve Economic Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Approval of Government Strategy Parameter ACME PM (%) Parameter ACME PM (%)
Standing Firm (All Tariffed) − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.405∗∗ 116.8∗∗ f(vCN) -0.211∗∗ -59.4∗∗
Standing Firm − Giving In After Tariffs r − αs 0.474∗∗ 115.3∗∗ f(vCN) -0.229∗∗ -55.2∗∗
Note: + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The negative sign in PM (%) indicates the ACME and the total effect have opposite directions.
Table A.22: Causal Mediation Analysis, Revisited Respondents Only
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A5.9 The Face Value of Public Statements (January Wave)
Our main results indicate the innocuous role of unfulfilled public commitments, which con-
tradicts the audience cost theory. Compared to backing down directly, making cheap talk
before backing down did not result in an additional decline in public approval (Figure 3).
They are in sharp contrast to previous findings based on the US public (Tomz, 2007; Levy
et al., 2015). We offer two tentative explanations for this discrepancy.
First, one may question if the audience cost theory can be tested with the real-world
settings of the survey experiment. The Chinese government had publicly refused to make
concessions under US coercion in March 2018 before any tariffs were imposed. Thus whether
or not respondents were explicitly primed with the government’s public commitments in the
survey experiment, they would have obtained related information from the official media
and hence punished the government for inconsistency in all the backing-down scenarios.
Therefore, the reputation parameter r could fully absorb the audience cost parameters α
and αs.10 However, this explanation is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, in the August
wave, respondents held significantly stronger perceptions of the state’s reputation for resolve
after being primed with the government’s unfulfilled commitments (Column 2, Figure 3).
Second, comparing the results across the two waves, the estimation of parameter r − αs is
largely stable, which still contradicts the prediction of the audience cost theory. Citizens
were constantly “treated” by the government’s commitments as the trade war escalated, but
they did not punish the government more for backing down at the latter stages of the trade
war.
The second explanation is that Chinese citizens update their beliefs of the state’s resolve
based on the face value of the government’s public commitments; they are much less sensitive
to inconsistencies between words and deeds than their counterparts in democracies. In
authoritarian countries, the state’s public statements may serve as cognitive shortcuts for
citizens, even though they constitute mere cheap talk. Existing literature shows that Chinese
citizens display strong trust in the central government despite possible social desirability
biases and misrepresentations of true preferences (Chen, 2017; Li, 2016; Tang, 2016). It also
suggests that under authoritarian contexts, there is a hard balance between the extent to
which citizens can be fooled and the extent to which citizens make deliberate reasoning of
complicated political events such as the US–China trade war.
We uncover supportive evidence for the second explanation using a conjoint experiment
embedded in the January wave (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Respondents
were asked to compare two hypothetical profiles of China’s behavior in the renegotiation stage
and to assess the relative degrees of China’s resolve. Each respondent completed four tasks
with randomized profile attributes. The main attribute of interests is whether the Chinese
government openly reiterated to defend the core national interests. As opposed to what
the government said, other attributes described what the government did or planned to do:
mobilization of popular nationalism, costly countermeasures to be taken if the renegotiation
failed, and concessions to the US regarding China’s structural economic reforms.
Figure A.18 displays the main results (average marginal component effects with 95%
10The alternative is to devise completely hypothetical vignettes in which respondents would not be influ-
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Fig. A.18: A Conjoint Experiment on the Effect of Words and Deeds
confidence intervals). Consistent with the second explanation, the government’s hardline
statements had a large and significant effect on respondents’ perceptions of the state’s re-
solve, and the magnitude is comparable to that of costly countermeasures (tariffs and invest-
ment sanctions). Proposing specific commitments to implement structural reforms under US
oversight decreased respondents’ perceptions of the state’s resolve. The state-led nationalism
increased respondents’ perceptions of the state’s resolve, although the effect is comparatively
smaller.
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A5.10 Citizens’ Response to the State’s Manipulation of Media Coverage
and Nationalist Collective Actions (August Wave)
Scholars have been interested in how the Chinese government manipulates popular national-
ism and tailors public discourse to its needs by controlling the media coverage of international
conflicts (Shirk, 2011; Weiss, 2014). In this section, we show that the state’s manipulation
of media coverage on the US-China trade war could influence citizens’ evaluations of nation-
alist collective actions, shape citizens’ perceptions of the state’s resolve, and change citizens’
approval of the government.
In the August wave, we embedded an experimental module in which respondents were
randomly assigned to one of three vignettes on how the government influenced public opinion
with different public campaign strategies (details in Section A2.1). The three vignettes are:
The government dialed down media coverage on the US–China confrontation and banned
nationalist protests and boycotts (the baseline); the government ramped up media coverage
on the confrontation but banned nationalist protests and boycotts; the government ramped
up media coverage on the confrontation and permitted nationalist protests and boycotts.11
Posttreatment questions include respondents’ support for and their self-perceived likelihood
of nationalist collective actions, perceptions of the state’s resolve to confront the US, and
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Fig. A.19: Manipulated Media Coverage as the Signal of Resolve
11Anecdotal evidence shows that the reporting of commercial media on sensitive international affairs has
been carefully handled by the propaganda department’s instructions (Shirk, 2011). Specifically for the US–
China trade war, we might have witnessed the baseline scenario after Trump made the threats of additional
tariffs on all the Chinese products (May 5th, 2019) yet major Chinese media outlets remained silent while
waiting for the state’s instructions, despite drastic market reactions (the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite
Index dropped by more than 5% in one day). In our design, we excluded the unlikely scenario in which the
government dialed down the confrontation but allowed nationalist protests and boycotts.
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As Figure A.19 shows, respondents gave significantly more positive responses toward
nationalist collective actions conditional on the government’s explicit consent (Column 1
and 2). Respondents also reported significantly stronger perceptions of the state’s resolve
given the state-sponsored media coverage on the US–China confrontation (0.455, p < 0.01,
Column 3), and the government’s consent of nationalist collective actions had a positive
but insignificant additive effect (0.161, p < 0.22, Column 3). The state-sponsored media
coverage on the confrontation significantly increased respondents’ approval of the government
compared to the baseline group, but the government’s consent of nationalist collective actions
did not make any difference (Column 4).
We interpret the state-controlled media coverage on the US–China confrontation as one
special type of public commitments, as the government was possibly mobilizing popular
nationalism by highlighting US threats. We argue that the government’s public commitments
can have face value (even though they are no more than cheap talk in hindsight) as they
possibly serve as cognitive shortcuts for citizens to understand foreign policy and to assess the
state’s intentions (Section A5.9). Consistent with this argument, the results above show that
respondents took information about the state-controlled media coverage on the US–China
confrontation as the signals of the state’s resolve.
Figure A.20 shows the ATEs conditional on respondents’ pretreatment political attitudes
(doves vs. hawks). The baseline group (dialing down media coverage and banning nationalist
collective actions) is unchanged. In Columns 1 and 2, if the state only increased media cov-
erage on the US–China confrontation, neither hawks nor doves significantly increased their
support for nationalist collective actions or believed they were more likely to happen. But
if the state gave consent to nationalist collective actions, hawks significantly increased their
support and believed these actions were more likely to happen, while doves only changed
their assessments of the likelihood (the ATEs are positive and significant at 0.05). In Col-
umn 3, we find that increasing media coverage on the US–China confrontation had a positive
effect on respondents’ perceptions of the state’s resolve for hawks and doves alike (the ATE
is marginally significant at 0.1 for doves). The government’s consent of nationalist collec-
tive actions had an additive effect on hawks’ perceptions of the state’s resolve (the ATE
is marginally significant at 0.1). And in Column 4, we find that only hawks displayed a
higher approval of the government if it sponsored more media coverage on the US–China
confrontation, and the government’s consent of nationalist collective actions did not make
any difference.
In Table A.23, we present the full regression results on the overall approval of the govern-
ment’s strategy with different interaction terms between the treatment vignette and political
attitudes (anti-Americanism, attitudes toward US products, and nationalism). While the
treatment effects are nearly identical (Media Coverage Only vs. Media Coverage & National-
ist Activities), consistent with Figure A.20, respondents holding strong anti-Americanism or
nationalism displayed a higher approval of the government when the government increased
media coverage on the US-China confrontation. The results suggest that while hawks and
doves similarly viewed the state-sponsored media coverage on the US–China confrontation as
the signal showing the state’s resolve, their reactions to the government’s campaign strategy
diverged based on their preferences: Doves preferred the government to lower its posture
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Hawks (N = 1025) and Doves (N = 1085)
Fig. A.20: ATEs on Posttreatment Attitudes, August Wave
(Manipulated Media Coverage as the Signal of Resolve)
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Outcome variable:
Approval of the Government’s Public Campaign Strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Media Coverage Only 0.108∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Media Coverage & Nationalist Activities 0.104∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.116∗∗





Important US Products −0.204∗∗ −0.201∗∗ −0.146
(0.098) (0.098) (0.099)
Media Coverage Only X Anti-Americanism 0.073∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.032) (0.033)
Media Coverage & Nationalist Activities X Anti-Americanism 0.146∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032)
Media Coverage Only X Nationalism 0.075∗∗
(0.030)
Media Coverage & Nationalist Activities X Nationalism 0.132∗∗∗
(0.030)
Media Coverage Only X Important US Products −0.057 0.019 0.030
(0.141) (0.141) (0.139)
Media Coverage & Nationalist Activities X Important US Products −0.191 −0.006 0.027
(0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
Oppose Challenging Government 0.243∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Oppose Censorship −0.060∗∗ −0.044∗ −0.041 −0.034 −0.025
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Age −0.039 −0.061 −0.069∗ −0.064∗ −0.069∗ −0.057
(0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Age-sq 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male −0.088∗∗ −0.037 −0.066∗ −0.029 −0.058 −0.062∗
(0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Edu: Associate Degree −0.160∗ −0.112 −0.110 −0.131 −0.121 −0.108
(0.086) (0.082) (0.082) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082)
Edu: Bachelor Degree −0.253∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗ −0.151∗ −0.179∗∗ −0.151∗ −0.133∗
(0.082) (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.079)
Edu: Master Degree or Above −0.216∗∗ −0.132 −0.090 −0.129 −0.090 −0.077
(0.108) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.104)
Regime Insider 0.102∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.061 0.084∗ 0.082∗
(0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Party Member 0.143∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.100∗∗
(0.052) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
Childhood Residence: Small City −0.104 −0.127∗∗ −0.098 −0.120∗∗ −0.098 −0.070
(0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)
Childhood Residence: Metropolitan −0.007 −0.066 −0.022 −0.056 −0.019 0.010
(0.066) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063)
Current Residence: Small City 0.018 0.028 −0.016 0.005 −0.023 −0.054
(0.126) (0.129) (0.119) (0.128) (0.120) (0.116)
Current Residence: Metropolitan −0.002 0.025 −0.018 0.006 −0.025 −0.055
(0.128) (0.131) (0.121) (0.130) (0.121) (0.117)
Income 0.034∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 3.640∗∗∗ 3.091∗∗∗ 3.058∗∗∗ 3.042∗∗∗ 3.044∗∗∗ 2.999∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.232) (0.224) (0.231) (0.225) (0.218)
No. Obs 2071 2071 2071 2071 2071 2071
Adj R2 0.015 0.113 0.148 0.128 0.153 0.177
Note: +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Provincial dummies are omitted for simplicity.
Table A.23: Treatment Effects on Approval of the Government, August Wave
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A5.11 A Conjoint Analysis of Citizens’ Preferences (August Wave)
In the August wave, we embedded a conjoint experiment and asked respondents to evaluate
randomized bundles of hypothetical policy changes (details in Section A2.1). The experiment
covers many politicized issues, including tariffs, China’s market entry, state subsidies and
IP protection, investment restrictions, and China’s promised imports from the US. Our goal
is to understand respondents’ preferences for policy substance and to assess the quality of
















   China encourages purchasing high tech products, patents and technology
   China encourages purchasing internet services
   China encourages purchasing agricultrual and energy products
   (Baseline = No official encouragement)
China Purchase from US:
   China and US close to each other
   China and US open to each other reciprocally
   US opens to China unilaterally
   (Baseline = China opens to US unilaterally)
Investment Restriction in Sensitive Areas:
   US−China bilateral framework
   Multilateral framework under WTO
   (Baseline = Domestic law)
China IP Protection:
   Maintain subsidies
   Increase subsidies
   (Baseline = Decrease subsidies)
China Subsidies to High Tech Industries:
   Require joint venture/technology transfer
   (Baseline = No restriction)
China Market Entry:
   US Decrease 25%
   US No change
   (Baseline = US Increase 25%)
US Tariff:
   CN Decrease 25%
   CN No Change
   (Baseline = CN Increase 25%)
China Tariff:
−0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Change in probability of preferring proposal
Fig. A.21: Public Approval of Hypothetical Policy Changes (Aug Wave)
We implemented the conjoint design with all the attributes randomized, and each re-
spondent was assigned to 4 tasks. Figure A.21 presents the main results (95% CI). Most
coefficients are intuitive. Respondents were most sensitive to US tariffs on China and reacted
most positively to the US decreasing tariffs by 25%.12 Respondents also reacted negatively
to China’s decreasing tariffs by 25%, but the coefficient is comparatively smaller. Compared
to the small positive effect of “US opens to China unilaterally,” respondents showed stronger
preferences toward the reciprocal openness of investment between China and the US (“对
等开放投资” in Chinese) in sensitive areas. We conclude that respondents (who we expect
to represent the average internet users) were not extremely nationalistic and did not want
to exploit every opportunity to maximize China’s gains. Instead, they still cared about
cooperation based on the principles of fairness and reciprocity. And respondents generally
12The number was chosen as the first tranche of US tariffs on $50 billion Chinese products was 25%.
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welcomed more China’s purchase of US products, with a slightly stronger preference for pur-
chasing high-tech products, patents, and technology (heavily restricted by US government)
over agricultural products and energy (encouraged by US government and generally regarded
























China encourages purchasing agricultrual and energy products
China encourages purchasing internet services
China encourages purchasing high tech products, patents and technology
(China Purchase from US)
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China and US close to each other
(Investment Restriction in Sensitive Areas)
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Fig. A.22: Subgroup Preferences (Aug Wave)
We present the subgroup analysis in Figure A.22 using the method introduced by Leeper,
Hobolt and Tilley (2020). Respondents were still separated into doves and hawks based on
their relative degree of anti-American sentiment. The results indicate considerable overlaps of
political preferences between doves and hawks. Some significant differences include: Hawks
more strongly favored China’s increasing tariffs and disfavored China’s decreasing tariffs;
hawks more strongly favored market entry restrictions over no market entry restrictions;
hawks more strongly disfavored China’s unilaterally opening to the US investment in sensitive
areas.
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A6 Supplementary Results of Text Analysis
In this section, we provide supplementary results of text analysis in three parts. First, we
present additional results on the temporal distribution of political topics on Weibo by month
and the clusters of keywords under each topic. Second, we make comparisons between Zhihu
(another major social media platform in China) and Weibo. Third, we present additional text
analysis of government statements (Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s remarks) and official
media commentaries (Global Times editorials). We also discuss how these state-controlled
outlets differ from commercial social media platforms and conclude that social media data
has its unique value in understanding Chinese public opinion.
A6.1 The Weibo Corpus
Figure A.24 shows the dynamic changes in topic proportions between the four main bargain-
ing stages with all the 10 topics; only T3, T7, T8, T9 and T10 are reported in the main text,
since they are more closely related to the theoretical arguments. Figure A.25 shows the tem-
poral changes in topic proportions by month and the baseline group is January-March (most
observations are concentrated in March; see Figure 2 in the main text). Figure A.23 shows
the monthly changes in the proportions of negotiation and compromise (T9) and resolve and
non-compromise (T10). Table A.24 shows the top words that define each topic.
Consistent with Figure 5 in the main text, we observe an upward trend of social media
content related to the Chinese economy (T3) and high-tech and private firms (T8) after June
relative to the baseline. The topic of US allies (T5) suggests that Chinese internet users held
a global view when discussing the US–China trade war; the proportion of this topic was
relatively stable over time. For the dovish topic of negotiation and compromise (T9) and
the hawkish topic of resolve and non-compromise (T10), the gap was still the largest in May,


































● Negotiation and Compromise
Resolve and Non−compromise
Dynamic Change of Hawkish vs. Dovish Rhetoric
Fig. A.23: Changes in Hawkish vs. Dovish Rhetoric
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Measurement Type Top Words
T1 US Products
High Prob 企业, 大豆, 出口, 公司, 进口, 影响, 市场, 行业, 国内, 生产, 汽车, 价格, 产品, 苹果, 制造业, 手机, 增加, 芯片, 成本, 减少, 最大, 农业, 需
求, 制造, 石油, 农产品, 全球, 国家, 工业, 产业
FREX 生产, 工厂, 粮食, 转基因, 万吨, 公司, 苹果, 订单, 采购, 业务, 万亿元, 玉米, 供应链, 高通, 宝马, 供应商, 涨价, 买家, 厂商, 销售, 销量, 巨
头, 出售, 零部件, 福特, 替代, 美豆, 供应, 巴西, 禁令
Score 大豆, 进口, 公司, 出口, 企业, 生产, 苹果, 价格, 万吨, 芯片, 行业, 工厂, 汽车, 产品, 同属, 粮食, 转基因, 农产品, 需求, 巴西, 豆粕, 万亿
元, 销售, 石油, 涨价, 国产, 农民, 同比, 半导体, 猪肉
T2 Mixed Feelings About Fighting
High Prob 没有, 不是, 现在, 如果, 不会, 不能, 知道, 川普, 真的, 应该, 其实, 中国人, 结果, 不要, 问题, 最后, 国家, 可能, 美帝, 开打, 希望, 准备, 肯
定, 只能, 最近, 事情, 老百姓, 感觉, 真正, 支持
FREX 美帝, 老美, 美国佬, 牛逼, 知道, 居然, 说话, 不行, 想想, 竟然, 看着, 感觉, 脑子, 可笑, 不让, 笑话, 兔子, 没人, 好好, 套路, 没用, 高兴, 厉
害, 大爷, 道理, 夫妻, 打仗, 可怕, 煽动, 以为
Score 川普, 现在, 美帝, 知道, 真的, 中国人, 不是, 老百姓, 感觉, 不能, 不好, 没有, 不要, 国人, 明白, 人民, 以为, 汉奸, 不会, 爱国, 台湾, 自黑,
不敢, 肯定, 老美, 战争, 老师, 商人, 不行, 祖国
T3 Chinese Economy
High Prob 股市, 经济, 影响, 市场, 可能, 全球, 美元, 政策, 人民币, 金融, 投资, 增长, 中国经济, 风险, 货币, 杠杆, 加息, 消费, 汇率, 房地产, 国内, 刘
强东, 未来, 导致, 持续, 压力, 中国股市, 美联储, 预期, 央行
FREX 杠杆, 汇率, 刘强东, 房价, 泡沫, 债务, 贬值, 楼市, 人民币, 内需, 中国股市, 货币, 升值, 金融危机, 放水, 通胀, 宽松, 央行, 万亿, 实体经
济, 资本市场, 资产, 流动性, 人民币汇率, 美债, 调控, 崩盘, 拉动, 货币政策, 增速
Score 股市, 刘强东, 杠杆, 加息, 房地产, 房价, 汇率, 人民币, 贬值, 中国股市, 货币, 美联储, 流动性, 央行, 泡沫, 增长, 美元, 消费, 利率, 通胀,
增速, 楼市, 债务, 降准, 资产, 放水, 经济, 金融, 下跌, 内需
T4 US Tariffs
High Prob 关税, 商品, 加征, 美元, 亿美元, 进口, 产品, 贸易, 宣布, 征收, 清单, 措施, 时间, 五百亿, 两千亿, 针对, 公布, 调查, 征税, 正式, 对华, 对
美, 决定, 代表, 六百亿, 实施, 限制, 表示, 钢铁, 三零一调查
FREX 征收, 五百亿, 商品, 六百亿, 关税, 加征, 生效, 备忘录, 办公室, 清单, 对美, 原产, 税率, 额外, 宣布, 亿美元, 两千亿, 报复, 投票, 惩罚性,
日起, 调查, 追加, 对价, 公布, 钢铝, 报复性, 豁免, 中止, 钢铁
Score 关税, 加征, 商品, 进口, 征收, 投票, 清单, 亿美元, 产品, 五百亿, 美元, 两千亿, 六百亿, 宣布, 征税, 措施, 三零一调查, 原产, 公布, 调查,
备忘录, 输美, 对美, 生效, 对华, 报复, 豁免, 办公室, 税率, 白宫
T5 US Allies
High Prob 特朗普, 总统, 欧盟, 贸易, 政府, 报道, 可能, 俄罗斯, 欧洲, 全球, 对华, 日本, 政策, 媒体, 国家, 认为, 川普, 加拿大, 选举, 表示, 威胁, 发
动, 英国, 世贸组织, 国会, 经济, 中期, 白宫, 德国, 标题
FREX 美媒, 欧盟, 共和党, 参考消息, 民主党, 加拿大, 警告, 支持率, 美欧, 墨西哥, 推特, 容克, 盟友, 美国国会, 竞选, 特朗普, 法案, 法国, 马克,
选举, 零关税, 默克尔, 龙永图, 民意, 赤字, 外媒, 普京, 快报, 议员, 协定
Score 特朗普, 欧盟, 总统, 报道, 大脑, 加拿大, 选举, 美媒, 俄罗斯, 共和党, 对华, 白宫, 川普, 墨西哥, 顾问, 日本, 民主党, 参考消息, 外媒, 盟
友, 欧洲, 推特, 容克, 警告, 农民, 支持率, 中期, 世贸组织, 媒体, 政府
T6 China’s Rise and US Hegemony
High Prob 世界, 经济, 国家, 发展, 战略, 日本, 政治, 历史, 关系, 大国, 全球, 战争, 军事, 目的, 问题, 成为, 开放, 国际, 西方, 认为, 强大, 全面, 未来,
贸易, 国内, 地位, 需要, 优势, 崛起, 冲突
FREX 霸权, 大国, 科学, 冷战, 中国崛起, 地位, 军事, 复兴, 和平, 年代, 文明, 共同体, 意识形态, 霸主, 南海, 世纪, 中华民族, 之争, 思想, 发达国
家, 民主, 帝国, 较量, 精英, 价值观, 西方, 强国, 资本主义, 实力, 民族主义
Score 世界, 军事, 日本, 霸权, 战争, 西方, 大国, 战略, 冷战, 科学, 发展, 雷思海, 意识形态, 政治, 国家, 全球化, 经济, 崛起, 中国崛起, 共同体,
和平, 改革开放, 人类, 文明, 中华民族, 遏制, 历史, 年代, 地位, 文化
T7 Stock Market
High Prob 市场, 黄金, 反弹, 板块, 指数, 美股, 行情, 下跌, 继续, 股市, 目前, 大盘, 震荡, 操作, 走势, 出现, 创业板, 资金, 上涨, 机会, 个股, 支撑, 影
响, 利好, 消息, 美元, 大跌, 没有, 短期, 短线
FREX 黄金, 反弹, 板块, 指数, 行情, 震荡, 操作, 创业板, 个股, 短线, 附近, 利空, 涨停, 均线, 日线, 盘面, 回落, 收盘, 金价, 低开, 上方, 跌破, 上
证指数, 盘中, 早盘, 区间, 上证, 低位, 股指, 开盘
Score 板块, 反弹, 黄金, 创业板, 行情, 个股, 指数, 震荡, 大盘, 短线, 日线, 均线, 走势, 操作, 金价, 盘面, 涨停, 附近, 下跌, 低开, 早盘, 回落, 盘
中, 两市, 上方, 收盘, 上证, 尾盘, 底部, 股市
T8 High-tech and Private Firms
High Prob 中兴, 市场, 技术, 科技, 企业, 高科技, 产业, 华为, 国家, 中兴通讯, 事件, 国企, 芯片, 领域, 问题, 升级, 国内, 发展, 机会, 研发, 财富, 人
才, 获得, 简单, 出现, 国外, 政府, 轮动, 过程, 创新
FREX 国企, 人才, 专利, 民企, 扶贫, 受限制, 产业化, 腐败, 教育, 高薪, 高校, 核心技术, 犀利, 医治, 学院, 毕业生, 同学, 美籍, 华为, 华商, 高技
术, 吉林大学, 折叠, 臃肿, 滴滴, 崔永元, 洗地, 直接税, 中兴, 厉害了
Score 中兴, 轮动, 华为, 国企, 扶贫, 产业化, 专利, 研发, 受限制, 首板, 中兴通讯, 强势股, 接力, 人才, 芯片, 妖股, 民企, 高薪, 题材, 医治, 高科
技, 挖掘, 退潮, 回调, 谈不谈, 企业, 腐败, 技术, 投入, 臃肿
T9 Negotiation and Compromise
High Prob 贸易, 谈判, 双方, 问题, 达成, 两国, 摩擦, 协议, 关系, 经贸, 接受, 磋商, 解决, 进行, 共识, 争端, 停止, 表示, 升级, 经济, 认为, 避免, 北京,
结束, 解读, 同意, 让步, 妥协, 不会, 时间
FREX 达成, 联合声明, 姆努钦, 谈判, 代表团, 美国财长, 元首, 协议, 会谈, 两国, 共识, 采访, 同意, 习近平, 财长, 停火, 磋商, 贸易谈判, 双方, 框
架, 双方同意, 对话, 总理, 争端, 接受, 峰会, 重磅, 回合, 逐条, 双赢
Score 达成, 谈判, 磋商, 双方, 协议, 经贸, 贸易, 共识, 联合声明, 两国, 姆努钦, 会晤, 元首, 美国财长, 记者, 采访, 代表团, 双方同意, 中方, 摩
擦, 同意, 逐条, 习近平, 华盛顿, 对话, 停火, 王毅, 举行, 接受, 争端
T10 Resolve and Non-compromise
High Prob 美方, 中方, 新闻, 利益, 挑起, 反击, 商务部, 应对, 坚决, 人民, 规则, 发动, 人民日报, 打响, 国际, 贸易, 代价, 赢家, 国家, 中国人, 反制, 维
护, 回应, 不得不, 标题, 发言人, 全球, 奉陪到底, 捍卫, 中国政府
FREX 奉陪到底, 捍卫, 人民日报, 坚决, 吓不倒, 霸凌, 挑起, 单边主义, 新闻, 代价, 维护, 大使, 锐评, 多边, 世贸, 多边贸易, 崔天凯, 发言人, 应
战, 赢家, 美方, 以战止战, 不得人心, 反复无常, 单方面, 大门, 付出, 挑衅, 底气, 恫吓
Score 中方, 美方, 商务部, 新闻, 挑起, 坚决, 吓不倒, 捍卫, 反击, 人民日报, 利益, 奉陪到底, 发言人, 人民, 代价, 初战告捷, 发表谈话, 锐评, 规
则, 维护, 霸凌, 新华社, 回应, 反制, 驳得, 多边, 大使, 单边主义, 侠客岛, 中国人
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99.9% CI. Extracted Topics: US Products (T1), Mixed Feelings About Fighting (T2), Chinese Economy
(T3), US Tariffs (T4), US Allies (T5), China’s Rise and US Hegemony (T6), Stock Market (T7), High-tech
and Private Firms (T8), Negotiation and Compromise (T9), Resolve and Non-compromise (T10)
Fig. A.24: Dynamic Changes in Topic Proportions on Weibo
A6.2 The Zhihu Corpus
Zhihu (“Do you know” in traditional Chinese) is another major online community in China
mainland. It is similar to Quora where users post questions and ask for others’ opinions.
According to Alexa, it has been one of China’s most-visited websites since 2017. The cen-
tralized network structure of Zhihu facilitates users to engage in extensive discussions under
questions of a given topic, and the sophisticated recommendation and invitation system en-
courages users to evaluate and share others’ comments and opinions. Zhihu is also distinct
from Weibo such that the Zhihu community strongly favors the user-generated content in-
stead of reposts/retweets. Unfortunately, the structure of Zhihu also facilitates censors to
shut down politically sensitive discussions and to forbid users from opening up new discus-
sions under a popular topic (e.g., starting new questions and adding new answers to existing
questions). To our knowledge, Zhihu banned new discussions on the US–China trade war as
a dedicated topic after the first round of negotiation in late May 2018.
Notwithstanding the impact of censorship, we collected 28, 010 posts from Zhihu on the
US–China trade war between March and May 2018. For the empirical analysis, we treat it
as a cross-sectional data set at the early stage of the trade war. In Figure A.26, we compare
the distribution of text length of the Weibo and Zhihu corpuses, and the major difference is
that Zhihu has more long posts. We also extract the top ten topics and present the results in
Table A.25. Similar to the Weibo topics, topics extracted from the Zhihu corpus also include
the economic impact of the trade war (T3, T6, and T7) and US products (T1). We also
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99.9% CI. Extracted Topics: US Products (T1), Mixed Feelings About Fighting (T2), Chinese Economy
(T3), US Tariffs (T4), US Allies (T5), China’s Rise and US Hegemony (T6), Stock Market (T7), High-tech
and Private Firms (T8), Negotiation and Compromise (T9), Resolve and Non-compromise (T10)
Fig. A.25: Dynamic Changes in Topic Proportions on Weibo, by Month
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and T10). The discussion on the reputation for resolve is absorbed in the topic of China’s
rise and US hegemony (T2), and there is a considerable degree of mixed feelings for fighting
and conceding (T5). We conclude that Zhihu and Weibo users shared concerns about the
economic consequences of the trade war, although the Zhihu corpus is limited to the early
stage of the trade war. Zhihu and Weibo users similarly linked the trade war to China’s rise
and US hegemony. One thing we find special with the Zhihu corpus is the topic related to
consumer boycotts and economic nationalism (T1), indicating that Zhihu users were more
nationalistic and more willing to take action against the US.
Fig. A.26: Histogram of Weibo/Zhihu Text Length
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Measurement Type Top Words
T1 US Products and Consumer Boycott
High Prob 苹果, 手机, 如果, 市场, 国内, 产品, 影响, 不会, 可能, 抵制, 生产, 企业, 问题, 禁售, 成本, 利润, 真的, 便宜, 华为, 系统, 应该, 损失, 不能,
禁止, 其实, 阿里, 价格, 品牌, 肯定, 就业
FREX 抵制, 苹果, 手机, 禁售, 涨价, 安卓, 米帝, 富士康, 阿里, 品牌, 不买, 谷歌, 波音, 代购, 便宜, 权限, 失业, 不卖, 盗版, 国产手机, 国货, 工
人, 消费者, 米国, 替代品, 税收, 苹果公司, 好莱坞, 订单, 假设
Score 苹果, 手机, 抵制, 玻璃, 禁售, 安卓, 华为, 产品, 代购, 三星, 微软, 米帝, 国产手机, 谷歌, 市场, 品牌, 涨价, 阿里, 权限, 失业, 生产, 软件,
不买, 加税, 富士康, 国产, 工人, 价格, 企业, 厂商
T2 China’s Rise and US Hegemony
High Prob 世界, 战争, 西方, 历史, 经济, 发展, 矛盾, 苏联, 中国人, 人民, 成为, 体系, 政治, 全球, 社会, 英国, 民族, 文化, 问题, 人类, 时代, 军事, 地
位, 和平, 崛起, 资本主义, 自由, 斗争, 帝国主义, 强大
FREX 帝国主义, 苏联, 资本主义, 团结, 文明, 帝国, 革命, 矛盾, 秩序, 西方, 斗争, 人类, 和平, 思想, 民主, 殖民, 战争, 伟大, 历史, 民族, 复兴, 中
华民族, 事物, 军队, 文化, 社会主义, 英国, 衰落, 侵略, 战胜
Score 团结, 帝国主义, 战争, 秩序, 矛盾, 苏联, 文明, 斗争, 和平, 世界, 殖民, 西方, 帝国, 诸侯, 霸权, 历史, 罗马, 人民, 资产阶级, 阶级, 革命, 思
想, 资本主义, 民主, 四境, 事物, 起视, 人类, 敌人, 秦兵
T3 Economic Impact
High Prob 房价, 工作, 房子, 房地产, 问题, 知道, 政府, 工资, 希望, 城市, 生活, 专业, 社会, 真的, 如果, 不会, 可能, 孩子, 教育, 实业, 地方, 老师, 人
才, 金融, 买房, 待遇, 毕业, 需要, 努力, 收入
FREX 房子, 孩子, 买不起, 年轻人, 买房, 同学, 炒房, 老师, 工资, 毕业, 实业, 转行, 学校, 学生, 一线, 房价, 大牛, 地产, 专业, 公务员, 城市, 大
学, 工作, 父母, 套房, 兴邦, 研究生, 本科, 加班, 韭菜
Score 房价, 赋予, 房子, 买房, 房地产, 毕业, 买不起, 转行, 炒房, 学校, 大牛, 科研, 孩子, 专业, 年轻人, 实业, 老师, 城市, 待遇, 工程师, 工作, 套
房, 工资, 一线, 公务员, 学生, 工科, 房产, 研究生, 地产
T4 ZTE Ban
High Prob 中兴, 华为, 制裁, 公司, 企业, 中兴通讯, 伊朗, 员工, 事件, 美国商务部, 出口, 协议, 法律, 美国政府, 通信, 违反, 禁令, 处罚, 相关, 业务,
调查, 设备, 高通, 影响, 合规, 和解, 可能, 产品, 不能, 禁止
FREX 中兴通讯, 中兴, 合规, 禁令, 处罚, 伊朗, 罚款, 员工, 美国商务部, 和解, 违反, 出口管制, 制裁, 奖金, 法律, 华为, 运营商, 文件, 高管, 违
规, 中兴公司, 把柄, 业务, 诚信, 证据, 美国政府, 通讯, 事件, 违法, 合同
Score 中兴, 中兴通讯, 华为, 合规, 美国商务部, 伊朗, 藐视, 奖金, 员工, 禁令, 制裁, 罚款, 处罚, 出口管制, 公司, 高通, 安全局, 认罪, 基站, 运营
商, 协议, 违反, 中兴公司, 和解, 停牌, 名高管, 企业, 芯片, 通信, 美方
T5 Mixed Feelings About Fighting and Conceding
High Prob 知道, 问题, 真的, 不会, 如果, 不要, 美帝, 不能, 回答, 其实, 中国人, 最后, 结果, 知乎, 应该, 日本, 肯定, 川普, 只能, 当年, 事情, 以为, 希
望, 答案, 感觉, 以后, 可能, 明白, 老大, 准备
FREX 老美, 美帝, 兔子, 老大, 小弟, 投降, 欺负, 老二, 屁股, 天朝, 面子, 美国佬, 老子, 打架, 大哥, 美利坚, 爸爸, 知乎, 打到, 药丸, 以为, 回答,
美分, 一拳, 评论, 打脸, 兄弟, 非要, 打赢, 加油
Score 杜鲁门, 机灵, 我兔, 发育, 老四, 鹰酱, 老三, 大哥, 脸上, 求和, 阴阳怪气, 粉红, 吓唬, 万岁, 嘴脸, 他妈的, 兔子, 被删, 忍辱负重, 跪下, 对
面, 猥琐, 管理员, 五毛, 一拳, 川皇, 川粉, 小人, 美利坚, 老美
T6 High-tech and Private Firms
High Prob 技术, 发展, 芯片, 行业, 产业, 科技, 企业, 制造业, 高端, 研发, 问题, 领域, 互联网, 需要, 投入, 市场, 高科技, 差距, 国内, 制造, 封锁, 基
础, 人才, 落后, 创新, 可能, 不能, 我国, 工业, 资本
FREX 封锁, 核心技术, 落后, 技术, 重视, 互联网, 行业, 差距, 科技, 高科技, 扶持, 创新, 追赶, 高铁, 发展, 高端, 原子弹, 投入, 发动机, 产业, 从
业者, 赶超, 两弹一星, 超车, 共享, 外卖, 弯道, 积累, 军工, 制造业
Score 芯片, 船舶, 技术, 研发, 行业, 产业, 发展, 投入, 制造业, 高端, 科技, 核心技术, 互联网, 人才, 科研, 封锁, 差距, 企业, 半导体, 两弹一星,
领域, 超车, 创新, 弯道, 落后, 高科技, 追赶, 房地产, 芯片业, 外卖
T7 Chinese Economy
High Prob 美元, 经济, 日本, 人民币, 全球, 市场, 金融, 货币, 石油, 如果, 世界, 资本, 投资, 股市, 消费, 导致, 可能, 出口, 影响, 国内, 大量, 增长, 黄
金, 制造业, 出现, 泡沫, 加息, 中国经济, 汇率, 资产
FREX 加息, 债务, 货币, 杠杆, 美元, 石油, 美债, 泡沫, 黄金, 内需, 外汇储备, 万亿, 贬值, 抛售, 美联储, 股市, 人民币, 美股, 通胀, 升值, 汇率, 央
行, 利率, 美国国债, 结算, 外汇, 金融危机, 下跌, 资产, 日元
Score 美元, 货币, 加息, 人民币, 委内瑞拉, 债务, 美债, 美联储, 贬值, 黄金, 杠杆, 房价, 利率, 泡沫, 央行, 抛售, 汇率, 通胀, 经济, 金融, 日元, 石
油, 外汇储备, 楼市, 内需, 股市, 美国国债, 升值, 美元指数, 结算
T8 Negotiation and the US Politics
High Prob 特朗普, 中美, 贸易, 经济, 川普, 可能, 问题, 利益, 谈判, 双方, 如果, 总统, 政治, 不会, 认为, 关系, 日本, 目前, 国内, 政策, 政府, 欧盟, 战
略, 俄罗斯, 威胁, 制裁, 最大, 影响, 两国, 目的
FREX 特朗普, 选举, 总统, 让步, 谈判, 双方, 共和党, 中美, 中期, 两国, 上台, 奥巴马, 民主党, 摩擦, 遏制, 强硬, 盟友, 白宫, 竞选, 选民, 希拉里,
选票, 川普, 威胁, 贸易, 博弈, 共识, 支持率, 筹码, 外交
Score 特朗普, 川普, 贸易, 谈判, 中美, 源自, 选举, 美方, 中方, 双方, 总统, 欧盟, 贸易逆差, 共和党, 民主党, 让步, 希拉里, 中期, 两国, 经济, 经
贸, 竞选, 奥巴马, 支持率, 选民, 俄罗斯, 选票, 白宫, 政治, 南海
T9 US Tariffs
High Prob 关税, 进口, 出口, 产品, 大豆, 我国, 商品, 贸易, 企业, 亿美元, 限制, 汽车, 世贸组织, 措施, 征收, 清单, 外资, 影响, 国内, 推销, 农产品, 钢
铁, 三零一调查, 保护, 加征, 包括, 调查, 知识产权, 要求, 入世
FREX 大豆, 推销, 关税, 入世, 征收, 钢铁, 加征, 清单, 三零一调查, 外资, 世贸组织, 进口, 农产品, 取消, 商场, 征税, 巴西, 合资企业, 纺织品, 对
美, 税率, 万吨, 配额, 措施, 中国出口, 猪肉, 反倾销, 进出口, 添加, 农业
Score 关税, 大豆, 推销, 进口, 征收, 出口, 加征, 化工产品, 入世, 亿美元, 世贸组织, 三零一调查, 农产品, 配额, 产品, 清单, 商品, 贸易, 措施, 征
税, 纺织品, 合资企业, 钢铁, 对美, 商场, 条款, 欧盟, 巴西, 税率, 外资
T10 Semiconductor Industry
High Prob 芯片, 公司, 半导体, 设计, 研发, 产品, 国产, 软件, 设备, 领域, 技术, 集成电路, 电子, 产业, 需要, 行业, 企业, 全球, 系统, 生产, 操作系统,
市场, 开发, 目前, 华为, 应用, 制造, 自主, 日本, 硬件
FREX 集成电路, 设计, 操作系统, 电子, 台积电, 海思, 工艺, 应用, 半导体, 处理器, 性能, 微电子, 龙芯, 英特尔, 计算机, 软件, 量产, 硬件, 国产,
麒麟, 元器件, 开发, 器件, 光刻机, 整机, 芯片, 紫光, 开源, 制程, 纳米
Score 芯片, 半导体, 电动车, 集成电路, 软件, 研发, 操作系统, 微电子, 工艺, 处理器, 海思, 设计, 国产, 器件, 性能, 龙芯, 三星, 台积电, 元器件,
设备, 基站, 应用, 华为, 光刻机, 公司, 麒麟, 硬件, 制程, 高通, 电子
Table A.25: STM Outputs: Top Words and Topics (Zhihu Corpus)
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A6.3 Government Statements and Official Media Reports
The intensive exchanges of elite rhetoric successfully mobilized domestic audiences in both
China and the US when the trade war escalated in 2018. President Donald Trump com-
mitted to end China’s “unfair trade policies” and “economic aggression” against the US.13
China, on the other hand, vowed to retaliate against US tariffs and to firmly defend its
“legitimate interests.” Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai commented on Trump’s accusations
as groundless and stated that “If people want to play tough, we will play tough with them
and see who will last longer.”14 The nationalist newspaper Global Times (under the People’s
Daily) compared US demands in the first round of negotiation in May 2018 to the “terms of
unjust treaty” in the First Opium War.15
Do official outlets have temporal changes in topics similar to what we observe from the
social media data? To answer this question, we collected 214 pieces of Foreign Ministry
spokesperson’s remarks and 153 pieces of Global Times editorials on the US–China trade
war. Due to the limited number of observations, we extract five top topics from the text
and present the results in Tables A.26 and A.27. And corresponding to Figure 5 in the main
text, we plot the temporal change of topics in Figures A.27 and A.28. We can observe some
similar trends of topics shared by official outlets and social media content: Official outlets
also changed from hawkish rhetoric of fighting the trade war to a softened tone regarding
the progress of bilateral negotiations.
We make comparisons between official outlets and social media content. It is also an
opportunity to evaluate the degree of the state’s influence on public discourse covering sen-
sitive political issues. We draw three conclusions. First, the clusters of keywords under
top topics (Tables A.24/A.25 vs. Tables A.26/A.27) show a sharp divergence between the
two data sources. Second, one important topic on China’s rise and US hegemony (detected
in both Weibo and Zhihu) that can be linked to popular nationalism can not be matched
to any topic extracted from the official outlets. One may interpret it as the evidence of
self-restraints: The Chinese government did not want to go too far in terms of fomenting
popular nationalism with provocative rhetoric. Third, we highlight people’s growing con-
cerns about the economic consequences in both survey experiments and social media data,
but topics about economic issues in the government statements and Global Times editorials
hardly displayed an upward trend (T2/T5 in Figure A.27 and T2 in Figure A.28). Taken
together, although we acknowledge the strong power of the authoritarian state in shaping
public discourse (also see Section A5.10), there are important differences in the substance of
information between official outlets and social media platforms. We argue that social media
analysis has its unique value in understanding Chinese public opinion and can be used as
supplementary evidence for survey findings.
13The White House documents, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies
and Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China’s Economic
Aggression.
14Bloomberg, Chinese Ambassador Warns of ‘Trade War’ Over Trump Tariffs.
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Fig. A.28: Dynamic Changes in Topic Proportions, Global Times Editorials
A-56
Measurement Type Top Words
T1 Negotiation and State Leaders
High Prob 双方, 磋商, 关系, 两国, 达成, 共识, 希望, 元首, 商务部, 发言人, 具体, 举行, 团队, 进行, 保持, 接受, 回答, 互利, 领域, 新闻, 会晤, 总统,
推动, 表示, 通话, 加征, 基础, 消息, 经济, 关税
FREX 元首, 团队, 达成, 磋商, 共识, 双方, 总统, 通话, 接受, 特朗普, 两国, 消息, 回答, 接触, 具体, 关心, 会晤, 举行, 记者, 新闻, 发言人, 华盛
顿, 细节, 保持, 介绍, 关系, 方案, 加强, 相向, 落实
Score 元首, 前提, 达成, 磋商, 团队, 双方, 细节, 方案, 商务部, 生效, 特朗普, 接触, 华盛顿, 联合声明, 总统, 同意, 财政部, 加征, 加紧, 姆努钦,
习近平, 访华, 通话, 日至, 罗斯, 争取, 进行磋商, 交换意见, 两国, 沟通
T2 FDI, Intellectual Property and Openness
High Prob 企业, 美国, 投资, 贸易, 开放, 国家, 改革开放, 世界, 继续, 市场, 发展, 公平, 全球, 环境, 知识产权, 推进, 进一步, 增长, 政策, 了解, 报告,
提供, 国际, 中国政府, 互利, 保护, 强调, 经济, 合作, 对外
FREX 投资, 企业, 环境, 改革开放, 市场, 对外, 知识产权, 公平, 人民币汇率, 创新, 国家安全, 开放, 保护, 外资, 外国, 征税, 报告, 中国经济, 便
利化, 市场准入, 政策, 超过, 进一步, 继续, 增长, 中国政府, 市场规律, 预期, 了解, 有力
Score 征税, 创新, 企业, 投资, 国家安全, 环境, 公平, 人民币汇率, 外资, 市场准入, 开放, 潜在, 知识产权, 超过, 对外开放, 兴业, 报告, 外国, 放
宽, 扩大开放, 鼓励, 营商, 预期, 市场规律, 无意, 经营, 中国经济, 全球, 便利化, 增长
T3 Negotiation and Compromises
High Prob 对话, 美国, 协商, 解决, 没有, 贸易, 摩擦, 分歧, 相互尊重, 关系, 立场, 双方, 如果, 经贸合作, 平等, 能够, 希望, 发展, 经济体, 基础, 两国
人民, 可能, 稳定, 应该, 世界, 两国, 不是, 强调, 符合, 问题上
FREX 协商, 对话, 摩擦, 解决, 诚意, 分歧, 出现, 经济体, 没有, 两国人民, 关键, 经贸合作, 声音, 相互尊重, 好处, 倾听, 诚信, 建立, 平等, 中欧,
能够, 问题上, 工商界, 主张, 方式, 理性, 可能, 任何一方, 升级, 持续
Score 对话, 所作所为, 协商, 善意, 诚意, 诚信, 摩擦, 建立, 相互尊重, 途径, 妥善解决, 认清形势, 任何一方, 胁迫, 展示, 沟通, 好处, 做大, 倾听,
两国关系, 关键, 施压, 贸易战, 在所难免, 执意, 单方面, 经贸合作, 造成, 妥善处理, 工商界
T4 Resolve and Countermeasures
High Prob 美国, 贸易, 规则, 世贸组织, 措施, 关税, 维护, 利益, 单边主义, 采取, 立场, 多边贸易, 体制, 贸易战, 保护主义, 自身, 国际, 商务部, 坚决,
坚定, 经济, 反对, 如果, 损害, 社会, 表明, 全球, 加征, 遵守, 进口
FREX 世贸组织, 多边贸易, 反制, 体制, 措施, 坚定, 单边主义, 坚决, 损害, 规则, 关税, 采取, 行为, 三零一调查, 正当, 合法权益, 捍卫, 必要, 反
对, 自身, 贸易战, 维护, 清单, 自由贸易, 调查, 争端, 进口, 全世界, 必要措施, 决心
Score 世贸组织, 不得不, 多边贸易, 体制, 关税, 反制, 三零一调查, 正当, 贸易战, 措施, 加征, 商务部, 单边主义, 损害, 成员, 清单, 捍卫, 规则,
汽车, 被迫, 救济, 自由贸易, 举措, 反对, 合法权益, 保护主义, 决心, 税率, 是典型, 采取
T5 Global Cooperation
High Prob 合作, 发展, 国际, 国家, 促进, 世界, 经济, 共同, 领导人, 支持, 各国, 地区, 关系, 一带一路, 和平, 原则, 人民, 希望, 报道, 各方, 贡献, 推
动, 建设, 社会, 积极, 稳定, 会议, 全球, 基础, 世界经济
FREX 一带一路, 和平, 促进, 支持, 倡议, 地区, 会议, 贡献, 合作, 领导人, 基础设施, 自由, 政治, 建设, 国际, 发展, 愿望, 构建, 普遍, 人民, 非正
式, 报道, 发展中国家, 地方, 各国, 各方, 安全, 国家, 期间, 愿同
Score 愿望, 一带一路, 倡议, 和平, 促进, 基础设施, 会议, 贡献, 建设, 繁荣, 各国, 自由, 支持, 合作, 共建, 经济社会, 非正式, 当地, 发展中国家,
论坛, 增进, 意愿, 陷阱, 秉持, 共商, 受到, 提出, 承诺, 成员, 区域
Table A.26: STM Outputs: Top Words and Topics
(Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks)
Measurement Type Top Words
T1 Regional Security
High Prob 台湾, 两国, 地区, 朝鲜, 大陆, 南海, 对抗, 台海, 大国, 军事, 安全, 同时, 进行, 紧张, 方式, 合作, 增加, 挑衅, 支持, 外交, 开展, 继续, 方向,
改善, 日本, 摩擦, 行动, 彭斯, 问题上, 选举
FREX 台湾, 朝鲜, 大陆, 南海, 台海, 地区, 军事, 挑衅, 彭斯, 局势, 紧张, 外交, 蓬佩奥, 改善, 安全, 亚洲, 和平, 对抗, 恶化, 一带一路, 友好, 访
问, 国务卿, 公开, 精英, 对华政策, 日本, 建设, 参加, 国防
Score 大陆, 台湾, 朝鲜, 台海, 南海, 参加, 军事, 地区, 新加坡, 彭斯, 国防, 局势, 蓬佩奥, 亚太, 对华政策, 冷战, 和平, 影响力, 挑衅, 访华, 会晤,
亚洲, 一带一路, 恶化, 当局, 两国关系, 事务, 改善, 国务卿, 核心
T2 Chinese Economy
High Prob 中国经济, 市场, 增长, 保持, 信心, 全面, 改革开放, 过去, 长期, 压力, 遏制, 实力, 强大, 舆论, 严重, 冲击, 挑战, 整个, 库德洛, 发生, 重要,
制造业, 中国崛起, 认识, 最大, 进一步, 持续, 历史, 增加, 现实
FREX 中国经济, 增长, 库德洛, 制造业, 信心, 人民, 长期, 处在, 经历, 冲击, 因素, 过去, 遏制, 消费, 释放, 经济发展, 斗争, 活力, 数据, 惯性, 中
国崛起, 潜力, 治理, 质量, 崛起, 互联网, 挑战, 实力, 形势, 精神
Score 库德洛, 增长, 中国经济, 数据, 质量, 下行, 活力, 制造业, 周期, 结构, 惯性, 数量, 信心, 潜力, 增速, 动能, 几〸年, 深度, 中外, 改革开放,
满足, 后劲, 治理, 创新能力, 更好, 积累, 斗争, 平稳, 战略性, 痛苦
T3 Resolve and Countermeasures
High Prob 加征, 亿美元, 美元, 报复, 损失, 清单, 进口, 措施, 商品, 接受, 两千亿, 美国政府, 公司, 规模, 不想, 公布, 对美, 出口, 宣布, 时间, 表示, 计
划, 反制, 威胁, 贸易逆差, 行动, 做法, 反击, 征税, 生产
FREX 清单, 美元, 两千亿, 报复, 商品, 调查, 损失, 不想, 加征, 五百亿, 亿美元, 干预, 公布, 大棒, 公司, 征税, 反击, 美国政府, 同等, 贸易逆差,
出口, 开打, 商务部, 选民, 反制, 措施, 大豆, 中国政府, 生产, 做法
Score 干预, 清单, 报复, 加征, 商品, 美元, 同等, 调查, 进口, 五百亿, 两千亿, 美国政府, 讹诈, 出台, 报告, 痛苦, 还手, 屈服, 征税, 办公室, 力度,
高科技产品, 中国政府, 生产, 委员会, 共和党, 芯片, 商务部, 开打, 消费市场
T4 Global Cooperation and the US Allies
High Prob 欧洲, 欧盟, 世贸组织, 合作, 规则, 体系, 汽车, 国际, 市场, 中欧, 盟友, 最大, 西方, 维护, 多边, 大国, 扩大, 主义, 世贸, 开展, 舆论, 所有,
严重, 霸权, 对抗, 日本, 应当, 伙伴, 要求, 同时
FREX 欧盟, 欧洲, 中欧, 世贸组织, 主义, 多边, 盟友, 世贸, 规则, 体系, 霸权, 单边主义, 合作, 加拿大, 加入, 汽车, 自由贸易, 成员, 组织, 德国,
保护主义, 伙伴, 峰会, 秩序, 维护, 日本, 霸凌, 共同, 承诺, 国际贸易
Score 中欧, 欧洲, 欧盟, 世贸组织, 盟友, 汽车, 加拿大, 单边主义, 世贸, 德国, 主义, 欧美, 合作, 成员, 冷战, 规则, 加入, 联手, 多边, 置于, 俄罗
斯, 传统, 签署, 会晤, 同盟, 国际贸易, 霸权, 钢铝, 保护主义, 峰会
T5 Negotiation and Compromises
High Prob 谈判, 达成, 协议, 对外开放, 要求, 两国, 中兴, 扩大, 磋商, 改革开放, 进口, 知识产权, 进行, 进一步, 企业, 实现, 对话, 压力, 主席, 经贸,
必须, 习近平, 信息, 举行, 应当, 做出, 解决, 决定, 纠纷, 共识
FREX 中兴, 协议, 对外开放, 达成, 知识产权, 谈判, 习近平, 代表团, 磋商, 主席, 对话, 博鳌, 信息, 落实, 要求, 经贸, 取得, 共识, 纠纷, 企业, 开
放, 举行, 成果, 积极, 刘鹤, 能源, 保护, 博览会, 讲话, 论坛
Score 博览会, 中兴, 代表团, 磋商, 博鳌, 首届, 论坛, 刘鹤, 知识产权, 主席, 习近平, 善意, 进口, 能源, 美好生活, 讲话, 汽车, 对外开放, 协议, 交
流, 规划, 满足, 融合, 信息, 推进, 达成, 贸易谈判, 双赢, 中国制造, 改革开放
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Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that international conflicts may dampen social discontent
and divert public attention from domestic problems. In this paper, we test this diversionary
logic in China: Whether or not international conflicts boost general public support for the
authoritarian regime. First, we obtain a nationally representative sample and exploit the
overlapping of the Sino-Japan territorial disputes in 2012 and the administration of the
survey. We find that although there was a significant drop in respondents’ trust toward
implicated out-groups (the “Americans”), their in-group solidarity and sensitivity towards
the severity of domestic issues (e.g., corruption, unemployment, social welfare) remained
largely stable. Second, we use a longitudinal online survey conducted in 2018 and 2019,
exploiting the escalation of the US-China trade war as another external shock. We again
show that respondents’ anti-US sentiment was moderately strengthened when the trade
war escalated, but their loyalty to the nation was unchanged. We conclude that interna-
tional conflicts have limited and narrow influences on political attitudes and add caveats
to explaining China’s foreign policies with the conventional diversionary logic.
Key words: Rally Effect, Diversionary Conflicts, Public Opinion, Authoritarian Poli-
tics
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Introduction
Engaging in interstate conflicts is often compared to taking a gamble that entails great
risks and uncertainty. Given the high stakes of losing, what are the domestic motives for
state leaders to fight rather than to seek negotiated settlements? The diversionary theory
of conflicts offers a straightforward and intuitive answer: International conflicts boost
domestic support for unpopular leaders (Davies, 2002; Kisangani and Pickering, 2009;
Levy, 1989; Miller, 1995; Miller and Elgün, 2011; Morgan and Bickers, 1992). Especially
when other legitimacy instruments are absent, the rise of popular nationalism stimulated
by external threats helps embattled state leaders stay in power (Mansfield and Snyder,
1995, 2002).
The diversionary theory postulates significant shifts in aggregate political attitudes
driven by external forces. Existing literature identifies two main rationales behind public
reactions towards international conflicts: re-assessing leadership competence and rallying
around the flag (Haynes, 2017). The first rationale suggests that interstate conflicts af-
ford citizens the rare opportunity to re-evaluate state leadership with updated information
about conflict outcomes and endorse state leaders for foreign victories (Downs and Rocke,
1994; Gelpi and Grieco, 2015; Goemans and Fey, 2009; Tarar, 2006). The relative weight
of domestic problems in judging leadership competence declines, although citizens may
not change their substantive preferences or perceptions regarding domestic problems. The
second rationale underscores the psychological change that makes people increasingly fa-
vor in-group members to out-group members when external threats loom large. Citizens
display higher approval of the government even when the conflict is ongoing and the out-
come is yet to be finalized. Public criticism of the government is discouraged or even
replaced by guarded support for fear of looking foolish or unpatriotic (Baker and Oneal,
2001). The rise of nationalism mitigates social discontent towards domestic problems,
e.g., inequality (Solt, 2011).
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A large volume of literature on the US elaborates the second rationale, indicating that
international conflicts cause rally effects and dampen critiques of the incumbent govern-
ment (Baker and Oneal, 2001; Baum, 2002; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Mueller, 1970; Schu-
bert, Stewart and Curran, 2002). However, empirical research based on other countries
is relatively scarce. Some research using the cross-national data treats country-year ob-
servations as the basic unit of analysis, focusing on the onset of international conflicts
conditional on domestic unrest (e.g., economic crises). The flaw in this approach is to take
the rally effects as guaranteed rather than to problematize its existence or magnitude. To
some scholars, this approach is justified as diversionary conflicts are defined by the nature
of the leaders’ motivation to use force, not by whether conflicts have changed the public
opinion in favor of the government (Oakes, 2006, p.433-4). But to others, it is unsatis-
factory and blurs the two distinct processes described in the diversionary theory: First,
internal conflict has a causal impact on the risk of external conflict, and second, external
conflict mutes internal conflict (Levy, 1989, p.267).
In this paper, we attempt to fill the gap and generalize the micro-foundation of the di-
versionary theory to the typical authoritarian context. Specifically, we focus on two recent
international crises that implicated China and another major country: The 2012 Diaoyu
Islands dispute with Japan and the 2018-19 trade war with the United States. We obtain a
nationally representative sample from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) in 2012 and
collect three-wave data of an online survey panel in August 2018 and January and August
2019. We leverage the dramatic and unexpected escalation of conflicts as natural shocks
and examine the temporal change of political attitudes. We present positive results on the
increasing anti-foreign sentiment, which discloses signs of nationalist rallies driven by dis-
trust and hostility against out-groups. However, we also present null results that repudiate
the core logic of rally effects: During the two international conflicts, Chinese citizens did
not displayed high in-group solidarity or become less sensitive to domestic problems. We
discuss possible explanations for the null findings and present supplementary evidence
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on the lack of correlations between anti-foreign sentiment and political support for the
government.
To reiterate and echo Levy (1989), we do not answer whether or not the Chinese leaders
have adopted the diversionary thinking in the past or estimate the likelihood of diversion-
ary conflicts in the future due to domestic unrest. Instead, our goal is to identify the causal
impact of international conflicts on the political attitudes of Chinese citizens. Overall, our
empirical results show that the rally effect is very limited in terms of decreasing people’s
discontent about domestic issues or increasing satisfaction and political loyalty. It is not to
say, however, that foreign victories have no impact on public opinion, as the citizens may
still evaluate state leadership based on their separate evaluation of domestic and foreign
policies. Substantively, the results may be interpreted as the evidence of deliberate citizens
(Colaresi, 2007), as people remained critical to domestic problems and did not succumb
to the force of blind patriotism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we review the
related literature on the micro-foundation of diversionary conflicts and present our hy-
potheses. In the third section, we introduce the context of the two cases as well as the
empirical methods and data. In the fourth section, we present the main findings and dis-
cuss the theoretical implications. The fifth section concludes.
Theoretical Arguments
In this section, we present our theoretical arguments in two phases. First, we revisit the
micro-level mechanisms of the diversionary theory and review the critical arguments that
challenge the theoretical presumptions. Second, we discuss causal mechanisms based on
the diversionary theory and present the hypotheses for empirical testing.
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The micro-foundations of diversionary conflict
The diversionary theory proposes causal mechanisms at the societal level that connect
domestic and international conflicts. The micro-foundations can be traced to the sociolog-
ical literature of social identity and group dynamics under external threats (Levy, 1989;
Shayo, 2009). Successful diversion depends on a minimal degree of internal cohesion, as
domestic groups who strongly oppose the ruling elites are unlikely to switch their stance
and embrace the long-standing foes.1 Theorists of diversionary conflicts usually portray
state leaders as perceptive, calculating, and self-serving manipulators of public opinion
struggling for political survival (Goemans and Fey, 2009). But in a sharply different man-
ner, they describe citizens as emotional and uncritical followers reacting impulsively to
external threats that are often exaggerated by elite rhetoric and manipulated information
(Theiler, 2018).
The diversionary theory takes the rise of nationalism as the predominant force driving
the dramatic shift of public opinion in favor of the incumbent government during interna-
tional crises.2 As a famous metaphor, nationalism consists of myths that turn chance into
destiny (Anderson, 1991). The power of nationalism on people’s mind has the potential
to surpass loyalty to other social groups (Van Evera, 1994). As the principal purveyor of
nationalism, modern states invent a variety of “cultural control” instruments to enforce
the universal identity of citizens within the national territory (Tilly, 1994, p.140). Even
non-coercive national symbols such as flags, anthem, and sports teams may strengthen
nationalism and alter the public preference in favor of militant foreign policies (Bertoli,
2017). And the emergence of external threats associated with salient issues, e.g., territorial
1However, it is a viable strategy that in countries with low internal cohesion, the ruling elites seek do-
mestic diversionary targets, e.g., ethnic minorities, to shore up political support (Tir and Jasinski, 2008).
2It should be noted that nationalism has two correlated but independent dimensions, one defined by
negative terms, e.g., xenophobia, warmongering, and hostility towards outsiders, and the other defined by
positive terms, e.g., pride and love of one’s own country. As discussed in the following, diversionary conflicts
may bring about changes in both the negative (anti-foreign sentiment) and positive (in-group solidarity)
dimensions alike. Some scholars also make the distinction by using nationalism for negative sentiment and
patriotism for positive sentiment (de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Li and Brewer, 2004).
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disputes, usually provokes a storm of anger and solidifies national identity amid citizens
(Theiler, 2018; Tir, 2010). Exposing to threats from hostile out-groups can shift citizens’
preference in support of right-wing groups and nationalist leaders (Getmansky and Zeit-
zoff, 2014).
To understand the impact of international conflicts on public opinion, contexts and
circumstances matter. As Levy argued, “Attention needs to be directed to the questions of
what kinds of domestic conflicts are likely to lead to diversionary actions and what kinds
of foreign conflict serve as useful distractions for internal unrest” (Levy, 1989, p.275). The
key point is to problematize public opinion during international crises rather than to take
rally effects as guaranteed. In the following, we discuss several theoretical challenges to
the simple causal claim such that international conflicts rally public support and improve
the domestic standing of the incumbent leadership.
Foremost, the assumption of the reflexive and emotional public oversimplifies the dy-
namics of public opinion during international crises. Those who adopt the assumption
needs to explain why rally events are essentially different from other political phenomena
such that pre-existing political preferences and updated information about conflicts are ir-
relevant to explaining individual preference. As stated in the introduction, international
crises allow citizens to observe government performance and make sensible evaluations
based on updated information (Debs and Weiss, 2016; Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver, 2007;
Gelpi and Grieco, 2015; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013; Snyder and Borghard, 2011).
Under information asymmetry, citizens may rationally support the government’s decisions,
and such calculated reactions are substantively different from the emotional and automatic
nature of responses driven by blind patriotism (Colaresi, 2007).
Second, the diversionary theory falls short of conceptualizing the complexity of the
domestic political process and elite-citizen communication. It is nevertheless important
for us to understand how international conflicts mute citizens’ political demands in unre-
lated domestic issues. To address the concern, Mansfield and Snyder (1995, p.7) stated
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that citizens are not naturally attracted to adventurous foreign policies as assumed by the
blind patriotism assumption and that the state’s effective manipulation of public opinion
requires careful agenda control and the creation of faits accomplis. However, in democratic
countries where state leaders have little leeway to directly manipulate media and other in-
formation outlets, citizens receive competing elite cues and can have divergent responses
to international crises (Groeling and Baum, 2008). Although the incumbent leader may
have some information advantage at the beginning, the rally effect inevitably shrinks as the
availability of additional information challenges the administration’s preferred framing of
the conflict (Baum and Groeling, 2010).
Third, the diversionary theory presumes a stark division between the in-group and out-
group members and assumes that the domestic audience has homogeneous preferences and
is united under the flag of nationalism. Admittedly, it is a useful simplification of citizens’
preferences in the context of endured rivalry (Mitchell and Prins, 2004), or salient issues
naturally tied to strong nationalist sentiment such as territorial disputes (McLaughlin and
Thyne, 2010; Tir, 2010). The simplification appears problematic, however, when the state
leader’s decision to escalate the conflict is controversial and has mixed consequences.
Dovish citizens will not approve the escalation of conflicts they view as provocative and
unnecessary (Brutger and Kertzer, 2018; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016). In particular, the
liberalist tradition of international relations suggests that the diffusion of democratic norms
and shared economic interests have profoundly changed the public preference and eroded
the basis of nationalism based on narrow in-group identity. It would be a formidable
task for democratic leaders to mobilize public support against other democratic countries
(Oneal and Russett, 2001; Tomz and Weeks, 2013).
To sum, blind patriotism offers a somewhat undecorated answer for why citizens rally
around the flag with political discontent largely muted during international crises. The
validity of the claim is challenged after taking into account contextual factors that shape
elite-citizen communication and influence citizens’ evaluation of political leadership. One
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may argue that such contextual factors are much weaker in typical authoritarian states,
e.g., China, which are defined by low political competition and restrictive information ac-
cess. The political reality of authoritarian politics facilitates elites to arbitrarily manipulate
popular nationalism and repress domestic discontent. We leave the discussion to the next
section.
Nationalist rallies and regime support: The case of China
Though not facing the direct pressure of competitive elections, authoritarian leaders depen-
dent on large constituencies may similarly be incentivized to leverage popular nationalism
and rally public support (Oakes, 2006; Pickering and Kisangani, 2010; Theiler, 2018). The
imposition of the nationalist agenda in autocracies is nevertheless vastly different from the
elite-citizen interaction in democracies. Abundant historical evidence suggests that chau-
vinism dictated by consolidated authoritarian regimes had decisive influences over public
preference, e.g., imperial Japan (Kushner, 2007), Nazi Germany (Herf, 2008), and the So-
viet Union (Bonnell, 1999). The authoritarian government can monopolize the political
discourse and justify expansionary objectives and nationalism is used to deter domestic
opposition (Snyder, 2013). At the micro-level, scholars have uncovered strong causal ef-
fects of the state-controlled media on radical nationalism and violent inter-group conflicts
(Adena et al., 2015; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014).
Pundits believe that the state-led nationalism serves important political purposes in
China after the debacle of communism in the 90s. On the one hand, nationalism provides
a crucial ideological source of political legitimacy and is an indispensable component of
public education. On the other hand, Chinese leaders recognize the disruptive force of
popular nationalism which may backfire and destabilize the society. Scholars argue that
the Chinese government has devised a sophisticated strategy of persuasion, repression,
and tolerance to stage-manage popular nationalism (Reilly, 2012; Weiss, 2014). With
public education, the Chinese government seeks to cultivate a relatively innocuous version
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of patriotism amid young students that underscores national identity and political loyalty
(Cantoni et al., 2017). The “Patriotic Education Campaign” partially unveils the state’s di-
versionary incentives (Wang, 2008), and the regime’s resources are concentrated in regions
with high anti-regime potentials (Liu and Ma, 2018). The success of the state-sponsored
nationalism can be illustrated by the strong correlative relationship between nationalism,
political conservatism, and traditional social values (Pan and Xu, 2018).
And scholars have paid close attention to the scenario of hyper-nationalism directed by
the troubled Chinese government in the midst of economic slow-down (Friedberg, 2005,
p.29-30). Despite general interests and speculations, China remains an understudied case
in terms of empirical studies and there is at most anecdotal evidence of the causal effect of
international conflicts on public opinion. One frequently mentioned example of diversion-
ary nationalism is the anti-US demonstrations against the NATO bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade in 1999, which have arguably mitigated the Chinese leadership’s
concerns about the tenth anniversary of the June Fourth Massacre (Zheng, 1999, p.14).
Based on longitudinal public surveys, scholars also indicated that the level of Chinese na-
tionalism has been largely stable for the past decade, despite China’s rising power and the
escalation of territorial disputes, including South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands dispute
(Johnston, 2017). The mixed evidence suggests both the volatility and stability of public
opinion in China, and it is difficult to make a conclusive statement linking international
changes to increasing political support at home.
Thanks to the availability of new survey data, in this study we test the following hy-
potheses derived from the diversionary theory and examine the causal effects of inter-
national conflicts on the Chinese public opinion. Firstly, we revisit the group dynamics
implied by the diversionary theory and test whether international crises increase Chinese
citizens’ negative sentiment against the “hostile foreign forces.” To recap, the diversion-
ary theory postulates that citizens facing the same external threat would temporarily put
aside political differences and support the incumbent leader who now represents national
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interests. The increasing salience of group identity results in stronger negative sentiment
against outsiders who are deemed as threatening. We present the first hypothesis as fol-
lows:
H1 (Out-group Hostility) The escalation of international disputes increases citizens’
hostility against implicated out-groups.
The group dynamics not only postulates negative sentiment against out-groups but also
stronger solidarity amid in-group members, e.g., loyalty to the nation when the external
threat looms large. Existing literature also includes citizens’ satisfaction with the social
status and leniency with inequality as additional evidence of in-group cohesion. Based on
the social identity theory, Shayo (2009) argued that people tend to identify themselves with
those they see as similar, and all else being equal they identify with high-status groups.
Nationalism can distract people’s attention away from their diverging circumstances and
makes economically disadvantaged citizens feel more satisfied with their social status.
And as for the relationship between nationalism and inequality, Solt (2011) argued that
stronger in-group solidarity would also weaken citizens’ perception of inequality and fur-
ther suppress political demands for distribution. We propose the second hypothesis:
H2 (In-Group Solidarity) The escalation of international disputes promotes citizens’
loyalty to the nation, improves satisfaction with social status, and decreases perception of
inequality.
Apart from group dynamics, the diversionary theory predicts the aggregate shift of po-
litical attitudes in favor of the incumbent government. It can be observed from people’s
satisfaction with their status and loyalty to the nation (which overlaps with the hypothesis
of in-group solidarity), as well as their sensitivity to the severity of other domestic prob-
lems. One mechanism is that international crises directly repress the voice of oppositions
(Baker and Oneal, 2001). In line with this argument, we should observe that people are
less likely to publicly complain about domestic problems and display higher approval of
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government performance.3 Therefore, we propose the third hypothesis:
H3 (Sensitivity to Domestic Problems) The escalation of international disputes de-
creases public discontent towards salient social problems.
It is worth mentioning that existing literature provides important insights on possible
null findings from the rationalist perspective. The basic argument is that nationalist ral-
lies are not fundamentally different from other political events. If citizens are sufficiently
forward-looking and stay informed of the domestic and international situation, their pref-
erences should be highly stable against the influence of temporary political shocks. And
when facing domestic difficulties, rational citizens would also expect the state leader’s pri-
vate incentives of diversion and view international conflicts as reckless and unnecessary. It
nevertheless remains a debatable question as to whether or not the assumption of rational
citizens holds in the Chinese context. Previous scholars have mostly portrayed Chinese cit-
izens as reflexive and emotional when China confronts foreign challenges (Weiss, 2014).
The lack of political competition also facilitates the authoritarian state’s manipulation of
public opinion, which cultivates the dominant public discourse of popular nationalism.
Data and Method
The 2012 Diaoyu Islands dispute
The first case we examine is the 2012 Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan.
In 2012, the relationship between China and Japan was unexpectedly strained again by
the long-simmering dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Infuriated by the Japanese
government’s announced plan to “nationalize” the uninhabited islands, Chinese citizens
launched large-scale anti-Japanese protests in late August and September that were largely
spontaneous but allowed by the state (Weiss, 2013). In Figure 2.1, we plot the temporal
change of the citizens’ exposure to the conflict information measured by the daily Baidu
3It is also important to understand the sensitive political context of China. Although anonymity was
promised to the respondents in all the surveys covered in this research, we acknowledge the fact that people
perceive themselves as publicly talking about government policies with survey enumerators.
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Index at the national level. It can be observed that two incidents contributed to the dra-
matic politicization of the conflict: The landing of Chinese activists on the Diaoyu Islands
(August 15) and the Japanese government’s announced the “final” nationalization of the
Islands (September 10). And after the two incidents, two waves of organized protests took
place (relatively small protests on August 19-20 and nationwide protests on September
15-18). Besides the historical animosity between China and Japan, territorial disputes are
generally regarded as strong cases in favor of the diversionary theory as they directly speak













































































Fig. 2.1: The Baidu Index of the Keyword “Diaoyu Islands,” 2012
To study the shift of public opinion, we utilize survey data from the China Family
Panel Studies (CFPS), a project funded by the Chinese government and administrated by
the Institute of Social Science Survey of Peking University. It is a nationally representative
survey conducted biannually since 2010 and provides a longitudinal dataset covering over
20,000 Chinese citizens. The 2012 Wave of CFPS was implemented between July 2012
and March 2013, and most interviews were concentrated between July and September in
2012. For the three months, the exact interview date was from July 12th to September
23rd, and in Figure 2.2 we plot the number of interviews for each day.
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Fig. 2.2: Number of CFPS Interviews by Date
The CFPS questionnaire does not have direct questions on people’s attitudes towards
Japan. Instead, we use the level of trust in Americans as the measurement of citizens’ atti-
tudes towards implicated out-groups (on the scale of 0-10). The US is the most important
military ally of Japan and deeply involved in the geopolitical puzzle of the East China Sea
(Smith, 2013). The US involvement in the dispute can also be illustrated by the direct mil-
itary intervention following China’s proclaimed Air Defense Identification Zone in 2013.
Some scholars also argue that anti-Americanism in China is strongly associated with other
dimensions of political attitudes, e.g., nationalism and skepticism of western values (John-
ston and Stockmann, 2007). It is possible that for the average Chinese citizens, the US is
an insidious accomplice of Japan and the two countries seek to collaborate and undermine
China. Therefore, we argue that the distrust of Americans provides a credible proxy that
measures overall antagonism against hostile out-groups.4
We use the citizens’ self-identification of social status and perception of inequality
to capture the positive change implied by in-group dynamics. In-group solidarity may
4In the Online Appendix, we provide additional analysis using survey data from Beijing Area Studies
(BAS) that reaffirms the correlative relationship. In particular, there is a very strong correlation between
anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiment (Pearson’s r = 0.62).
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also be reflected by one’s higher satisfaction with the current situation and stronger con-
fidence in the future, which we also covered in the empirical analysis. To identify the
changes in political support for the government on domestic issues, we include citizens’
self-evaluation of the severity of multiple social issues including corruption, environmen-
tal protection, unemployment, education, healthcare, housing price, and social welfare.
Due to data availability, we only examine whether the conflict led to a higher evaluation of
local government officials. Although the diversionary theory emphasizes the effect of con-
flicts on public opinion towards the incumbent state leader, in authoritarian regimes like
China, attitudes towards the local government may be a more relevant indicator of gen-
eral political satisfaction given citizens’ strong reluctance to openly criticize the central
government (Chen, 2017; Li, 2016).
As suggested by the changes of Baidu Index and the occurrence of nationalist protests,
we use August 15th as the cutoff point of the escalated conflict (i.e., the treatment).5 The
treatment effect is estimated using the following model with standard errors clustered by
the primary sampling unit (county) and re-weighted by the sampling weight:
Political Attitudei = βEscalationt +Xiθ + δj + τk + εi
Escalationt is the dummy variable indicating that the interview was conducted after
August 15th. Xi is a vector of demographic covariates such as family income, education,
age, gender, marital status, employment status, party membership, etc. δj is the county
fixed effect and τk is the day-of-the-week fixed effect. To improve the comparability be-
tween the treatment and the control group, we drop counties which hosted less than 15
respondents, and counties in which over 85% of the interviews were conducted either be-
fore or after August 15th.6
The basic assumption of identifying the causal effect is that respondents are similar be-
5As robustness checks, we discuss how choosing different cutoff dates may change the results. We also
evaluate the sensitivity of empirical results by changing the bandwidth of observations around the cutoff date
(e.g., using observations of August only).
6The main results do not substantively change without the restrictions.
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Fig. 2.3: The Balance of Demographics (Entropy Balancing)
fore and after the cutoff date and the treatment is as-if-random. Thanks to the longitudinal
structure of the survey, we test the balance of political attitudes, using the 2010 and 2014
Wave. We show that respondents who were visited before and after the cutoff date in 2012
did not display any systematic difference two years before and after the Sino-Japan con-
flict (results relegated to the Online Appendix). The treatment and control group indeed
show some significant differences in terms of demographic factors in the 2012 Wave (Fig-
ure 2.3), though the standardized mean difference (SMD) indicates that the magnitude of
absolute difference is considerably low.7 Besides directly adding demographic covariates
as control, we also re-analyze the data using the entropy balancing method which ensures
the perfect balance of demographic covariates (Hainmueller, 2012).
The 2018-19 US-China trade war
The second case we examine is the 2018-19 US-China trade war. In Figure 2.4, we again
plot the temporal change of the citizens’ exposure to the conflict information measured by
the daily Baidu Index at the national level. It can be observed that there were three jumps of
7For instance, the average age is 43.01 for the control group and 42.17 for the treatment group, with the
p-value of 0.002 and SMD of 0.061.
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citizens’ exposure to the conflict information, the release of the US Trade Representative
report (March 22, 2018), the start of the first tranche of the US tariffs on $50 billion
Chinese goods (July 6, 2018), and the failure of the re-negotiation and the re-escalation
of tariffs on $200 billion Chinese goods (May 5, 2019). Public interests in the trade war
waned gradually between July 2018 and May 2019, which may be a result of the state-
controlled media that toned down the confrontation. And Trump and Xi’s G20 meeting
in late November 2018 started a temporary de-escalation of the conflict, and both sides
































































Fig. 2.4: The Baidu Index of the Keyword “US-China Trade War,” 2018-19
We utilize three waves of online surveys, one after the first escalation of the US tariffs
(August 6-14, 2018), one after the restart of the US-China negotiation and the temporary
detente (January 19-24, 2019), and one after the re-escalation of the US tariffs (August 1-
10, 2019). The number of respondents is 2, 110 in the first wave, 1, 398 in the second, and
1, 709 in the third. The survey was implemented by a local survey company, which used
the same sampling frame consisting of a large online population. 1, 012 respondents par-
ticipated in the first and second wave, and 582 respondents participated in all three waves.8
8The political sensitivity of our survey may deter respondents from re-participating. However, we find
that most political attitudes of the respondents in the first wave did not significantly change their likelihood
PAPER 2. DOES NATIONALISM RALLY SUPPORT 113
The samples of the first and second waves show an overall good balance of demographics
while the sample of the third wave displays some significant differences (details reported
in the Online Appendix).
And compared to the general population, the online samples are biased towards the
group of high-income, well-educated urban residents and much less representative com-
pared to the CFPS panel. Notwithstanding the limitations of external validity and sample
representativeness, we test if the unexpected escalation and de-escalation of trade disputes
have contributed to changes in political attitudes. The first and third waves were conducted
during the period of escalation, while the second wave was conducted in the interim of
de-escalation. Therefore, the temporal changes of political tensions allow us to examine
how anti-foreign sentiment and political loyalty shift. We asked multiple questions that
systematically measure the respondents’ feelings about the US. We measured individual
loyalty to the nation by probing for the propensity to stay in China when other options
are available. All the responses are coded in the 5-point Likert scale, and the wording of
the questions and the distribution of responses are relegated to the Online Appendix. To
mitigate the concern of sample imbalance, we conduct paired sample t-tests based on the
revisited respondents only and draw strict causal inferences based on the same subset of
individuals.
Empirical Results
The 2012 Diaoyu Islands dispute
We first present evidence on the shift of citizens’ negative sentiment against out-groups be-
fore and after the escalation of the territorial dispute (H1). The main results are reported in
Table 2.1, and the outcome variable is the trust in Americans (negative coefficient indicates
stronger distrust). The effect of escalation is estimated using the original survey weights
of participating in the second and third waves. The results are presented in the Online Appendix.
PAPER 2. DOES NATIONALISM RALLY SUPPORT 114
in Panel A and the entropy balancing weights in Panel B.9 In Column 1, we present the
estimated effect based on the full sample and the coefficient is negative and significant. We
further separate the respondents from 25 provinces into two roughly equal groups using
two measurements of popular nationalism at the provincial level (above versus below me-
dian): the conflict information exposure (Baidu Index) and the percentage of population
witnessing early and large nationalist protests (population in cities with protests divided
by the provincial population). As shown in Column 2 - 5 of Panel A (original survey
weights), the effect of escalation tends to be stronger in provinces with relatively higher
information exposure and more intense nationalist protests.
Panel A: Original Survey Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample High Information Low Information High Protest Low Protest
Escalation -0.282∗∗ -0.326∗∗ -0.233+ -0.326∗∗ -0.203+
(0.0742) (0.0817) (0.119) (0.0972) (0.115)
Weighted Mean (DV) 2.639 2.616 2.659 2.612 2.677
N 15,986 7,535 8,451 8,196 7,790
No. Counties 130 59 71 65 65
R-sq 0.138 0.168 0.117 0.143 0.135
Panel B: Entropy Balancing Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample High Information Low Information High Protest Low Protest
Escalation -0.284∗∗ -0.284∗∗ -0.283∗ -0.300∗∗ -0.253∗
(0.0726) (0.0848) (0.115) (0.0848) (0.123)
Weighted Mean (DV) 2.568 2.580 2.574 2.574 2.561
N 15,986 7,535 8,451 8,196 7,790
No. Counties 130 59 71 65 65
R-sq 0.126 0.153 0.108 0.140 0.119
Note: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, cluster standard error in parentheses
Covariates and county fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Table 2.1: Territorial Dispute and Distrust of Americans
In the Online Appendix, we present a multitude of robustness checks which offer ad-
ditional support to findings in Table 2.1, i.e., negative sentiment against implicated out-
groups following the escalated conflict. We first focus on respondents from provinces of
9The entropy balancing weights are calculated with the ebalance package in Stata 14, and the original
survey weights are supplied as the base weights (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). The entropy balancing weights
are re-calculated for each subgroup.
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very high versus very low levels of popular nationalism based on the two measurements
above (top 20/30 percentile vs. bottom 20/30 percentile). Again, we find that the impact
is much stronger for respondents from provinces witnessing a strong upsurge of popular
nationalism. Second, we focus on the shorter time windows of observations (August and
August/September) and uncover largely robust results. Third, we use different cutoff dates
as the start of the treatment, e.g., the start of protests (August 19) and Japan’s announced
completion of the nationalization plan (September 10). It appears that the treatment ef-
fect is driven by a series of escalating events after August 15, and adding placebo dummy
variables of dates before August 15 does not change the main results. Fourth, we conduct
subgroup analysis and uncover heterogeneous effects amid different groups (age, educa-
tion, party membership, etc.).
Inequality and Social Identification













Escalation 0.0958 0.0533∗ 0.0435+ 0.0187 0.0332 0.00127
(0.0831) (0.0244) (0.0221) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0250)
Weighted Mean (DV) 6.744 2.639 2.838 3.303 3.465 3.693
N 16,261 16,638 16,514 16,596 16,591 16,482
No. Counties 130 130 130 130 130 130
R-sq 0.090 0.045 0.079 0.085 0.081 0.097
Note: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, cluster standard error in parentheses
Covariates and county fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Table 2.2: Territorial Dispute and Social Identification
Next, we discuss the hypothesized impact of international conflicts on the citizens’
perception of inequality and social status (H2), as well as perceptions of domestic prob-
lems (H3). To save space, we only present results using the entropy balancing weights and
using the original survey weights does not render substantively different results. In Table
2.2, we present the treatment effect on the outcome variables related to the perception of
inequality, and social status. As we discussed in the literature review, scholars propose
that nationalism enhances citizens’ perception of in-group status and stifles demands for
redistribution. Yet we observe no significant effect on citizens’ perception of inequality
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(Column 1), and some limited positive effects on social status and the coefficients are
comparatively small (Column 2 and 3). And overall, citizens did not display higher life
satisfaction or become more confident in the future (Column 4 - 6).
Panel A: Self-Reported Severity of Social Problems















Escalation 0.0588 -0.0482 -0.0401 -0.115 -0.0887 0.0256 -0.0309
(0.100) (0.0798) (0.0832) (0.0787) (0.0851) (0.0862) (0.0827)
Weighted Mean (DV) 5.915 5.738 5.882 5.353 5.527 5.532 5.342
N 15,846 16,235 16,105 16,142 16,307 16,232 16,111
No. Counties 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
R-sq 0.106 0.123 0.099 0.090 0.092 0.117 0.095
Panel B: Political Support (Local Government)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Trust in Local Officials (0-10) Local Government Performance (1-5)
Escalation 0.0116 -0.00296
(0.0290) (0.0747)
Weighted Mean (DV) 4.798 2.563
N 16,054 16,518
No. Counties 130 130
R-sq 0.084 0.092
Note: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, cluster standard error in parentheses
Covariates and county fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Table 2.3: Territorial Dispute and Government Performance
In Table 2.3, we present results related to people’s perception of domestic problems
and the approval of local officials. In general, we find no evidence that the escalation of
the territorial dispute had any diversionary effects on citizens’ perceived severity of so-
cial issues (Panel A), or significantly changed citizens’ evaluation of local officials (Panel
B). And examining the weighted mean of the outcome variables, one may also discover
that respondents in the sample, on average, slightly leaned towards giving the negative
evaluation of the local government. As aforementioned, the direct questioning of Chinese
citizens’ support for the central government is often problematic due to self-censorship and
political sensitiveness, and satisfaction with local government officials usually provides a
better proxy for overall political support (Chen, 2017). The null results we uncover reject
the core diversionary logic, indicating that citizens’ attitudes did not shift in favor of the
authoritarian government due to international conflicts.
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The 2018-19 US-China trade war
As aforementioned, we collect three waves of online survey data in August 2018, January
2019 and August 2019. We exploit the unexpected escalation and de-escalation between
China and the US. To make strong causal claims, we implement the paired sample t-tests
based on the subsample of revisited respondents (revisited respondents in August 2019
compared to January 2019; revisited respondents in August 2018 compared to January
2019). We examine whether or not the escalation of the trade dispute has contributed
to more intensive hostility against the US (H1) and stronger loyalty to the nation (H2).
Besides the same set of questions on political attitudes, respondents were also asked to
report their interests in the ongoing trade war so we can separate those highly alert to
the dispute from others. For the comparison between the first and second waves, 543
out of 1, 012 respondents had reported constantly strong interests in the news of the trade
war. For the comparison between the second and third wave, 316 out of 650 had reported
constantly strong interests in the news of the trade war.
We report the main findings on citizens’ attitudes towards the US in Figure 2.5. Except
for the US fear of China’s rise, the negative mean of the difference indicates that respon-
dents displayed more negative sentiment against the US (H1). Comparing the anti-US
sentiment in the first and second waves (the upper figure), we discover that only the re-
spondents who reported strong interests in the trade war had experienced some significant
changes in their attitudes towards the US and the magnitude is 0.1 on the 5-point scale.
The attentive citizens were less likely to believe that the US complies with the rule of law
or the US is peaceful immediately after the escalation of the trade war. And comparing the
anti-US sentiment in the second and third waves (the lower figure), we report a more dra-
matic change of anti-American sentiment following the re-escalation in May 2019. Even
for citizens who are not attentive to the trade war, there was still a significant change of
anti-American sentiment. The magnitude of attitudinal changes is between 0.1 and 0.2 for
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Fig. 2.5: Trade War and Anti-Americanism (Out-group Hostility)
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the whole sample and the subsample of attentive citizens alike.
●
●
Rather be a Chinese Citizen (Whole Sample)
Rather be a Chinese Citizen (Attentive Audience)
0.00 0.05
Mean of the Differences, Aug 18 − Jan 19 (Paired t−test with 95% CI)
●
●
Rather be a Chinese Citizen (Whole Sample)
Rather be a Chinese Citizen (Attentive Audience)
−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Mean of the Differences, Aug 19 − Jan 19 (Paired t−test with 95% CI)
Fig. 2.6: Trade War and Loyalty to the Nation (In-group Solidarity)
Next, we discuss if the escalation of trade disputes might have boosted the Chinese
citizens’ loyalty to the nation. The findings are presented in Figure 2.6. Contrary to the
expectation derived from the diversionary theory, we find no evidence supporting the ex-
istence of rally effects such that on average, the respondents were more loyal to the nation
(H2) in both periods of escalation. The difference in citizens’ responses is insignificant
from zero. Besides, the lack of significant changes is consistent for respondents who con-
stantly paid close attention to the progress of the US-China trade war compared to those
who did not. The results largely reaffirm the findings based on the CFPS data that inter-
national conflicts have very limited power on public opinion and do not boost people’s
loyalty to the nation.
Revisiting the correlation between nationalism and regime support
To sum, the empirical results above show that international conflicts provoke stronger
hostility against out-groups, which may largely account for the nationalist rallies observed
in the real world. Based on the nationally representative sample, we report a significant
jump of out-group hostility following the escalation of the Diaoyu Islands dispute in 2012.
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And based on the two-wave online survey, we show that citizens who reported constant
interests in the US-China trade war also displayed stronger anti-US sentiment when the
situation escalated in August 2018. The relatively smaller effect size may be attributed to
the fact that the G20 meeting between Xi and Trump was only a temporary ceasefire and
might not be strong enough to alter the entrenched distrust of the US amid Chinese citizens.
Furthermore, we present null findings that reject the hypotheses of in-group solidarity and
political support, contrary to the expectations of the diversionary theory.
In this section, we try to account for the null findings without assuming that Chi-
nese citizens are rational, forward-looking, or informed of the state leaders’ diversionary
interests. Alternatively, we argue that nationalism has two intercorrelated but conceptu-
ally independent facets: Anti-foreign sentiment (negative) and national pride and loyalty
to the authoritarian state (positive). The negative anti-foreign sentiment may be highly
malleable and reflexive under the impact of some external shocks, e.g., international con-
flicts, which may further result in substantial behavioral changes against the implicated
out-groups (Heilmann, 2016; Pandya and Venkatesan, 2016). But citizens’ national pride
and voluntary loyalty to the state may be much more stable and only gradually grow given
the persistent influence of public education and the state-sponsored propaganda (Cantoni
et al., 2017). Unlike the positive sentiment, the negative sentiment of nationalism may not
be readily translated into individual satisfaction with social status or political support for
the government.
To assess the explanation, we re-analyze the survey data used in the paper and revisit
the correlative relationship between nationalism and political attitudes. We first discuss
the results based on the CFPS data. We find that there is no clear relationship between the
distrust of Americans and citizens’ perceived severity of domestic social problems (Panel
A, Table 2.4). The linear regression results suggest citizens who trust Americans more
express stronger concerns about education and health care, but the coefficients become
insignificant on corruption, environment, and social welfare that are more directly related
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Panel A: Self-Reported Severity of Social Problems















Trust: Americans -0.011 0.004 -0.018 0.044*** 0.028** 0.015 0.011
(0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 18,177 18,560 18,428 18,481 18,616 18,557 18,456
R2 0.121 0.125 0.105 0.084 0.089 0.119 0.098
Panel B: Social Identification and Happiness













Trust: Americans -0.046*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.019***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 18,588 18,773 18,807 18,861 18,861 18,774
R2 0.094 0.083 0.086 0.093 0.082 0.109
Note: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, cluster standard error in parentheses
Covariates and county fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Table 2.4: Distrust of Americans and Political Support (CFPS)
to the prevalent themes of contentious politics in China. We also find a negative corre-
lation between anti-American sentiment and citizens’ social identification and happiness,
contrary to the logic of diversion and distraction (Panel B, Table 2.4). Citizens who trust
Americans more are actually more likely to identify with higher social groups and show
greater satisfaction, while citizens holding stronger distrust are less satisfied with their
situation and social status.
Aug 2018 Wave Jan 2019 Wave
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Oppose Criticism of the Government
Anti-Americanism 0.003 -0.020
(0.017) (0.021)
Rather be a Chinese Citizen 0.360*** 0.323***
(0.023) (0.031)
Observations 2,086 2,086 1,378 1,378
R2 0.020 0.108 0.000 0.073
Note: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, standard error in parentheses
Covariates and provincial fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Table 2.5: Nationalism and Political Support (Online Sample)
We also re-analyze the first two waves of the online sample, using all the available
observations besides revisited respondents. We use how strongly the respondents oppose
the public criticism of the government as the dependent variable of political support. With
the principal component analysis (PCA), we measure the respondents’ overall degree of
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anti-Americanism using the first principal component based on the five questions in Figure
2.5. As shown in Table 2.5, we find that anti-American sentiment does not contribute to
higher intolerance of criticism of the government. Instead, the coefficient is insignificant
and close to zero. The lack of correlation indicates that negative anti-foreign sentiment
does not strongly boost the domestic position of the government. As the comparison, we
run the same regression using the loyalty to the nation (rather be a Chinese citizen given
other alternatives) as the independent variable. And noticeably, the positive sentiment
of in-group solidarity is strongly associated with higher disapproval of criticism of the
government. Again, the results further indicate the divergent political implications of the
two facets of nationalism.
Panel A: Anti-Americanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Gains from Reform
(0-10)






Anti-Americanism −0.006 0.008 −0.016 −0.002 −0.007
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261
R2 0.065 0.066 0.132 0.051 0.042
Panel B: In-Group Loyalty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Gains from Reform
(0-10)






Loyalty to the Nation 0.147∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.017) (0.032) (0.019) (0.017)
Observations 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261 4,261
R2 0.071 0.070 0.143 0.060 0.053
Note: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, cluster standard error in parentheses
Covariates and district fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Table 2.6: Nationalism and Political Attitudes (Beijing Area Studies)
In addition to the two primary data sources, we utilize another social survey based on
the representative sample of Beijing residents, or the Beijing Area Studies (BAS) under
the administration of Peking University (Johnston, 2017). We pool the two recent surveys
conducted in 2013 and 2015 and impute the missing values of demographics; the total
number of observations is over 4, 000. Similar to the online sample, we perform the same
PCA analysis based on the questions about respondents’ feelings about Americans10 and
10The wording of the questions is very similar to that in the two-wave online sample presented in Figure
2.5.
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extract the first principal component as anti-Americanism. We also measure the positive
feelings of nationalism using the same question of the loyalty to the nation (rather be a
Chinese citizen given other alternatives) with a slightly different scale (from 1 to 4). As
shown in Table 2.6, we again find no correlative relationship between the negative senti-
ment of nationalism and individual satisfaction or positive view of economic performance
(Panel A). Instead, we have robust findings that loyalty to the nation is strongly associated
with individual satisfaction and the positive view of economic performance (Panel B).
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the diversionary theory of international conflicts under the Chi-
nese context, using the 2012 Diaoyu Islands dispute and the 2018-19 US-China Trade War
as two examples. We test the hypotheses derived from the diversionary theory that in-
ternational conflicts increase citizens’ hostility against implicated out-groups, strengthen
in-group solidarity, and boost political support for the regime. We report jumps of anti-
foreign sentiment in both cases, yet fail to detect significant changes of in-group solidarity
or general political support. We conclude that international conflicts render limited do-
mestic benefits for authoritarian leaders. To account for the null findings, we propose the
explanation based on two facets of nationalism and the different political implications.
Different from negative nationalism (e.g., anti-foreign sentiment), positive nationalism
(e.g., national pride and loyalty to the in-group) is highly stable and not subject to change
given temporary international shocks.
The empirical findings we present contradict the general perception that the authoritar-
ian state monopolizes the political discourse and powerfully shape the preference of do-
mestic preference via a multitude of coercive policy instruments. Previous research under-
scores considerable investments of the state in the official ideology but focuses primarily
on the medium or long-term effect, e.g., propaganda and education. While acknowledging
the state’s influence on public opinion, we view our results as delimiting the upper bound
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of the state’s influence in the short-term, i.e., during critical political junctures of inter-
national crises. Despite the presence of intensive elite rhetoric and state-media coverage
in the two cases we examine, we conclude that political attitudes amid Chinese citizens
generally remain stable.
As covered in the literature review, the study of diversionary theory provides a concise
and plain logic that links domestic politics and foreign policies. Yet the research agenda
meets the perplexing problem of pinpointing the micro-level mechanisms and quantifying
the magnitude of domestic benefits generated by international conflicts. The diversionary
theory forecasts the spike of anti-foreign sentiment accompanied by rising in-group soli-
darity and support for the regime amid citizens. The prospect of gaining domestic support
incentivizes state leaders to aggressively pursue foreign victories.
Extending the theoretical and empirical scopes of the existing literature, our empirical
findings contribute to the scholarly debate on the general relationship between domestic
politics and foreign policies. Scholars have long debated the independent role of popu-
lar nationalism and the extent to which public preference drives China’s foreign policies
(Johnston, 2017; Quek and Johnston, 2018; Reilly, 2012; Weiss, 2013). One proposition
is that China’s new assertiveness in the territorial disputes meets the hawkish demands of
the domestic audience (Johnston, 2013). Experts on China also mark the rise of Xi Jinping
as a critical juncture of political changes and argue that the state-sponsored nationalism
has become much more closely tied to foreign policy objectives (Blackwill and Campbell,
2016; Zhao, 2013).
Sharing doubts with Quek and Johnston (2018), we are not convinced with this argu-
ment that Chinese leaders aim to rally domestic support and stifle political unrest by ag-
gressively pursuing international victories. The null findings we report unveil the formidable
task of manipulating public opinion even in the authoritarian context. Although the Chi-
nese government may have strong incentives to cultivate nationalist credentials as the
source of its legitimacy, we suggest that it should not be confused with initiating con-
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flicts that explicitly serve for the short-term benefits of diverting domestic discontent and
rallying domestic support. The stability of people’s political attitudes substantiate a sophis-
ticated domestic audience that is hardly controlled by the impulses of blind nationalism.
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M/`/ 2``Q`b BM T`2Mi?2b2b
*Qp`Bi2b 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i?2` "2 *?BM2b2 *BiBx2M UK2M Ub/VV 9Xkj UyXNdV 9XjR UyXNyV yXyyj
GQr2` h`Bz UK2M Ub/VV jXjd UyXNeV jX9R UyXNdV yXkk9
*?BM@la SQr2` "HM+2 UK2M Ub/VV kXRd URXy9V kX99 URXR9V IyXyyR
la@H2/ avbi2K, "2M2}+BH UK2M Ub/VV kXNk URXRRV jXyy URXRRV yXy8y
la, S2+27mH UK2M Ub/VV kXdN URXyeV kXd9 URXy3V yXR8d
la, _mH2 Q7 Gr UK2M Ub/VV jXyk URXReV kXNy URXkyV yXyyR
la, qQ`/b Ji+? .22/b UK2M Ub/VV kX83 URXyeV kX8R URXy3V yXyk3
la, 62` *?BMǶb _Bb2 UK2M Ub/VV 9XRR UyXN9V 9Xky UyXNjV yXyyd
h#H2 Xd, aKTH2 "HM+2 "2ir22M m;mbi kyR3 qp2 M/ m;mbi kyRN qp2
K2`B+MBbK #b2/ QM i?2 S`BM+BTH *QKTQM2Mi MHvbBb US*VX HH i?2 +Qp`Bi2b mb2 i?2
/i BM i?2 m;mbi kyR3 qp2X q2 }M/ i?i BM ;2M2`H- MiB@K2`B+MBbK Q` BMiQH2`M+2 Q7
+`BiB+BbK Q7 i?2 ;Qp2`MK2Mi /Q2b MQi bB;MB}+MiHv BM~m2M+2 i?2 T`Q##BHBiv Q7 #2BM; `2pBbBi2/
BM i?2 7QHHQrBM; irQ rp2bX S`i Q7 i?2 bKTH2 ii`BiBQM Bb /`Bp2M #v 7+iQ`b MQi /B`2+iHv
`2Hi2/ iQ TQHBiB+H iiBim/2b- 2X;X- ;2 M/ m`#M `2bB/2M+2X q2 BM/22/ }M/ i?i `2bTQM/2Mib
r?Q `2TQ`i2/ bi`QM;2` HQvHiv iQ i?2 MiBQM r2`2 bQK2r?i H2bb HBF2Hv iQ T`iB+BTi2 BM i?2
7QHHQr@mT bm`p2vbX h?2 ii`BiBQM /Q2b MQi /B`2+iHv D2QT`/Bx2 i?2 `2b2`+? /2bB;M b r2 QMHv
+QKT`2 `2bTQM/2Mib `2T2i2/Hv T`iB+BTi2/ BM Qm` bm`p2vX
@9
.2T2M/2Mi p`B#H2,
_2pBbBi2/- CM kyRNU4 RV _2pBbBi2/- m; kyRNU4 RV
L 4 RyRk L 4 d89
URV UkV UjV U9V
;2 0.486!!! 0.466!!! 0.401!!! 0.383!!!
(0.091) (0.091) (0.096) (0.097)
;22 !0.032!!! !0.030!!! !0.022!! !0.020!!
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
JH2 0.140 0.129 0.128 0.115
(0.094) (0.093) (0.097) (0.097)
aQK2 *QHH2;2 0.140 0.121 0.252 0.238
(0.199) (0.200) (0.214) (0.215)
"+?2HQ` 0.065 0.058 0.443!! 0.442!!
(0.190) (0.191) (0.207) (0.208)
Jbi2` Q` #Qp2 !0.274 !0.277 0.013 0.016
(0.246) (0.248) (0.265) (0.265)
_2;BK2 AMbB/2` 0.026 0.026 !0.076 !0.076
(0.106) (0.107) (0.110) (0.110)
S`iv !0.090 !0.067 !0.001 0.019
(0.117) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119)
*?BH/?QQ/ _2bB/2M+2, aKHH *Biv !0.053 !0.078 0.116 0.097
(0.147) (0.147) (0.158) (0.158)
*?BH/?QQ/ _2bB/2M+2, J2i`QTQHBiM 0.230 0.199 0.284! 0.261
(0.154) (0.154) (0.167) (0.166)
*m``2Mi _2bB/2M+2, aKHH *Biv 1.094!!! 1.114!!! 0.212 0.224
(0.398) (0.396) (0.389) (0.386)
*m``2Mi _2bB/2M+2, J2i`QTQHBiM 1.237!!! 1.256!!! 0.410 0.421
(0.404) (0.402) (0.400) (0.397)
AM+QK2 0.045 0.047 0.027 0.029
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
MiB@K2`B+MBbK !0.016 !0.022
(0.028) (0.029)
_i?2` #2 *?BM2b2 *BiBx2M !0.122!! !0.107!!
(0.051) (0.051)
PTTQb2 *`BiB+BbK Q7 :Qp2`MK2Mi !0.003 0.027 !0.010 0.017
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043)
*QMbiMi !3.041!!! !2.565!!! !2.854!!! !2.441!!!
(0.441) (0.486) (0.441) (0.480)
LQi2, +T<yXRc !T<yXy8c !!T<yXyR
h#H2 X3, S`2/B+i2/ S`Q##BHBiv Q7 "2BM; _2pBbBi2/
@8
RXj h?2 Q`B;BMH i2tib Q7 i?2 bm`p2v [m2biBQMb
*6Sa
Ç U.Bbi`mbi Q7 K2`B+MbV AM vQm` QTBMBQM- ?Qr i`mbirQ`i?v `2 K2`B+Mb\
ӭцѤмϪϡҞࡄڗ֏Ғح\
Ç UaQ+BH B/2MiB}+iBQMV q?B+? bQ+BH +Hbb /Q vQmfvQm` 7KBHv #2HQM; iQ\
ӭfӭрϨӆсϡघϿс֧\
Ç UAM/BpB/mH biBb7+iBQM M/ +QM}/2M+2V >Qr biBb}2/ `2 vQm rBi? vQm`fvQm` 7KBHvǶb
HB72\ ӭцІѝfІрТ҅ϡٶҺࡄ֏\
>Qr +QM}/2Mi `2 vQm Q7 7mim`2\ ӭцІѝ۔ϱϡҞКࡄ֏\
Ç Ua2H7@`2TQ`i2/ b2p2`Biv Q7 bQ+BH T`Q#H2KbV >Qr b2`BQmb /Q vQm i?BMF i?2 7QHHQrBM; bQ+BH
Bbbm2b `2 BM +QMi2KTQ``v *?BM\ AM+Hm/BM; *Q``mTiBQM- 1MpB`QMK2Mi- 1/m+iBQM-
>2Hi? *`2- >QmbBM;- aQ+BH q2H7`2- AM2[mHBiv
ӭڶЋйЎ՜֣ϨϢмϡ଴Գࡄ֏Ғح\ Uฒਠ䩟॒ࢲ䩟ڌड़䩟ࣨඎ䩟֙ࠚ䩟घϿخ
ᅣ䩟ϤכҳV
Ç UGQ+H ;Qp2`MK2MiV AM vQm` QTBMBQM- ?Qr i`mbirQ`i?v `2 i?2 HQ+H ;Qp2`MK2Mi Q{+BHb\
ӭцחݾ U܋ӾссҤू௞؃ܥV ϡҞࡄڗ֏Ғح\
Ç q?i Bb vQm` Qp2`HH 2pHmiBQM Q7 i?2 HQ+H ;Qp2`MK2Mi\
ӭцЧёӆ໋fصfू߇௞֞ӑϡւՄ߯٣ϥѮА\
PMHBM2 am`p2vb
Ç UMiB@K2`B+MBbKV "b2/ QM vQm` 72HHBM;- r?i FBM/ Q7 +?`+i2`BbiB+b /Q vQm i?BMF la
T2QTH2 ?p2\ la T2QTH2 `2 T2+2@HQpBM;fla T2QTH2 +`2 #Qmi `mH2bfla T2QTH2 Ki+?
i?2B` rQ`/b rBi? /22/bfla T2QTH2 72` #Qmi i?2 `Bb2 Q7 *?BM U6Q` 2+? +?`+i2`BbiB+b-




Ç Uh?2 la@H2/ BMi2`MiBQMH bvbi2KV _2;`/BM; *?BM䦦b /2p2HQTK2MiH Ti? BM i?2 Tbi
jy v2`b- r?i `QH2 /Q2b i?2 +m``2Mi la@H2/ BMi2`MiBQMH bvbi2K M/ ;HQ#H Q`/2` THv\
U*?QQb2 7`QK ǳo2`v TQbBiBp2Ǵ iQ ǳo2`v M2;iBp2-Ǵ BX2X- 8@TQBMi b+H2 ǳLQ bB;MB}+Mi





Ç UGQvHiv iQ i?2 MiBQMV ;`22 Q` /Bb;`22\ 1p2M B7 A ?p2 Qi?2` +?QB+2b- A rQmH/ `i?2`
#2  *?BM2b2 +BiBx2MX U*?QQb2 7`QK ǳai`QM;Hv ;`22Ǵ iQ ǳai`QM;Hv /Bb;`22-Ǵ BX2X- 8@
TQBMi b+H2V ӭϥਦ൐ӎЎӌϡವ਎䩭ٍسНйࡺשԒ֎ϼحڗԷؚмр䩟ϢЇѸ݁
Һ҂Ѕмԍھ䦚䩛Ԫמ૆ӎҺϺמ૆ϤӎҺࡺש䩜
Ç UPTTQb2 +`BiB+BbK Q7 ;Qp2`MK2Mi- m; kyR3 M/ CM kyRNV ;`22 Q` /Bb;`22\ b i?2
;Qp2`MK2Mi ;2M2`HHv im`Mb Qmi iQ #2 `B;?i #Qmi i?BM;b- +BiBx2MbǶ +`BiB+BbK Q` Qp2`bB;?i
Q7 i?2 ;Qp2`MK2Mi䦦b TQHB+B2b `2 mM?2HT7mH M/ +`2i2 bQ+BH /BbQ`/2`X U*?QQb2 7`QK
ǳai`QM;Hv ;`22Ǵ iQ ǳai`QM;Hv /Bb;`22-Ǵ BX2X- 8@TQBMi b+H2V ӭϥਦ൐ӎЎӌϡವ਎䩭
ू௞҂оϡݸӡ֡׶ϥԜ৭ϡ䩟ԍھ౓߯ڈϥฮᒾू௞ϡݸ೫ϥЬϩࡾݨϡ䩟ބґ
Ͽ߃юघϿౢࣣ䦚䩛Ԫמ૆ӎҺϺמ૆ϤӎҺࡺש䩜
RX9 MiB@7Q`2B;M a2MiBK2Mi M/ SQHBiB+H S`272`2M+2
lbBM; i?2 "a /i UkyRj M/ kyR8V- r2 HbQ +QKT`2 i?2 K2bm`2K2Mi Q7 MiB@K2`B+MBbK
M/ MiB@CTM2b2 b2MiBK2MiX b *?BMǶb irQ KBM ;2QTQHBiB+H QTTQM2Mib- i?2`2 Bb  bi`QM;
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6B;X Xd, MiB@K2`B+MBbK M/ MiB@CTM2b2 a2MiBK2Mi
AM h#H2 XN M/ XRy- r2 HbQ +QKT`2 ?Qr MiB@7Q`2B;M b2MiBK2Mi Bb `2Hi2/ iQ HQvHiv iQ
i?2 MiBQM M/ 7Q`2B;M TQHB+v T`272`2M+2 BM ;2M2`HX b bm;;2bi2/ BM i?2 KBM i2ti- i?2`2 Bb 
TQbBiBp2 `2HiBQMb?BT #2ir22M MiB@7Q`2B;M b2MiBK2Mi M/ HQvHiv iQ i?2 MiBQM- M/ S2`bQM
*Q``2HiBQM Bb #2ir22M 0.15 M/ 0.20X ai`QM;2` MiB@7Q`2B;M b2MiBK2Mi HbQ +QMi`B#mi2b iQ
i?2 bi`QM;2` T`272`2M+2 Q7 BM+`2bBM; /272Mb2 bT2M/BM;b- M/ HQr2` T2`+2TiBQM Q7 i?2 i?`2i
Q7 /QK2biB+ mM`2bi `2HiBp2 iQ 2ti2`MH i?`2ibX q2 /Q MQi }M/ Mv `2HiBQMb?BT #2ir22M
MiB@7Q`2B;M b2MiBK2Mi M/ T`272`2M+2 Q7 BM+`2bBM; *?BMǶb 7Q`2B;M B/ Q` 7`22 i`/2X
@d
URV UkV UjV U9V U8V






6`22 h`/2 Uy@RV h?`2i Q7 .QK2b@
iB+ lM`2bi Uy@RV
MiB@CTM2b2 yXy8d!! yXyR3!! yXyyy9 yXyyk !yXyRN!!
P#b2`piBQMb 9-keR 9-keR 9-keR 9-keR 9-keR
_2 yXyNk yXyjN yXykd yXyjj yXyjd
LQi2, + p < 0.1- ! p < 0.05- !! p < 0.01- +Hmbi2` biM/`/ 2``Q` BM T`2Mi?2b2b
*Qp`Bi2b M/ /Bbi`B+i }t2/ 2z2+ib `2 QKBii2/ 7Q` bBKTHB+BivX
h#H2 XN, MiB@CTM2b2 a2MiBK2Mi M/ SQHBiB+H iiBim/2b U"aV
URV UkV UjV U9V U8V






6`22 h`/2 Uy@RV h?`2i Q7 .QK2b@
iB+ lM`2bi Uy@RV
MiB@K2`B+MBbK yXy83!! yXyRN!! !yXyyR yXyyj !yXyR8!!
UyXyRyV UyXyy8V UyXyy8V UyXyyjV UyXyy8V
P#b2`piBQMb 9-keR 9-keR 9-keR 9-keR 9-keR
_2 yXyNk yXy9y yXykd yXyj9 yXyj8
LQi2, + p < 0.1- ! p < 0.05- !! p < 0.01- +Hmbi2` biM/`/ 2``Q` BM T`2Mi?2b2b
*Qp`Bi2b M/ /Bbi`B+i }t2/ 2z2+ib `2 QKBii2/ 7Q` bBKTHB+BivX
h#H2 XRy, MiB@K2`B+MBbK M/ SQHBiB+H iiBim/2b U"aV
@3
k _Q#mbiM2bb *?2+Fb, h?2 .BQvm AbHM/ .BbTmi2
AM i?Bb b2+iBQM- r2 T`2b2Mi //BiBQMH `Q#mbiM2bb +?2+Fb QM i?2 `2TQ`i2/ }M/BM;b Q7 BM+`2bBM;
MiB@7Q`2B;M b2MiBK2Mi /m`BM; BMi2`MiBQMH +`Bb2bX
kXR *QKT`BM; T`QpBM+2b Q7 p2`v ?B;? pbX HQr MiBQMHBbK
AM //BiBQM iQ i?2 KBM `2bmHib T`2b2Mi2/ BM h#H2 R- ?2`2 r2 T`2b2Mi //BiBQMH bm#;`QmT
MHvbBb #b2/ QM i?2 BMi2MbBiv Q7 TQTmH` MiBQMHBbK r?2M i?2 .BQvm AbHM/b /BbTmi2
2b+Hi2/X AMbi2/ Q7 i?2 K2/BM mb2/ BM i?2 KBM i2ti- q2 2tKBM2 i?2 iQTf#QiiQK jy
T2`+2MiBH2 BM h#H2 XRR M/ iQTf#QiiQK jy T2`+2MiBH2 BM h#H2 XRkX h?2 M2;iBp2 2z2+i Bb
+QMbBbi2MiHv /`Bp2M #v T`QpBM+2b Q7 `2HiBp2Hv ?B;? MiBQMHBbK b K2bm`2/ #v BM7Q`KiBQM
2tTQbm`2 M/ MiBQMHBbi T`Qi2bibX
SM2H , P`B;BMH am`p2v q2B;?ib
URV UkV UjV U9V U8V
6mHH aKTH2 >B;? AM7Q`KiBQM GQr AM7Q`KiBQM >B;? S`Qi2bi GQr S`Qi2bi
UhQT jyV U"QiiQK jyV UhQT jyV U"QiiQK jyV
1b+HiBQM @yXk3k!! @yXjdd!! @yXRd3 @yXjed!! @yXRkN
UyXyd9kV UyXyNRjV UyXRReV UyXRjyV UyXRdeV
q2B;?i2/ J2M U.oV kXejN kXe39 kXej8 kXd39 kXeRj
L R8-N3e 8-98j 8-9yj 8-ky9 9-33R
LQX *QmMiB2b Rjy 9j 9R 9R 9y
_@b[ yXRj3 yXRdk yXRRd yXR9e yXR9k
SM2H ", 1Mi`QTv "HM+BM; q2B;?ib
URV UkV UjV U9V U8V
6mHH aKTH2 >B;? AM7Q`KiBQM GQr AM7Q`KiBQM >B;? S`Qi2bi GQr S`Qi2bi
UhQT jyV U"QiiQK jyV UhQT jyV U"QiiQK jyV
1b+HiBQM @yXk39!! @yXje9!! @yXk8e! @yXj99!! @yXky9
UyXydkeV UyXy393V UyXRR8V UyXy3jkV UyXRkdV
q2B;?i2/ J2M U.oV kX8e3 kX8Rk kXeyj kX3ye kX83e
L R8-N3e 8-98j 8-9yj 8-ky9 9-33R
LQX *QmMiB2b Rjy 9j 9R 9R 9y
_@b[ yXRke yXR9N yXRRj yXRjd yXRRe
LQi2, + p < 0.1- ! p < 0.05- !! p < 0.01- +Hmbi2` biM/`/ 2``Q` BM T`2Mi?2b2b
*Qp`Bi2b M/ +QmMiv }t2/ 2z2+ib `2 QKBii2/ 7Q` bBKTHB+BivX
h#H2 XRR, am#;`QmT MHvbBb, hQT pbX "QiiQK jy S2`+2MiBH2
SM2H , P`B;BMH am`p2v q2B;?ib
URV UkV UjV U9V U8V
6mHH aKTH2 >B;? AM7Q`KiBQM GQr AM7Q`KiBQM >B;? S`Qi2bi GQr S`Qi2bi
UhQT kyV U"QiiQK kyV UhQT kyV U"QiiQK kyV
1b+HiBQM @yXk3k!! @yX9Rd!! yXyeej @yXjjy+ @yXRkN
UyXyd9kV UyXRRkV UyXkyNV UyXRdyV UyXRNyV
q2B;?i2/ J2M U.oV kXejN kX39j jXRj3 kX3dj kX3ke
L R8-N3e j-jyj j-yN9 j-jjj 9-yk3
LQX *QmMiB2b Rjy kd kk kd jk
_@b[ yXRj3 yXR3k yXydR yXR38 yXRN9
SM2H ", 1Mi`QTv "HM+BM; q2B;?ib
URV UkV UjV U9V U8V
6mHH aKTH2 >B;? AM7Q`KiBQM GQr AM7Q`KiBQM >B;? S`Qi2bi GQr S`Qi2bi
UhQT kyV U"QiiQK kyV UhQT kyV U"QiiQK kyV
1b+HiBQM @yXk39!! @yX98j!! @yXyej3 @yXkee+ @yXRj9
UyXydkeV UyXRR3V UyXR9yV UyXR88V UyXky8V
q2B;?i2/ J2M U.oV kX8e3 kXdR3 kXNdy kXNj9 kXede
L R8-N3e j-jyj j-yN9 j-jjj 9-yk3
LQX *QmMiB2b Rjy kd kk kd jk
_@b[ yXRke yXR8e yXyNR yXRe9 yXR9N
LQi2, + p < 0.1- ! p < 0.05- !! p < 0.01- +Hmbi2` biM/`/ 2``Q` BM T`2Mi?2b2b
*Qp`Bi2b M/ +QmMiv }t2/ 2z2+ib `2 QKBii2/ 7Q` bBKTHB+BivX
h#H2 XRk, am#;`QmT MHvbBb, hQT pbX "QiiQK ky S2`+2MiBH2
@N
kXk a?Q`i2` rBM/Qrb Q7 Q#b2`piBQMb
AM i?Bb b2+iBQM- r2 `2THB+i2 i?2 `2bmHib BM h#H2 R mbBM; b?Q`i2` rBM/Qrb Q7 Q#b2`piBQMb
Um;mbi M/ m;mbifa2Ti2K#2`V iQ 2Mbm`2 i?2 `2bmHib `2 MQi /`Bp2M #v Q#b2`piBQMb 7`
#27Q`2 i?2 2b+HiBQM Q7 i?2 .BQvm AbHM/b /BbTmi2 Um;mbi R8V- r?Q rQmH/ bmTTQb2/Hv
b?Qr Km+? HQr2` MiB@7Q`2B;M b2MiBK2MiX Ai +M #2 Q#b2`p2/ i?i `2KQpBM; Q#b2`piBQMb BM
CmHv QMHv /Q2b MQi bB;MB}+MiHv +?M;2 i?2 K;MBim/2 Q7 i?2 i`2iK2Mi 2z2+i Uh#H2 XRjVX
_2KQpBM; Q#b2`piBQMb BM a2Ti2K#2` `2bmHib BM i?2 bKHH2` i`2iK2Mi 2z2+i- r?B+? Kv #2
2tTHBM2/ #v i?2 7m`i?2` 2b+HiBQMb BM a2Ti2K#2` Uh#H2 XR9VX
SM2H , m;mbi M/ a2Ti2K#2`- P`B;BMH am`p2v q2B;?ib
URV UkV UjV U9V U8V
6mHH aKTH2 >B;? AM7Q`KiBQM GQr AM7Q`KiBQM >B;? S`Qi2bi GQr S`Qi2bi
1b+HiBQM @yXkde!! @yXjyy!! @yXkjN+ @yXjRj!! @yXky3
UyXy3y3V UyXy3NRV UyXRk3V UyXRy8V UyXRkNV
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Abstract
State actors often make economic sanction threats in interstate conflict. However, there
is limited understanding about how such threats materialize. In this paper, we theorize
the mobilization of popular nationalism in economic statecraft: the state can disrupt trade
by inciting citizens’ anti-foreign sentiment. We study three major conflicts between China
and its key trading partners - Japan, South Korea, and the US. We find that the post-conflict
decline in Chinese imports is associated with strong popular nationalism. We then revisit
the “Dalai Lama Effect” using two similar cases - France and the UK - and uncover a
similar relationship. To draw a stronger causal claim, we exploit the regional variations in
nationalist activism during the 2012 Diaoyu Islands dispute and find a significant negative
effect of early and large protests on local imports from Japan.
Key words: Nationalism, Economic Statecraft, Interstate Conflict, Authoritarian Poli-
tics
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Introduction
When an international conflict escalates, state actors often employ economic sanction
threats to signal and coerce (Whang, McLean and Kuberski, 2013). The classical the-
sis of economic statecraft takes the materialization of sanction threats for granted and
presumes that trade follows the flag. On the one hand, state actors exert political influence
over lucrative international business and exploit economic interdependence as non-violent
avenues for interstate bargaining (Berger et al., 2013; Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2018;
Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Hirschman, 1980; Krasner, 1976). On the other hand, private
economic actors make business changes under political pressure and align themselves with
state objectives (Li and Sacko, 2002; Long, 2008; Morrow, 1999).
However, the assumption of strong political control over international economic flows
appears problematic in the modern era of globalization (Rodman, 1995). Given the auton-
omy of private economic actors, state actors cannot costlessly project their political influ-
ence into the economic realm (Bapat and Kwon, 2015; Morgan and Bapat, 2003). Firms
and consumers independently shape cross-border economic flows and undermine state ef-
forts to enforce costly sanctions (Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny, 2004). Bottom-up market
power absorbs the economic repercussions caused by interstate conflict, which is widely
observed in democratic and autocratic contexts alike (Drury and Li, 2006; Norris, 2016).
As supportive evidence, scholars uncover growing economic interdependence in the era of
intensive security competition (Copeland, 1996) and present null effects of interstate con-
flict on economic exchanges between major trading partners (Davis and Meunier, 2011;
Du et al., 2017).
Given these constraints in reality, how can state actors fulfill their sanction threats and
inflict substantive economic damage on adversaries? A direct answer is that state actors
need to credibly signal their resolve to cut economic ties and rally domestic support for
restrictive measures. Ideally, state actors can mobilize popular nationalism against the
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target country and disrupt economic ties spontaneously formed between private economic
actors. Practically, state actors need to have skillful assessments of circumstances and
timing, especially the direction of public sentiment. For instance, the Clinton administra-
tion discontinued economic sanctions on China imposed by the Bush administration after
the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, while the Biden administration inherited Trump’s
legacy of China policy. The contrast may be partially explained by the growing hostility
amid the US public toward China after 2017.
The existing literature on interstate conflict and domestic audiences has primarily fo-
cused on democratic countries. In this paper, we explore the role of popular nationalism
in Chinese economic statecraft. The Chinese government has frequently invoked popular
nationalism and strategically stage-managed collective actions such as nationalist protests
and boycotts (Blumenthal, 2018; Ratner, 2018; Weiss, 2014). However, the economic im-
pact of popular nationalism remains unclear and unidentified. One question is whether
China’s sanction threats backed by popular nationalism are merely bluffing and the actual
economic impact is exaggerated by external observers.
Our theory theorizes the popular basis of Chinese economic statecraft. We argue that
popular nationalism, when successfully mobilized by the government, can significantly
affect economic exchanges. We present two parts of empirical analysis. First, we use an
event analysis with two sets of cases and show a positive correlation between popular na-
tionalism and the magnitude of economic disruption. We estimate the economic impact of
three major conflicts between China and Japan, South Korea, and the US conditional on
the level of popular nationalism. We also re-estimate the “Dalai Lama Effect” using France
and the UK as the most similar cases and examine its association with popular national-
ism. Second, to make a stronger causal claim, we revisit the 2012 Sino–Japanese dispute
with subnational data of popular nationalism and international economic exchanges. We
leverage the geographical variations in the early development of nationalist activism and
employ the difference-in-difference (DID) design to identify the effect of popular nation-
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alism on trade. We show that regions having stronger nationalism had a greater decline in
imports from Japan after the conflict.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we outline the
theory of popular nationalism and economic statecraft. In the third section, we present the
event analysis of two sets of cases and evaluate the theoretical arguments. In the fourth
section, we present an additional analysis of the 2012 Sino–Japanese dispute over the
Diaoyu Islands with subnational data of nationalism and trade. The fifth section concludes.
The Popular Basis of Economic Statecraft
Economic statecraft comprises both positive inducements and negative sanctions. In the
following discussion, we limit the scope of analysis to the negative side. In this section,
we revisit the existing literature on the use of economic sanctions and highlight popular
nationalism as a possible channel through which state actors influence international eco-
nomic exchanges.
Economic sanctions as foreign policy instruments
We summarize two main strands of literature on the rationale behind economic sanctions.
The first strand underscores the informational effect. In interstate bargaining, one side’s
willingness to bear economic costs increases others’ perceptions of its resolve (Fearon,
1997). Therefore, imposing sanctions on mutually beneficial economic exchanges is taken
as a credible signal of resolve (Martin, 1994; Morrow, 1999, 2003; Stein, 2003). However,
state actors under public pressure are also obliged to respond to the needs of domestic
groups who suffer from economic disruptions (Lektzian and Sprecher, 2007). These con-
flicting motives pose a strategic dilemma to state actors: Economic disruptions should be
maximized to make the threat credible but minimized to decrease domestic opposition.
The second strand of literature focuses on the coercive effect of sanctions. Both
the sanctioning and sanctioned states suffer from welfare losses. The coercive power of
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sanctions stems from the sanctioner’s greater ability to withstand the cost and stand firm
(Whang, McLean and Kuberski, 2013). Intuitively, larger states that have a more diversi-
fied economy or face a lower cost of trade diversion possess stronger coercive power over
smaller ones. The information effect of sanctions is also contingent on the coercive ef-
fect: Rational actors should avoid strategies that disproportionately harm their bargaining
position. For example, although “severing one’s own limb” is a costly signal with high
informational value, it has little coercive power (Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001).
The effectiveness of economic sanctions is crucially dependent on how successful state
actors mobilize domestic groups and enforce economically inefficient restrictions. Natu-
rally, domestic groups with high stakes in international business oppose economic sanc-
tions (Drezner, 1999; Kastner, 2007). Private economic actors usually have strong incen-
tives to maximize their utility by evading state sanctions (Bapat and Kwon, 2015; Drezner,
2000). In general, enforcing sanctions is difficult when private economic actors such as
entrepreneurs and consumers are influential in domestic politics.
Scholars traditionally focus on formal sanction tools, which broadly cover state sanc-
tions on trade, finance, aid, and investment (Drezner, 1999; Hirschman, 1980; Martin,
1994). An emerging strand of literature unveils multiple informal and extralegal instru-
ments that are harder to trace by external observers, which include public procurement
(Berger et al., 2013; Kono and Rickard, 2014; Weiss and Thurbon, 2006), consumer bias
against foreign products (Kim, 2018), and anti-foreign protests and boycotts (Heilmann,
2016). The economic power of non-state actors makes the so-called “private sanctions”
possible (Rodman, 1994). Besides, state actors can utilize the informality and flexibility
of private sanctions and embed them into economic statecraft.
Informal and extralegal instruments, while economically equivalent to conventional in-
struments, have certain merits that may even magnify the coercive effect of economic sanc-
tions. As noted by Kono and Rickard (2014), this “behind-the-door” strategy is opaque
with unclear welfare effects and helps state leaders avoid publicly reneging on free-trade
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commitments. State leaders can also avoid being held accountable for escalating the dis-
pute, as it is difficult for external observers – for example, international arbitrators – to
attribute disrupted economic flows to state interference. Therefore, powerful states can
manipulate international economic transactions without necessarily being constrained by
international institutions and obtain a strategic advantage over weak states (Kim, 2018).
The implementation of informal and extralegal instruments incurs the problem of en-
forceability. For instance, some state actors can gain tighter control of economic agents
via increasing the share of state ownership (Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2018). But such a
strategy has its drawbacks (e.g., economic inefficiency) and does not guarantee effective
control (e.g., the principal-agent problem). To mobilize the public’s anti-foreign senti-
ment, state actors also need to reshape the political discourse and fend off the challenges
of political opposition, especially business groups having international economic interests.
Popular nationalism as an instrument of economic coercion
Nationalism is commonly understood as a set of ideas and feelings shared by the members
within a limited boundary, or the “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991). The strength
of nationalist sentiment can be highly malleable under external shocks, indicating the vari-
able components of national identity at the individual level. For instance, the diversionary
theory of war posits that popular nationalism suppresses citizens’ redistributive demands
originating from social and class identities (Solt, 2011).
Micro-level evidence of behavioral changes supports the aggregate impact of popular
nationalism on economic exchanges. Recent studies uncover strong correlations between
anti-foreign sentiment and individual economic preferences (Clerides, Davis and Michis,
2015; Fouka and Voth, 2013; Pandya and Venkatesan, 2016). Scholars reveal that nation-
alism rooted in historical animosity has a profound and lasting impact on international
commerce (Che et al., 2015; Lan and Li, 2015). The rise of popular nationalism also
foreshadows the emergence of populist and protectionist politicians and drives substantial
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policy shifts in democratic countries (Colantone and Stanig, 2017, 2018).
We argue that popular nationalism can be weaponized by rational state actors as a coer-
cive tool in interstate conflict. The conversion of state influence on public preferences into
economic disruption is not an easy task. State actors need to set political agenda, rally do-
mestic support, and incentivize individuals and corporations to make behavioral changes.
State actors must credibly signal their resolve by taking costly action, e.g., refueling the
momentum of popular nationalism for a reasonably long period. In the Chinese context,
state actors also need to assess the political cost of (temporarily) allowing for collective
actions organized by citizens (Cairns and Carlson, 2016; King, Pan and Roberts, 2013). A
major risk is that state actors may lose control of mass movements and that angry citizens
begin to question the government’s competence in handling the international crisis (Weiss,
2013).
Anecdotal evidence shows that by leveraging popular nationalism, the Chinese gov-
ernment has obtained strong coercive power versus foreign firms having high stakes in
their access to the Chinese market. In 2018, China successfully pressured U.S. airlines to
change their website references to Taiwan, despite direct opposition from US government.
The NBA-China dispute over the Rockets’ general manager Daryl Morey’s support for
Hong Kong protestors in 2019 also illustrates the fragility of foreign firms under politi-
cal pressure. Popular nationalism has influenced Chinese firms as well, which are highly
responsive to the changing public sentiment and government influence on it. In 2016, Chi-
nese travel agencies swiftly suspended the lucrative business of group packages destined
for South Korea as a response to the simmering THAAD dispute between China and South
Korea and the increasing anger of Chinese citizens.
We specifically discuss how different types of firms, i.e., state-owned, private, and
foreign-invested, would respond to the rise of popular nationalism orchestrated by the
state. Davis, Fuchs and Johnson (2018) argued that state ownership serves as an instrument
of the Chinese government, which increases its influence over firms’ economic decisions.
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However, SOE managers may have incentives different from the state’s foreign policy
objectives, and there is little evidence suggesting any direct instruction restricting business
activities from the Chinese government to SOE managers in the past international crises.
Alternatively, we argue that popular nationalism orchestrated by the state serves as a strong
political message and credibly signals the government’s resolve. Economic actors that are
more susceptible to political pressure, e.g., state-owned and foreign-invested firms, are
more likely to adjust their behavior consistent with the state’s interests in international
conflicts.1
Given its informal characteristics, we note that appealing to popular nationalism can
be a sensible choice for rational state actors who hope to retain some flexibility in the bar-
gaining. And the sanctioner may circumvent retaliation: When seeking arbitration from
international institutions, the sanctioned state has the burden of proof showing that na-
tionalism is manipulated by the sanctioner and violates the sanctioner’s free-trade com-
mitments. However, the lack of institutional protection makes it difficult to deter the
weaponization of popular nationalism. The 2019 Japan-South Korea trade dispute is an
example: Two democratic countries mobilized economic nationalism while international
institutions largely failed to govern their behavior.
To summarize, nationalist sentiment against a specific country generally decreases the
utility of trading with the sanctioned state and incentivizes economic actors to search for
alternatives supplanting the existing connections. The effectiveness of enforcement is re-
lated to the strength of popular nationalism. Under a typical authoritarian context like
China, the government can control the flow of conflict information (e.g., news reports by
official media) and stage-manage citizens’ collective actions (e.g., consumer boycotts and
protests), making it convenient to mobilize popular nationalism during international crises.
1Davis, Fuchs and Johnson (2018) only considered SOEs and private firms but omitted foreign firms in
their analysis. With their original data, we discovered a significant effect of political conflict on foreign
firms’ imports and the magnitude is comparable to that of SOEs. We relegate the analysis to the Online
Appendix and argue that state ownership is not the only channel that conveys the government’s political
pressure.
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Therefore, variations in state efforts to mobilize popular nationalism can explain different
economic consequences following the outbreak of interstate conflict. We propose the first
hypothesis on the coercive effect of popular nationalism mobilized by the state.
H1 (Disruptive Effect) Strong popular nationalism has a positive effect on the mag-
nitude of economic disruption following interstate conflict.
A natural extrapolation from H1 is the conditional effect of interstate conflict on trade.
Some recent studies show small and transitory negative effect of interstate conflict on eco-
nomic exchanges (Davis and Meunier, 2011; Du et al., 2017). One possible reason is
that rational economic actors price in the prospect of interstate relations, which influences
trade flows ex ante (Morrow, 1999). When facing potential threats of a minor conflict in
line with their expectations, economic actors would maintain scheduled transactions and
avoid overreactions to decrease the cost of diversion, e.g., fees of terminating contracts
and locating partners unaffected by political tensions. H1 suggests that interstate conflict
can have an ex post effect on economic exchanges when state actors are determined to
escalate the conflict and politicize economic cooperation via mobilizing popular national-
ism. Under the pressure of popular nationalism orchestrated by the state, economic actors
face increasingly strong disincentives to continuing business with the target country.
It is possible, however, that interstate conflict can affect trade ex post independent
of state efforts to appeal to popular nationalism. Private economic actors may promptly
adapt to ever-changing political situations and avoid risky transactions exposed to a major
interstate conflict regardless of public sentiment at a given point in time. We discuss an
additional condition that differentiates between the two types of ex post effects. Scholars
argue that a high degree of pre-existing interdependence is a precondition for state actors
to implement economic statecraft to reshape the target country’s payoffs (Stein, 2003).
However, high interdependence also limits the disruptive effect of economic sanctions, as
private economic actors have a strong incentive to evade sanctions. In H2, We stipulate
a baseline condition under which this incentive to evade restrictions imposed by political
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tensions is observed in the absence of strong popular nationalism mobilized by the state.
H2 (Cushioning Effect) High interdependence has a negative effect on the magnitude
of economic disruption following interstate conflict.
In the empirical analysis, we focus on cases in which some degrees of interdependence
existed between China and the target country. Our prior expectation is that interstate con-
flict has a limited ex post impact on bilateral trade due to the cushioning effect of existing
interdependence. Other previous research has examined cases in which China’s depen-
dence on the target country is considerably low, including China’s sanctions on North
Korea (Gulotty et al., 2018) and Norway (Kolstad, 2019). The lack of cushioning effects
suggests that the Chinese government can unilaterally change bilateral economic relation-
ship without appealing to popular nationalism. In these cases, other factors unrelated to
popular nationalism, including the government’s influence over a small group of firms,
have stronger explanatory power.
Economic Disruptions and Popular Nationalism: A Event Study
In this section, we evaluate the association between popular nationalism and economic
disruptions using two sets of event analysis. The first set includes three major conflicts
between China and its important trading partners since 2012: the Diaoyu Island dispute
(Japan), the THAAD crisis (South Korea), and Trump’s new China policy focusing on
Taiwan and trade (US). The second set includes two highly similar cases related to the
so-called “Dalai Lama Effect” (Fuchs and Klann, 2013): French and UK leaders’ meeting
with Dalai Lama in 2008 and 2012 respectively.
Data and method
We use the total Chinese imports from the target country as the main dependent variable
(log-transformed). Sanctions on imports and exports may similarly cause economic dam-
age to the target country. But from the perspective of mercantilism, restricting imports is a
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more sensible strategy for it maximizes the sanctioning country’s trade surplus and causes
more harm on the target country. Citizens are also more sensitive to buying products from
hostile countries and more likely to engage in consumer boycotts.
For the independent variable, we code the strength of popular nationalism orchestrated
by the state based on two standards. First, whether there is extensive official media cov-
erage on the dispute that attempts to lead public opinion. And second, whether citizens
organized and participated in nationalist protests or other collective actions that are tacitly
allowed, if not encouraged, by the government. Although it is impossible to observe the
decision making inside the Chinese government and obtain direct evidence of state manip-
ulation, scholars find that the Chinese government habitually suppress citizens’ collective
actions and curtail engaged debates about controversial political issues (King, Pan and
Roberts, 2013, 2017). Therefore, as an important exception to this general pattern of gov-
ernment repression, public awareness of international dispute and citizens’ participation
in collective actions such as protests and boycotts uncover the authoritarian government’s
intention to mobilize popular nationalism in support of state interests.
We collect monthly trade data from China’s General Administration of Customs and
implement the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) to estimate the impact of interstate con-
flicts on Chinese imports from the target country (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller,
2010, 2015). We construct a synthetic control unit for each target country with up to 24
months of the pre-dispute data. The candidate pool of control units is limited to the OECD
countries and other major trading partners of China (over 50 countries excluding Middle
Eastern oil exporters).2 As the first robustness check, we construct the synthetic control
unit using different lengths of pre-dispute data (18, 15, and 12 months) and none of the
results vary substantively. We also verify the SCM results using the gravity model of
2For the specification of SCM, the balancing covariate includes distance and annual GDP (similar to the
conventional gravity model). The lagged dependent variable in the pre-dispute period is added to improve
matching. In the cases of Japan, South Korea, and the United States, we treat the European Union as a
hypothetical economy as only a few countries had comparably high trade volume with China.
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international trade and relegate the analysis to the Online Appendix.
The comparison of cases: basic information
In Table 3.1, we summarize the basic information about the two sets of cases. For the first
set, we examine the impact of some prolonged conflicts on Chinese imports from Japan,
South Korea, and the United States. As the percentage of Chinese import and export
shows, these three countries are major trading partners of China and indicate compara-
bility across the cases. For the second set, we examine the Dalai Lama effect on Chinese
import from France and the UK. While controlling for the nature of conflict events, China’s
economic relationship with France and the UK share similar characteristics. The volume
of trade is much smaller compared to that of the countries in the first set, indicating much
lower interdependence.
Table 3.1: Basic Information about Conflict Event Analysis
Target Year Conflict Event Chinese Import Chinese Export
(% Total) (% Total)
Japan 2012-14 Diaoyu Islands 194.2 (11.2%) 146.4 (8.4%)
South Korea 2016-17 THAAD Deployment 174.5 (10.4%) 101.4 (6.0%)
USA 2016-18 Taiwan/Economic Policy 149.6 (8.9%) 409.8 (24.4)
France 2008 Dalai Lama/Tibet 13.2 (1.4%) 20.3 (2.1%)
UK 2012 Dalai Lama/Tibet 14.5 (0.8%) 44.0 (2.5%)
Unit: Billions in Current USD
In addition to the pre-existing economic relationship, another confounding factor –
the severity of conflict events – may undermine the comparability of cases. The first
set of cases covers different types of issues, and it is unclear whether these issues are
of similar political significance to the Chinese government. An alternative hypothesis is
that issues associated with lower political tensions result in smaller economic disruptions
regardless of the level of popular nationalism, even though popular nationalism may be
positively associated with dramatic international events. Comparatively, the second set of
cases raises less concerns as the two cases lie within the scope condition of the Dalai Lama
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Effect (meetings between foreign leaders and Dalai Lama), and we should expect similar
degrees of political tensions based on the conflict’s nature.
To mitigate concerns about confounding mechanisms, we assess the severity of conflict
events using the Political Relationship Index (PRI) developed by Yan and Qi (2009). The
PRI is coded based on government statements and official media reports and proxies for
Chinese elites’ evaluations of bilateral relationship. Figure 3.1 plots the temporal changes
in the PRI around the conflictual events (+/− 24 months). To facilitate interpretation, we
recenter the relationship index by setting the raw score one month before the outbreak of
each conflict to 0.
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Fig. 3.1: Political Relationship Before and After Key Conflict Events
For the first set of cases, Figure 3.1 shows that the bilateral relationship significantly
worsened despite differences in the magnitude. Before the outbreak of key conflict events,
the relationship scores stayed in positive territory, although there were multiple ups and
downs for the cases of Japan and the US. From all the three cases, we can observe clear
negative trends of the relationship scores lasting for more than 12 months after the key
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conflict event. The deterioration of China–Japan relations after 2012 was the most dra-
matic one at the beginning of the crisis, which nevertheless became much flatter after the
first month. The magnitude of deterioration was roughly at the same level for the Japan
and US cases 24 months after the initial conflict and smaller for the South Korea case.
For the second set of cases, Figure 3.1 shows that meetings between foreign leaders
and Dalai Lama did not cause major problems to bilateral relations from the Chinese per-
spective. It suggests that the Chinese government’s formal objections and protests could
be cheap talk. Comparatively, French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s meeting with Dalai in
December 2008 had a somewhat larger impact on bilateral relations, given its relatively
sensitive timing after the 2008 Tibetan unrest and Beijing Olympics.
The heterogeneous effects of interstate conflict
In this section, we present the first set of cases chronologically. We focus on the rela-
tionship between popular nationalism and disruptions of trade. To briefly summarize, we
find that the decline in Chinese imports was larger when popular nationalism was stronger
(the Diaoyu Islands dispute), but smaller when popular nationalism was either carefully
managed (the THAAD crisis) or suppressed by the Chinese government (Trump’s China
policy).
The Diaoyu Islands Dispute Before 2012, the Sino–Japanese relationship was char-
acterized as “cold politics and hot economics” (Armstrong, 2012), and periodic political
tensions had limited economic consequences (Davis and Meunier, 2011). In 2012, the
territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan dramatically esca-
lated in several steps. In April 2012, some Japanese politicians proposed to nationalize
the Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese government issued a formal objection and demanded
Japan to withdraw its plan. As a result Chinese activists landed on the disputed islands on
August 15 and were temporarily detained by the Japanese government. The Japanese gov-
ernment “finalized” the nationalization on September 11. More than 150 Chinese cities
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witnessed highly organized protests from September 15 to 22, which were the largest ones
after 1989. Protestors’ gather was tacitly approved by most local governments. In some
cities (e.g., Xi’an and Changsha), protests become violent and developed into vandalism.
After September 2012, the territorial dispute remained salient. The Chinese government
regularly sent petrol ships to the disputed region and announced its East China Sea Air
Defense Identification Zone in November 2013.












































Fig. 3.2: The Economic Consequence of Conflicts: Japan
Given the extensive media coverage and nationwide anti-Japanese protests tolerated
by the Chinese government, we code the intensity of popular nationalism as high and
expect a strong and lasting impact on the economic exchanges. We present the SCM
output in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 shows a noticeable gap between Japan and the synthetic
control unit after October 2012. The average value of the gap is −0.247, or 21.9% drop in
Chinese imports for 24 months after the outbreak of the conflict. The results show a large
effect of interstate conflict on trade that is associated with strong popular nationalism. The
effect is also much larger and persistent compared to that in Heilmann (2016), and a major
methodological difference is that we use trade statistics from China.
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The THAAD Crisis As response to North Korea’s missile tests, the South Korean
government proposed to deploy the US-made THAAD system in February 2016, which
was completed in July 2016. The Chinese government believed the THAAD system would
undermine China’s security and demanded South Korea to terminate the plan. In addition
to freezing bilateral relationship, China fomented popular nationalism against South Korea
and imposed administrative restrictions on South Korea’s entertainment products. South
Korea filed a formal complaint to WTO, accusing China of violating its free trade com-
mitments. In October 2017, China conditionally backed down and accepted South Korea’s
reassurance of the THAAD system’s defensive use.




































































Fig. 3.3: The Economic Consequence of Conflicts: South Korea
Notwithstanding China’s effort to mobilize popular nationalism as a credible threat to
economic cooperation, we find that when the THAAD crisis escalated, popular nationalism
was significantly less intense compared to that in the Diaoyu Islands dispute. The Chinese
government cautiously controlled public gatherings and strictly banned mass protests in
major cities. Citizens’ expression of anger was largely limited to the internet, and the
nationalist discourse was orchestrated by the official media. Furthermore, when China
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accepted South Korea’s reassurance, there was no observable public disagreement from
nationalist groups – we interpret it as the suggestive evidence of weak nationalism in line
with small “audience costs” (Weiss, 2013).
Given China’s constrained nationalism and high dependence on South Korea, we pre-
dict that the overall influence of the THAAD crisis on Chinese imports from South Korea
is much smaller compared to that of the Diaoyu Islands dispute. We present the SCM
output in Figure 3.3 and find the conflict had no persistent impact on Chinese imports. We
only observe some minor gaps when the situation escalated between March and October
2017. At that time, some Chinese citizens called for boycotting the Korean firm Lotte
(which was eventually forced to exit from the Chinese market). The average value of the
gap over the 24-month post-conflict period is −0.078, indicating a 7.5% drop in Chinese
imports from South Korea compared to the synthetic control unit. The average value after
the boycott of the South Korean Lotte Group and before the preliminary settlement of the
dispute (7-months) is −0.139, indicating a larger impact in the short term.
Trump’s China Policy During his electoral campaign in 2016, Donald Trump em-
ployed hawkish rhetoric against China and promised to bring fundamental changes to US–
China relations. After being elected, Trump started his offensive by first leveraging the
status of Taiwan. His phone call as the president-elect with then-Taiwanese President Tsai
Ing-wen in December 2016 was unprecedented and marked rewarming US–China rela-
tions. Trump also pushed for changes in China’s trade practice and started the trade war
in March 2018.
Trump’s tough stance on Taiwan and trade posed a severe challenge to China’s political
and economic interests. However, scholars argue that Chinese leaders cautiously adopted
a strategy of wait-and-see and refrained from taking preemptive actions (Miura and Weiss,
2016). Responding to Trump’s accusation of China’s trade practice, Chinese president Xi
Jinping visited the US in April 2017 and promised to increase Chinese imports from the
US (the so-called “100-Day Plan”). China also refrained from mobilizing anti-American
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sentiment after significant improvements of US–Taiwan relations, e.g., the introduction
(2017) and final passage (2018) of the Taiwan Travel Act. It is in sharp contrast to the
government’s strategy in the Diaoyu Island dispute and the THAAD crisis. Given the
repressed nationalism, we expect the deteriorating US–China relations had a negligible
effect on trade before 2018.












































Fig. 3.4: The Economic Consequence of Conflicts: United States
Figure 3.4 shows that according to the SCM model, in the 15 months before the US–
China trade war (March 2018), Chinese imports from the US were highly stable. The
average value of the gap between Chinese imports from the US and that from the syn-
thetic control unit is −0.033 or 3.4% drop in Chinese imports. The t-test shows that it is
insignificant from 0 (p = 0.28). Therefore, we find no evidence that China looked for the
substitutes of US products, a sensible choice if Chinese leaders believed that US-China
decoupling was inevitable. Furthermore, the short-term effect of the “100-Day Plan” after
Xi’s visit to the US in 2017 is anything but positive.
We limit the scope of observations to March 2018 before Trump announced to impose
tariffs on Chinese products and waged the US–China trade war. There are two reasons.
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First, as a formal instrument of economic statecraft, tariffs have an instant and direct effect
on trade. The Chinese government adopted a tit-for-tat strategy and imposed retaliatory
tariffs. Second, as the US–China trade war unfolded, the Chinese government criticized
US decisions with hawkish rhetoric and stoked anti-American sentiment, abolishing its
repression on nationalism. Therefore, the imposition of tariffs and the rise of popular
nationalism may combine to have a joint effect on Chinese imports from the US, making
the identification of the true decisive factor difficult. We discuss the overall impact of
the US–China trade war in the Online Appendix. While popular nationalism may play a
supplementary role, the timing of the decline in Chinese imports matched better with that
of imposed tariffs.
The popular basis of the Dalai Lama effect
In this section, we revisit the Dalai Lama effect, a phenomenon well-noted in the recent lit-
erature on China’s economic statecraft (Fuchs and Klann, 2013; Lin, Hu and Fuchs, 2018).
The basic argument is that meetings of foreign leaders and Dalai Lama often caused politi-
cal tensions and drop in Chinese imports. As Figure 3.1 shows, the political significance of
the Dalai Lama effect may be exaggerated. Fuchs and Klann (2013, p.166) described pop-
ular nationalism as a possible mechanism. An extrapolation is that the magnitude of the
Dalai Lama effect is contingent on the intensity of nationalism encouraged by the Chinese
government.
Popular nationalism played a noticeably more significant role in China’s response to
then French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s meeting with Dalai Lama in December 2008.
After the 2008 Tibetan Unrest, multiple events fueled antagonism against France among
the Chinese public. In April, the Beijing Olympic torch relay was disrupted in Paris by
Tibetan activists, and Sarkozy proposed boycott of the Beijing Olympics and planned to
meet Dalai Lama. After April 10th, hundreds of Chinese citizens gathered at the French-
owned Carrefour stores in several major cities, including Hefei, Changsha, and Xi’an,
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calling for boycotting French companies. official media reported these protests, indicating
a welcoming attitude of the Chinese government. Despite Sarkozy’s softening stance –
including sending a special envoy to China in April and attending the Beijing Olympics
opening ceremony in August, he met Dalai Lama in December and caused a second round
of tensions with China. Infuriated Chinese citizens renewed their calls to boycott French
products.
Compared to Sarkozy’s meeting, then British Prime Minister David Cameron’s meet-
ing with Dalai Lama in May 2012 did not cause a major upsurge of popular nationalism in
China. We find no concrete evidence suggesting that the Chinese government stoked pop-
ular nationalism in order to punish the UK economically. By contrast, China’s response
was routine and constrained, which was limited to restrictions over governmental interac-
tions, including suspension of state visits and exchanges of government officials. Citizens
did not call for a boycott of British products or participate in any forms of protests.
























































Fig. 3.5: The “Dalai Lama Effect,” France (2008)
If popular nationalism drives the Dalai Lama effect, we should observe a large negative
effect on Chinese imports in the French case, but no effect in the UK case. This expectation
is consistent with the SCM output in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. For the French case, we use the
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Fig. 3.6: The “Dalai Lama Effect,” UK (2012)
first round of tensions in April 2008 as the start of the conflict and detect one large dip
(lasted for two months). Furthermore, after Sarkozy met with Dalai Lama in December,
we observe a persistent and large negative impact. For 24 months after the initial outbreak
of the conflict, the average value of the gap is −0.111, or 10.5% less imports compared to
that of the synthetic control unit. The average value of the gap is −0.156 after Sarkozy’s
meeting with Dalai Lama. For the UK case, we use Cameron’s meeting with Dalai Lama
in May 2012 as the start of the conflict and observe no negative effect on Chinese imports.
And after the G20 Summit in September 2013 (when Cameroon met Xi Jinping and was
invited to visit China), we even detect an increase in Chinese imports compared to that
of the synthetic control unit, which corresponds to warming political relationship between
China and the UK after 2013.
Taken together, the two cases suggest that there is a popular basis of the Dalai Lama
effect: the decline in Chinese imports was associated with the strength of popular nation-
alism. The sharp contrast between the two cases also indicate China’s flexible use of sticks
(France) and carrots (the UK) under different circumstances.
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Summary
Our analysis shows the heterogeneous effect of interstate conflict on trade. The compar-
ison of the cases suggests that strong nationalism is associated with a sharper decline in
Chinese imports, while weak nationalism is associated with limited changes in Chinese
imports. The null findings can be explained by the cushioning effect of existing economic
connections, in particular for the US case. To control for confounding factors, our analysis
takes into account the persistent deterioration of bilateral relations (Japan, South Korea,
and the US) and the nature of the conflict (France and the UK). In the Online Appendix,
we examine the impact of conflict on different types of tradable products. For the cases
of France and Japan, a large proportion of the decline in Chinese imports is differentiated
products that are more complicated and relationship-specific, e.g., machinery and preci-
sion instruments.
The Impact of Nationalism: Evidence from Subnational Data
In this section, we present additional analysis on the Diaoyu Islands dispute. As discussed
above, the outbreak of the Diaoyu Islands dispute had an instant and dramatic impact
on China–Japan relations and aroused strong popular nationalism in China. One may sug-
gest that dramatic international events arouse popular nationalism and disrupt international
trade; the connection is nevertheless correlative not causal. To mitigate this concern, we
utilize the geographical variations in popular nationalism and examine its effect on trade
at the province and city levels using a conventional DID design.
Data and empirical strategy
We propose two indicators of popular nationalism at the subnational level. Due to data
quality concerns, we exclude four western inland provinces or autonomous regions (Ningxia,
Qinghai, Tibet, and Xinjiang). At the subnational level, we treat the central government’s
mobilization of popular nationalism in this territorial dispute as an exogenous shock that
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affected citizens from top down. Two factors possibly contributed to regional variations
in popular nationalism. One is the intrinsic nationalist preference that varies across re-
gions (Pan and Xu, 2018). The other is local governments’ response to changes in public
sentiment and citizens’ capacity of organizing collective actions (Weiss, 2013).
The first indicator we use is the degree of nationalist activism measured by the occur-
rence of early and large protests on or before September 15, 2012.3 Compared to latecom-
ers, early protestors face more political risks, as the local government may still repress
mass gatherings, citing the lack of official permits (Mattingly et al., 2020). Therefore, the
degree of nationalist activism should be strong enough to overcome such political risks,
making the occurrence of early and large protests a sensible indicator. In total, we record
early protests in 84 cities (out of 277) with a sizable crowd marching in the streets (at least
500 protestors).4 At the province level, we calculate the prevalence of nationalist protests
at the province level by taking the average of early and large protests weighted by city
population.5
The second indicator we use is citizens’ exposure to the conflict information, measured
by the aggregate Baidu searches for the Diaoyu Islands at the city and province levels when
the standoff escalated on August 15, 2012. We validate these two indicators of nationalism
with the logistic regression by predicting the occurrence of early and large protests with
information exposure at the city level. The relationship between the two indicators is
positive and strong at the city level. The two indicators are also positively correlated at the
province level after controlling for GDP and population. We relegate the information to
3We choose this date as the cut point for it is the first day on which large protests spread nationwide and
had taken place in at least one city of all provinces and autonomous regions in the date set.
477 of these 84 cities had at least 2 large protests on different days or in different metropolitan areas
between August 19 and September 23. To determine the crowd’s size, we collected photos and videos
recording protests from the Chinese social media and cross-checked protest information with news reports
in both Chinese and Japanese.
5Reweighing the indicator using the city GDP instead of the population does not render substantively
different empirical results. For municipalities, Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing are coded to 1 as they all
had early protests that were considerably large (estimated protestors over 5, 000). Tianjin had one relatively
small and peaceful protest on September 18 and is thereby coded to 0.
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the Online Appendix.
As the main dependent variable, we obtain official data of international trade at the
city and province levels from 2010 to 2015. We obtain annual trade data for 277 cities and
monthly trade data for 27 provinces and municipalities. For supplementary analysis, we
also examine the impact of popular nationalism on economic growth and foreign invest-
ment and relegate the results to the Online Appendix. We adopt the following OLS models
with the standard DID assumptions:
log(Imports)prov,t = αprov+γt+θlog(Imports)prov,t−1+βPostt∗Nationalismprov+
λX + ε
log(Imports)city,t = αcity + γt + βPostt ∗Nationalismcity + λX + ε
The coefficient of the interaction term between the post-conflict dummy and the strength
of nationalism, β, represents the causal effect. αprov and αcity are the province and city
fixed effects, which control for time-invariant factors such as historical animosity (Che
et al., 2015). γt is the time fixed effect, which control for common temporal trends. X is
the set of covariates, including GDP per capita and population (lagged by one year). As the
province level trade data is observed on the monthly basis, we include the lagged depen-
dent variable (LDV) to control for the temporal dependence.6 We also use the clustered
standard errors, and re-estimate the model at the province level using the bootstrapped
cluster standard errors as robustness checks (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008).
Main results
We present the main results (using both city and province level data) in Table 3.2. To
account for possible attenuating effects of the territorial dispute over time, we use different
time windows of observations (2011-13, 2010-14, and 2010-15). For the yearly trade data
at the city level, we set 2013 as the start of the treatment. For the monthly trade data at the
6Readers may worry that by including the LDV, the estimation is biased due to the “Nickell Bias” (Nick-
ell, 1981). We agree that the inclusion of the LDV is most problematic when the panel data has “small T and
large N.” This issue is mitigated when T is considerably large our province-level data (> 35).
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province level, we set September 2012 as the start of the treatment.
In general, we observe a significant negative effect of strong nationalist activism (mea-
sured by the occurrence of early large protests) on local imports from Japan. The coef-
ficients of people’s exposure to the conflict information (measured by the magnitude of
Baidu Index) points to the negative direction, but is nevertheless insignificant. Results
in Panel A show that cities having experienced early and large protests would witness a
decline in Japanese imports in the first 12 to 24 months after the dispute. The effect is at-
tenuated when observations of year 2015 is included in the regression. Results in Panel B
display a similar pattern: a higher prevalence of nationalist protests in a province resulted
in sharper decline in Chinese imports from Japan in 2013 and 2014. We also observe a
positive effect of past trade connections (proxied by the lagged dependent variable), and
this cushioning effect is unchanged before and after the conflict (with an additional in-
teraction term with the post-conflict dummy). As a placebo test for the results presented
in Panel B, we change the post-conflict dummy to 6 or 12 months before and after the
actual start of conflict (September 2012), and find that the magnitude and significance of
coefficients both decrease.
To rule out pretreatment trends of decline in imports from Japan, we visualize the
negative effect of popular nationalism on cities’ imports from Japan by year in Figure 3.7
(with 90 and 95 confidence intervals). We are interested in the coefficients of interaction
terms between year dummies and the treatment, and the year of 2012 is used as the baseline
group. The left plot of Figure 3.7 shows that cities having experienced early and large
protests against Japan did not show significant differences before 2012 or in 2015, and that
the coefficients are only significantly negative in 2013 and 2014. The right plot of Figure
3.7 shows that cities having been exposed more to conflict information did not show any
significant difference from 2010 to 2015. The findings are consistent with results presented
in Panel A of Table 3.2.
One concern is whether the negative effect is driven by one province or municipality
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Table 3.2: The Impact of Nationalism on Chinese Imports from Japan
DV: Log(Imports from Japan)
Panel A: City Level Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Conflict * Baidu Index -0.580 -0.252 -0.121
(0.501) (0.281) (0.210)
Post-Conflict * Early Large Protest -0.583∗∗ -0.472∗∗ -0.323∗∗
(0.235) (0.185) (0.157)
Years Included 2011-13 2010-14 2010-15
R-sq 0.936 0.936 0.924 0.925 0.915 0.915
Obs. 828 831 1380 1385 1656 1662
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Panel B: Province Level Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Import, lagged 0.324∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.093) (0.078) (0.077) (0.073) (0.072)
Post-Conflict * Baidu Index -0.222 -0.060 0.080
(0.186) (0.135) (0.114)
Post-Conflict * Early Large Protest -0.377∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗ -0.125
(0.140) (0.107) (0.081)
Years Included 2011-13 2010-14 2010-15
R-sq 0.968 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Obs. 972 972 1620 1620 1944 1944
Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y




































































Fig. 3.7: Treatment Effects by Year (City Level Data)
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given the geographical clustering of nationalist protests at the early stage of the movement.
We run a sensitivity test that excludes one province or municipality from the regression at
a time and re-estimate the effect of nationalist protests. We use the data from 2010 to 2014
and present the histogram of the re-estimated effects along with the corresponding p-values
in Figures 3.8 (city) and 3.9 (province). The red line indicates the original estimations in
Column 4 of Table 3.2. The distribution of estimated effects suggest the main findings are




















Fig. 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis (City Level Data)
We also disaggregate the imports by product types and re-analyze the province level
results and relegate the results to the Online Appendix. We focus on 9 two-digit chapters
of products in the harmonized system, which cover more than 80% of trade transactions
between China and Japan. We find that the effect of post-conflict nationalism is most
significant for differentiated and final products such as electronics and cars. The effect is
also negative for intermediate industrial products such as chemicals or metal materials, but
the coefficient is smaller and less significant.
As robustness checks, we consider several competing hypotheses that may also explain
for the post-conflict drop in Chinese imports from Japan and relegate the results to the





















Fig. 3.9: Sensitivity Analysis (Province Level Data)
Online Appendix. One explanation is that domestic economic actors, especially the state-
owned enterprises, were more susceptible to political influence and decreased their imports
from Japan after the conflict. We use the percentage of domestic firms’ industrial output at
the city level and the percentage of SOEs’ capital stock at the province level to proxy for
the influence of domestic economic actors on the local economy, and add the interaction
terms with the post-conflict dummy in the regression. We find no evidence that the weight
of domestic economic actors exerts a direct influence on the drop in Chinese imports from
Japan, while the effect of nationalist activism remains strong and negative.
A second explanation is that the territorial dispute re-ignited hostility against Japan
rooted in historical legacy during World War II, even though the overall impact of historical
legacy on trade is absorbed in the fixed effects. To proxy for historical legacy, we use an
official source of data on the occurrence of massacres committed by the Imperial Japanese
Army at the city level (History Research Center, 2016). The interaction term between
historical legacy and the post-conflict dummy is negative but insignificant, and the main
findings are largely robust.
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Supplementary analysis of economic outcomes
We discuss other possible economic impacts of popular nationalism after 2012 in the On-
line Appendix and present the following summary of results. First, we use foreign invest-
ment at the city level as the dependent variable and examine whether stronger nationalism
reduces a city’s attractiveness to foreign investors. We find a sharp decline in Japanese
investment after 2012 in cities with stronger nationalism. However, we find no evidence
that foreign investment from other countries was negatively affected by the rise of popular
nationalism against Japan. On the contrary, the volume of utilized capital and the number
of new contracts grew faster in cities that had experienced early and large protests in 2012.
Second, we examine the impact of popular nationalism on local economic growth.
A sensible extrapolation is that given the disruptive effect of nationalism on trade, cities
having stronger nationalism would have lower economic growth after 2012. However,
we find this is not the case, and these cities grew significantly faster after the conflict.
Although international conflict is often associated with economic disorder, this finding
suggests the resilience of Chinese local economy.
Third, we examine the impact of interstate conflict on Chinese exports to Japan. We
find that regions having stronger nationalism did not decrease exports to Japan. This find-
ing corresponds to previous research showing that importers are be more sensitive to in-
ternational tension under public pressure (Heilmann, 2016). It also supports existing lit-
erature on the Chinese economic statecraft, which primarily focuses on imports instead of
exports (Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2018).
Concluding Remarks
Despite its rapid marketization process in the past decades, China still has an economic
system that is still heavily influenced by the government. Scholars argue that this hybrid
system constitutes the foundation of the Chinese economic statecraft, as important eco-
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nomic actors seamlessly follow the state’s command and swiftly divert transactions away
from countries in dispute with China (Davis, Fuchs and Johnson, 2018; Norris, 2016).
The Chinese government has leveraged its domestic influence and weaponized economic
interdependence in its global competition for power and influence.
In this paper, we focus on a reverse, bottom-up channel and present a theory on the
popular basis of the Chinese economic statecraft. We argue that popular nationalism helps
materialize the state’s political power in the economic realm. The mobilization of popu-
lar nationalism can disrupt economic exchanges and signal the state’s resolve. The main
empirical results are two-fold. First, we examine two sets of cases and perform an event
analysis. We uncover the heterogeneous effect of international conflict on trade condi-
tional on the intensity of popular nationalism. The impact is considerably large even if
interdependence is high. Second, we leverage the subnational variation in popular nation-
alism during the 2012 Diaoyu Islands dispute and estimate its effect on trade. We find that
regions having early and large nationalist protests had a sharper decline in imports from
Japan.
Political support from domestic audiences is generally viewed as crucial for authoritar-
ian leaders (Svolik, 2012). Our findings add to this argument and propose a specific role
of citizens in foreign policymaking. There is a possible drawback of weaponizing pop-
ular nationalism, though; mass movements, even under the flag of patriotism, can breed
chaos and disorder. State actors may weigh the utility of an international victory and the
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A1 A Discussion on the Outcome of Conflict Events
In this section, we add further details to the event analysis. Specifically, we discuss the
outcome of conflict events and evaluate the effectiveness of China’s economic statecraft.
Reasons for the failure of economic sanctions include the lack of enforcement and the target
country’s ability to internalize the cost.
In the following, we report that a large decrease in Chinese imports from the target country
does not mean China would obtain a landslide victory. It supports Pape’s (1997) argument
that state actors rarely achieved important political goals by imposing economic sanctions
alone. However, we find that China obtained some symbolic and partial concessions from
Japan and South Korea, suggesting some successes of economic statecraft. We also discuss
China’s flexible use of carrots and sticks in the French and UK cases. We summarize the
outcomes of conflict events in Table A.1 and present evaluations in the following.
Target Year Issue Nationalism Loss of Chinese Imports Concessions?
in the Next 24 Months
Japan 2012-14 Diaoyu Islands High −21.9%, High Partial
Korea, Rep. 2016-17 THAAD Deployment Medium −7.5%, Medium-Low Partial
USA 2016-18 Taiwan/Economic Policy Low −3.4%, Low No
France 2008 Dalai Lama/Tibet Medium −10.5%, Medium Yes
UK 2012 Dalai Lama/Tibet Low No Negative Effect Yes
Table A.1: The Summary of the Outcomes
Japan
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute has long soured China–Japan relations. Although
the unprecedented upsurge of popular nationalism in 2012 had a large economic impact,
China failed to extract substantive concessions from Japan. The lack of Japan’s substantive
concessions may be attributed to the indivisibility of territory that implicates domestic
politics (Fang et al., 2018). The two countries only accepted the status quo while setting aside
the dispute after 2014. One concession from Japan is its admission of territorial dispute in the
4-point consensus with China in 2014, a symbolic gesture showing Japan’s acknowledgment of
China’s interests.1 Economic incentives may partially explain Japan’s symbolic concessions,
as China adopted other coercive strategies, e.g., increasing ship patrols near the Diaoyu
Islands after 2012 and the promulgation of the Air Defense Identification Zone in 2014.
Korea, Rep.
China and South Korea tightened bilateral ties between 2012 and 2015, and the dramatic
deterioration of bilateral relations in 2016 was unexpected. South Korea reacted strongly to
the North Korean nuclear test and decided to deploy the US-made THAAD system in 2016.
As mentioned in the main text, China’s attempts to politicize the economic relationship and
to sway South Korea’s realignment with the US had some short-term, limited effects on trade.
The bilateral tension ebbed in November 2017, as China eventually accepted South Korea’s
reassurance, or the “three no’s”: no additional THAAD deployment, no participation in
1A China-Japan Breakthrough: A Primer on Their 4 Point Consensus, the Diplomat, November 7, 2014,
retrieved on October 1, 2018, Link.
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the US missile defense network, and no establishment of a trilateral military alliance with
the US. The concessions partially met China’s expectation, and China softened its previous
stance and stopped to insist on South Korea’s full withdrawal from the THAAD deployment.
USA
After the Trump-Tsai call in December 2016, China first downplayed Trump’s actions and
accused Tsai’s government of playing “little tricks.” Then Chinese Minister Wang Yi did not
directly rebuke Trump but reiterated the so-called “One-China Policy” as the bedrock of the
healthy relationship between China and US.2 On December 11, 2016, Trump stated that the
One-China policy may be a bargaining chip, and Chinese officials lodged “serious concerns”
but their rhtoric of protests was still constrained, reiterating that China and the US should
maintain the proper and healthy course of development in the future. In the hindsight,
China’s conciliatory posture in the first year of Trump’s presidency may have conveyed a
signal of weakness and encouraged Trump to adopt more coercive policies on both Taiwan
and trade. Disregarding China’s warnings, Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act into law
on February 28, 2018, marking a substantial upgrade to US-Taiwan relations. Trump also
formally waged the trade war with China in 2018. Interestingly, China again refrained from
mobilizing popular nationalism; it did not utilize Taiwan as a convenient tool or proactively
link it to the trade war. Public discussions on the Taiwan Travel Act was under heavy
censorship on major social media websites such as Zhihu and Weibo. We discuss the impact
of the US–China trade war in Section A.6.
France and UK
These two cases pertain to the well-known “Dalai Lama effect” (Cuchs and Klann, 2013).
In 2008, then French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s provocative tongue challenged China’s
authority given the sensitive timing: the Tibetan Riot in March and the Beijing Olympics
in August. Comparatively, in 2012, then UK Prime Minister David Cameron showed more
constraints before and after his meeting with Dalai Lama. The Chinese government adopted
sharply divergent strategies, suggesting its flexible use of sticks (France) and carrots (UK).
On the one hand, China’s threats of economic sanctions successfully changed the behavior of
French leaders and set a precedent: There were no further official meetings between French
leaders and Dalai Lama after 2008. When asked if he would meet with Dalai Lama, then
French President Emmanuel Macron publicly stated in April 2018 that an official meeting
with Dalai Lama “will create a crisis with China.”3 On the other hand, China did not severely
punish the UK economically after 2012 and its retaliation is limited to suspending political
connections. Official meetings was restarted in 2013 after the UK made new commitments
to enhance economic cooperation with China. China’s growing influence is best illustrated
by UK’s decision to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015.
2Trump’s Taiwan Phone Call: China Reacts, the Diplomat, December 3, 2016, retrieved on October 1,
2018, Link.
3President Macron on U.S.–France Relations, April 25, 2018, Retrieved on October 1, 2018, Link.
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A2 A Replication Note of Davis, Fuchs and Johnson (2017)
Davis, Fuchs, and Johnson (2017) theorized the role of the state-controlled economy in the
economic statecraft. As discussed in the main text, we agree that on average, SOEs are more
responsive to the state’s command. In addition, we argue that popular nationalism can be a
strong political signal dictated by the central leaders, motivating local underlings to act in
accordance.
However, if popular nationalism generates bottom-up pressure, foreign firms are also
obvious targets and thereby sensitive to political shocks. We evaluate the impact of political
shocks on foreign firms using the original trade data from 1993 to 2012 in Davis, Fuchs and
Johnson, 2017. We approximate the imports of foreign firms by deducting the imports of SOE
and private enterprise from the total imports.4 As shown in Table A.2, the impact of political
tension is negative and significant for foreign firms as well (Column 4). The magnitude is
also comparable to that of SOEs (Column 2, 4). The results again suggest that the top-down
political control through state ownership is not the only mechanism characterizing China’s
economic statecraft.
4The estimated value would include the imports of foreign firms and firms of other undefined types (such
as the collectively-owned business), while we expect the vast majority (over 90 percent) to be the imports
of foreign firms (including the joint-venture firms).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Imports) log(SOE Imports) log(Private Imports) log(Foreign Imports)
Panel A (GDELT Negative Events, Government)
Political Relation -0.101∗∗ -0.122∗∗ 0.0607 -0.106∗∗
(-3.24) (-2.97) (1.05) (-3.58)
log(GDP) 1.413∗ 1.399+ 1.865+ 1.145
(2.22) (1.78) (1.90) (1.30)
log(Population) 3.070+ 5.090∗ 4.099∗ 2.027
(1.80) (2.46) (2.25) (1.30)
WTO Member 0.176 0.0846 2.043∗∗ 0.404
(0.48) (0.16) (3.12) (0.95)
Polity Score 0.0767+ 0.0294 -0.0707 0.0127
(1.76) (0.52) (-1.21) (0.37)
Observations 3003 3003 3003 3003
R2 0.760 0.725 0.829 0.792
Panel B (GDELT Negative Events, Military)
Political Relation -0.137∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.135 -0.151∗∗
(-4.60) (-4.21) (-1.41) (-5.02)
log(GDP) 1.417∗ 1.404+ 1.839+ 1.148
(2.22) (1.78) (1.86) (1.31)
log(Population) 2.982+ 4.986∗ 4.087∗ 1.932
(1.76) (2.42) (2.26) (1.25)
WTO Member 0.197 0.109 2.048∗∗ 0.427
(0.53) (0.21) (3.13) (1.01)
Polity Score 0.0780+ 0.0312 -0.0742 0.0140
(1.79) (0.56) (-1.28) (0.41)
Observations 3003 3003 3003 3003
R2 0.760 0.724 0.829 0.791
Panel C (Ideal Point Distance)
Political Relation -0.315∗∗ -0.427∗∗ -0.0972 -0.345∗∗
(-2.99) (-3.77) (-0.70) (-4.03)
log(GDP) 1.155 1.010 1.904+ 0.897
(1.56) (1.24) (1.72) (0.92)
log(Population) 2.919+ 4.726∗ 3.773∗ 1.976
(1.76) (2.40) (2.13) (1.29)
WTO Member 0.215 0.133 2.068∗∗ 0.425
(0.58) (0.26) (3.07) (1.00)
Polity Score 0.0967∗ 0.0493 -0.0777 0.0316
(2.19) (0.86) (-1.32) (0.89)
Observations 2973 2973 2973 2973
R2 0.767 0.731 0.830 0.796
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Country and year fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Table A.2: The Economic Impact of Political Shock
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A3 SCM Model and Supplementary Results
The Synthetic Control Method is data-driven and creates a weighted average of the con-
trol units (countries that did not experience political shocks with China during the same
time window). We first present additional information on the weighting matrix (W ) of the
synthetic control unit for each case in Table A.3. In general, the choice of countries with
high weights is intuitive (though the availability of potential control units for Japan, South
Korea, and the US is severely limited) and good fitness is realized for the pre-shock period,
i.e., the average difference between the treated and the synthetic control unit is insignificant
from 0.
Since China nearly simultaneously went into conflicts with South Korea (THAAD system)
and the United States (Trump’s hawkish policies on Taiwan and trade), we attempt to
minimize the interference when constructing the synthetic control unit for one country by
manually excluding the other country. The results do not substantively change, however,
if we do not impose the exclusion as the synthetic control unit remains constant. And as
mentioned in the main text, we use the European Union as a single economy for the cases
of Japan and South Korea to make up for the lack of countries that have comparably high
volumes of trade with China.
France UK Japan United States South Korea
United States 0.293 United States 0.355 European Union 0.640 Japan 0.968 Japan 0.569
Japan 0.121 Greece 0.097 South Korea 0.360 Germany 0.032 European Union 0.429
Brazil 0.076
* Only countries with weight larger than 0.03 are reported.
Table A.3: Composition of Synthetic Control Group, Important Contributors
Country Year Issue under Dispute SCM Gravity Model
Japan 2012-14 Diaoyu Islands -0.247 -0.286
South Korea 2016-17 THAAD Deployment -0.078 -0.147
USA 2016-18 Taiwan/Economic Policy -0.033 -0.076
France 2008 Dalai Lama/Tibet -0.111 -0.126
UK 2012 Dalai Lama/Tibet 0.145 0.175
Table A.4: Comparison between SCM and Gravity Model Estimates
In Table A.4, We compare the impact of political shock estimated by SCM and the
conventional gravity model. For the gravity model, we control for the country and year-
month fixed effects and GDP (lagged by one year). Adding country-specific trends into
the model would not substantially change the coefficient. We also limit the sample to the
OECD countries for better comparison. Essentially, the gravity model makes the parallel
trends assumption, and it raises new problems if developing countries are included in the
sample. The effect of political shocks is identified using the interaction term between the
target country and the post-conflict dummy (also see Heilmann, 2016). The time window
is restricted to 24 months before and after the conflict. In general, the outputs of the two
models are largely consistent, although the gravity model tends to give larger estimates of
the impact.
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Fig. A.1: Chinese Imports from Japan
(Differentiated Products)































































Fig. A.2: Chinese Imports from South Korea
(Differentiated Products)
We also examine the robustness of the SCM outputs by focusing on differentiated products
that are most sensitive to contract enforcement and require extensive buyer-seller interac-
tions. Compared to homogenous products (organized exchange or reference priced; see the
definitions in Rauch 1999), differentiated products are highly relationship-specific and have
attributes salient to the buyers such as brand and national origin. Therefore, the trade
of differentiated products may be more sensitive to the influence of interstate conflict and
nationalist sentiment. However, the characteristics of differentiated products indicate that
the cost of finding qualified substitutes is also high, which may partially offset the negative
A-6
impact of interstate conflict. Therefore, the overall effect on differentiated goods has an
uncertain direction.









































Fig. A.3: Chinese Imports from the US
(Differentiated Products)




















































Fig. A.4: Chinese Imports from France
(Differentiated Products)
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Fig. A.5: Chinese Imports from UK
(Differentiated Products)
We limit the scope of differentiated products to machinery and electrical equipment (HS
Section 16), transport equipment (HS Section 17), and optical, photographic and cinemato-
graphic equipment (HS Section 18) and implement the SCM again, using the imports of
differentiated products as the dependent variable. The output is presented in Figure A.4 -
A.3. When the dependent variable changes, the weighting matrix in the SCM model also
changes and in each case there is a slightly different synthetic control unit. To summarize,
we obtain a similar negative effect of interstate conflict on Chinese imports from Japan. And
for the cases of South Korea and the US, the SCM outputs suggests the impact of political
tensions on differentiated products is relatively small. Other results of the Dalai Lama effect
are also largely consistent with the findings reported in the main text.
A-8
A4 Formal Tools of Economic Sanctions: The US–China Trade
War
We theorize that interstate conflict has a negative effect on economic exchanges through
popular nationalism encouraged by the state. The 2018-19 US–China trade war provided
an opportunity for us to compare formal and informal instruments of economic statecraft.
We use the same model settings in the main text but extend the observations to June 2019,
after two main tranches of China’s tariffs on the US products between July and September
2018 ($50 billion worth of products with 25% tariffs and $60 billion worth of products with
5% - 10% tariffs).
The main results in Figures A.6 and A.7 show that the SCM model captures a large gap
between the actual Chinese imports and the synthetic unit for the total imports after July
2018. The gap for the high-end differentiated products (HS16, 17, and 18) appears much
smaller, indicating difficulties of searching for substitutes. As mentioned in the main text,
there was a strong association between the outbreak of the trade war and the rise of popular
nationalism against the US. However, the time when the gap first appeared matched well
with the imposition of tariffs, suggesting that the gap should be attributed to the formal
sanction instrument (for other recent work, see Fajgelbaum et al. 2019).
Another conclusion we draw from the US–China trade war is that the escalation of political
disputes does not necessarily disrupt economic exchanges. The impact of interstate conflict
can be mitigated by the cushioning effect of interdependence. As we have discussed in
the main text, the political tension between China and the US had started to build up
after Trump was first elected in 2016. In August 2017, Trump authorized a Section 301
investigation into China’s “unfair” trade practice, and the tariff plan was announced in
March-April 2018. Yet we only observe a large and persistent decline in Chinese imports
from the US after the tariffs were eventually imposed in July 2018.























































Fig. A.6: Chinese Imports from the US
(January 2015 - June 2019)
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Fig. A.7: Chinese Imports from the US
(Differentiated Products January 2015 - June 2019)
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A5 Descriptive Statistics, Subnational Data (Diaoyu Island Dis-
putes)
In this section, we present the summary of subnational data (city and province level) for the
analysis of the Diaoyu Islands Dispute between 2010 and 2015.
Variable n Min !x x̄ Max IQR s #NA
Import from Japan (1000 USD), Log 1662 0.0 9.6 9.0 17.4 4.5 4.0 0
Import from South Korea (1000 USD), Log 1662 0.0 9.1 8.3 17.1 5.3 4.4 0
Import from USA (1000 USD), Log 1662 0.0 10.0 9.4 17.2 4.3 3.7 0
Total Import (1000 USD), Log 1662 0.0 13.0 12.8 19.7 3.3 3.0 0
GDP Per Capita (RMB), Log 1662 8.4 10.4 10.4 12.6 0.9 0.6 0
Population (10,000), Log 1662 2.9 5.9 5.9 8.1 0.8 0.7 0
College Students (10,000), Log 1652 0.0 1.5 1.6 4.6 1.2 1.0 10
GDP Growth, % 1662 -26.8 11.7 12.5 49.6 10.9 8.2 0
Industrial Output, Log 1662 3.5 7.4 7.4 10.4 1.4 1.2 0
Industrial Output: Domestic, % 1662 23.4 91.8 85.7 100.0 16.8 15.0 0
Industrial Output: Foreign, % 1662 0.0 4.6 8.3 51.5 9.2 9.7 0
Utilized Foreign Capital (10,000 USD), Log 1607 3.8 10.1 10.2 14.6 2.1 1.7 55
No. Foreign Contracts, Log 1566 0.7 2.9 3.2 8.7 2.3 1.6 96
WWII Massacre 1662 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.5 0
Early and Large Protest 1662 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.5 0
Baidu Search (Diaoyu Islands) 1656 2.5 3.4 3.4 4.7 0.3 0.3 6
No. JAP Investment, log 1662 0.0 0.0 0.5 6.4 0.7 1.0 0
No. KOR Investment, Log 1662 0.0 0.0 0.7 5.8 1.1 1.1 0
No. USA Investment, Log 1662 0.0 0.0 0.6 5.7 0.7 1.0 0
No. USA Investment, Log 1662 0.0 2.4 2.7 8.4 2.2 1.7 0
Table A.5: Summary Statistics, City-Level
Variable n Min !x x̄ Max IQR s #NA
GDP (100 million RMB), Log 1620 7.4 9.6 9.6 11.0 0.8 0.7 0
Population (10,000), Log 1620 6.8 8.4 8.3 9.3 0.9 0.6 0
Fixed Investment (100 million RMB) 1620 6.9 9.2 9.2 10.5 0.9 0.7 0
Import (USD), Log 1620 12.5 18.7 18.5 22.3 3.0 2.1 0
Import Intermediate Product, Log 1620 7.7 16.9 17.1 21.0 2.9 2.3 0
Import Differentiated Product, Log 1620 10.9 18.4 18.0 21.8 2.8 2.2 0
Export (USD), Log 1620 14.0 18.1 18.5 21.9 2.6 1.8 0
Trade Total (USD), Log 1620 14.7 19.2 19.3 22.6 2.8 1.8 0
SOE Capital (%) 1620 15.1 50.3 51.7 90.0 30.9 19.7 0
Private Firm Capital (%) 1620 2.0 20.6 21.7 57.8 16.5 12.1 0
Foreign Firm Capital (%) 1620 4.6 21.3 26.7 64.9 27.7 17.6 0
Baidu Search (Diaoyu Islands) 1620 3.3 3.9 3.9 4.5 0.5 0.3 0
Prevalence of Early and Large Protest 1620 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.3 0
Table A.6: Summary Statistics, Province-Level
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A6 Measurements of Popular Nationalism
In Table A.7 and Table A.8 we compare the two measurements of nationalism. Table A.7
shows the linear regression results at the province level, and there is a positive relation-
ship between the information exposure (Baidu Index) and the prevalence of early and large
protests at the province level. The correlation is weaker if no other controls are included
in the regression. In Table A.8, utilizing the city level data we run the logistic regression
and predict the occurrence of early protests at the city level; the positive relationship is
still significantly positive. Furthermore, variables that may contribute to collective actions
(i.e., college graduates) become insignificant after introducing the information exposure of





Prevalence of Early Large Protests 0.279 0.201∗
(0.193) (0.100)
SOE Capital (%) -0.0002 0.0002
(0.002) (0.002)
GDP Per Capita (log, yuan) 0.467∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.072)
Population (log, 10 thousand) 0.351∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023)
No. Obs 27 27 27
R-sq 0.036 0.832 0.859
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01






Baidu Index (City) 5.549∗∗∗ 5.950∗∗∗
(0.990) (1.976)
WWII MASSACRE 0.440 0.486
(0.471) (0.489)
Population (log) 0.628 -0.268
(0.482) (0.629)
GDP Per Capita (log) 0.659 -0.477
(0.596) (0.767)
College Students (log) 0.908∗∗∗ 0.218
(0.302) (0.369)
GDP growth (%) -0.002 0.017
(0.034) (0.029)
Domestic Industrial Output (%) -0.006 0.016
(0.028) (0.034)
Province FE Y Y Y
No. Obs 276 274 273
McFadden’s pseudo R-sq 0.337 0.305 0.342
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01

























































































Predicting Protest with Exposure to Conflict Information
Fig. A.8: Predicting Protests with Baidu Index
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A7 The Economic Impact of Popular Nationalism on Trade
A7.1 Alternative Explanations
In this section, we discuss two alternative factors that drive the decline in Chinese imports
from Japan mentioned in the main text: domestic firms (including the state-owned ones) and
historical legacies of animosity. For the influence of domestic firms, we use domestic firms’
industrial output at the city level and the percentage of state-owned enterprises’ capital
stock at the province level. For the influence of historical animosity, we use the occurrence




Years included: 2011-13 Years included: 2010-14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP, Log −2.724 −2.975 −2.709 −2.959 −0.735 −0.781 −0.724 −0.766
(2.612) (2.771) (2.619) (2.777) (1.145) (1.155) (1.152) (1.164)
Population, Log 0.157 0.279 0.161 0.280 0.163 0.209 0.155 0.198
(0.937) (0.978) (0.935) (0.978) (0.858) (0.854) (0.865) (0.861)
GDP Growth 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Domestic Firm Output 0.008 0.007 −0.007 −0.008
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
Post * Early and Large Protest −0.583∗∗ −0.561∗∗ −0.569∗∗ −0.551∗∗ −0.472∗∗ −0.466∗∗ −0.458∗∗ −0.451∗∗
(0.235) (0.239) (0.254) (0.261) (0.185) (0.191) (0.201) (0.208)
Post * Domestic Firm Output (%) 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Post * WWII Massacre −0.051 −0.038 −0.053 −0.058
(0.203) (0.203) (0.173) (0.176)
Observations 831 831 831 831 1385 1385 1385 1385
R-sq 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
City and year FEs are omitted for simplicity.
Table A.9: Nationalism and Trade Disruption (City Level)
Dependent variable:
Log(Import)
Years included: 2011-13 Years included: 2010-14
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Import), Lagged 0.311∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.089) (0.076) (0.076)
SOE Capital (%) 0.007 −0.001
(0.006) (0.004)
GDP −0.324 −0.427 0.024 0.104
(0.675) (0.571) (0.572) (0.543)
Fixed Investment −0.533 −0.541 −0.489∗ −0.495∗
(0.412) (0.430) (0.274) (0.265)
Population −1.307 −1.761 −0.465 −0.387
(1.587) (1.864) (1.001) (0.971)
Post * Prevalence of Early and Large Protest −0.377∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗ −0.261∗∗
(0.140) (0.131) (0.107) (0.104)
Post * SOE Capital (%) 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 972 972 1620 1620
R-sq 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
City and year-month FEs are omitted for simplicity.
Table A.10: Nationalism and Trade Disruption (Province Level)
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A7.2 Heterogeneous Effect: Product Type
We discuss the heterogenous effect of nationalist activism on different types of imports from
Japan. We argue that trading differentiated products is more sensitive to political shocks,
for it is relationship-specific and highly contingent on contextual factors such as political
institutions (Berkowitz et al., 2006; Nunn, 2007). But the nature of differentiated products
also makes it difficult to relocate substitutes and the transaction cost of finding replacements
is substantially higher, which may offset the destructive consequences of political shocks.
Here we limit the scope of differentiated products to machinery and electrical equipment
(HS Section 16), transport equipment (HS Section 17), and optical, photographic and cin-
ematographic equipment (HS Section 18). China’s other major imports from Japan are
chemicals and allied industries (HS Section 6), plastics and rubbers (HS Section 7), pulp of
wood or other fibrous material (HS Section 10), textiles (HS Section 11), stone and glass
(HS Section 13), and base metals (HS Section 15) that are comparatively less complicated
manufactured products or intermediate products. We separate the imports into two types
and re-rerun the regression in the main text. As shown in Table A.11, the prevalence of
early and large nationalist protests at the province level has a larger impact on both types
of products, and the effect becomes insignificant after 5 years.
DV: Log(Imports from Japan)
Panel A: 2011-13 Panel B: 2010-14 Panel C: 2010-17
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Type Differentiated Intermediate Differentiated Intermediate Differentiated Intermediate
Post-Conflict * Protest -0.433∗∗ -0.292 -0.291∗∗ -0.235∗ -0.164 -0.203
(0.214) (0.214) (0.127) (0.136) (0.119) (0.138)
Prov FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Covariates (Provincial GDP, fixed investment volume, and population) are omitted for simplicity.
Table A.11: Popular Nationalism and Imports from Japan, Product Tyle
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A7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Tables A.12 and A.13 provides the information of the sensitivity analysis in the main text. In
each regression, we leave out one province/Municipality and re-estimate the negative effect of
nationalism on trade. It mitigates concerns that early and large protests are geographically
clustered and the results may be driven by a few observations within a province.




























Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shanghai -0.483 0.010
Table A.12: Sensitivity Analysis (Leaving One Out), City
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Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shanghai -0.420 0.059
Table A.13: Sensitivity Analysis (Leaving One Out), Province
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A8 Supplementary Results: Economic Impact of Nationalism
In this section, we present additional analysis on the economic influence of interstate con-
flict, including foreign investment, Chinese exports to Japan (province- and city-level), and
economic growth.
A8.1 The effect of nationalism on Chinese exports to Japan
Table A.14 shows the effect of nationalism on Chinese exports to Japan. There is no obser-
vation disruption, and we find that provinces exposed to more information about the Diaoyu
Islands dispute exported more to Japan after the conflict (Panel A); the coefficient is positive
and significant.
DV: Log(Imports from Japan)
Panel A: City Level Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Conflict * Baidu Index 0.277 0.218 0.209
(0.282) (0.244) (0.232)
Post-Conflict * Early Large Protest 0.081 0.060 0.054
(0.144) (0.128) (0.125)
Years Included 2011-13 2010-14 2010-15
R-sq 0.936 0.936 0.920 0.920 0.916 0.916
Obs. 828 831 1380 1385 1656 1662
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Panel B: Province Level Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export, lagged 0.429∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.106) (0.077) (0.075) (0.069) (0.066)
Post-Conflict * Baidu Index 0.353∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗
(0.113) (0.103) (0.114)
Post-Conflict * Early Large Protest 0.025 0.072 0.097
(0.117) (0.120) (0.115)
Years Included 2011-13 2010-14 2010-15
R-sq 0.968 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Obs. 972 972 1620 1620 1944 1944
Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.14: The Impact of Nationalism on Chinese exports to Japan
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A8.2 The trend of Chinese and Japanese investment
In Figure A.9 we show the number of newly-established firms by Japan, South Korea, and
the United States from 2010 to 2015. It can be observed that only for Japan the number of
newly established firms significantly dropped after 2012. For the United States, there was a
steady decline from 2010, and for South Korea, the temporal trend was a U-curve (lowest in
2012) and the number of investments increased after 2012.
As the benchmark, we also plot China’s outward direct investment (ODI) in Japan, Korea,
and the US from 2010 to 2015 in Figure A.10 using the data from the Ministry of Commerce.
It can be observed that the territorial dispute does not have any impact on China’s ODI
in Japan, and is roughly at the same level as China’s ODI in South Korea. Comparatively,
China’s ODI in the US increased at a fast pace and skyrocketed in 2014 and 2015. One
may also draw tentative conclusions from the disproportionate impact of the conflict on
Japanese and Chinese investors: 1) Japan is a democratic government and foreign investment











































Fig. A.9: Total Number of Newly Established Firms by Country-Year
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Fig. A.10: Total Number of Newly Established Firms by Country-Year (China ODI)
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A8.3 The effect of nationalism on Japanese investment in China
In this section, we discuss whether the decline in Japanese investment can be explained by
the geographical variations in popular nationalism after 2010. We focus on cities that have
hosted foreign investment between 2010 and 2015. It makes no substantive difference if all
the cities are included in the regression.
In addition to the measurements of popular nationalism, we examine several competing
mechanisms. First, we consider the historical legacy of hostility after the WWII (Columns
1-3). Although the interaction term between the post-conflict dummy and WWII Massacre
is significant at the 0.1 level (Column 1), the coefficient shrinks and becomes insignificant
after adding interaction terms between the post-conflict dummy and popular nationalism
(Columns 2-3). Next, we control for the substitute effect of South Korea and US firms and
examine the independent effect of popular nationalism on Japanese investment (Column 4-7).
The coefficients shrink and the treatment effect of protest becomes insignificant (Columns
4 and 6). The results suggest that the decline in Japanese investment may be driven by
increasing competition of South Korean and US firms, which can also be correlated with
nationalism.
DV: log(No. New Japanese Firms + 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Population (log) -0.372 -0.187 0.071 -0.134 -0.041 0.039 0.068
(0.310) (0.290) (0.328) (0.333) (0.344) (0.346) (0.353)
Domestic Firm Output (%) -0.013 -0.013∗ -0.012∗ -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Industrial Output (log) 0.474∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.227∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.230∗
(0.143) (0.138) (0.129) (0.123) (0.125) (0.122) (0.122)
College Graduate (log) 0.060 0.102 0.093 0.049 0.048 0.015 0.015
(0.143) (0.141) (0.132) (0.129) (0.125) (0.135) (0.131)
GDP PC (Log) -0.342∗ -0.319∗ -0.264 -0.230 -0.225 -0.174 -0.181
(0.187) (0.184) (0.178) (0.183) (0.181) (0.172) (0.173)
log(No. New South Korea Firms + 1) 0.090∗ 0.084
(0.049) (0.051)
Post-2012 * log(No. New South Korea Firms + 1) -0.177∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.041)
log(No. New US Firms + 1) 0.186∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.046)
Post-2012 * log(No. New US Firms + 1) -0.156∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗
(0.026) (0.043)
Post-2012 * WWII Massacre -0.130∗ -0.099 -0.063
(0.075) (0.076) (0.069)
Post-2012 * Early and Large Protest -0.164∗∗ -0.068 -0.098
(0.077) (0.071) (0.070)
Post-2012 * Baidu Index -0.574∗∗∗ -0.269∗ -0.334∗
(0.114) (0.153) (0.174)
Obs 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026
R-sq 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
City and year fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Covariates are lagged by one year.
Table A.15: Alternative Channels: Historical Legacy and Foreign Competition
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Table A.16 displays regression results based on other common transformation of the count
variable, including square-root transformation and inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transforma-
tion while retaining the flexibility of the OLS model (Shi and Xi, 2018). The coefficients
of popular nationalism are robust compared to Columns 2-3 in Table A.15, and there is a
strong negative effect of popular nationalism on the number of new Japanese firms.
DV: ihs(No. New Japanese Firms) DV: sqrt(No. New Japanese Firms)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WWII Massacre -0.078 -0.056 -0.182 -0.142
(0.109) (0.108) (0.167) (0.166)
Capital City 0.052 -0.222 -0.472 -0.969
(0.288) (0.330) (0.536) (0.631)
Early and Large Protest 0.041 0.014
(0.134) (0.209)
Baidu Index 1.466∗∗∗ 2.649∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.813)
Population (log) 0.366∗ 0.213 0.240 0.212 0.833∗∗ 0.540 0.610∗ 0.650
(0.207) (0.418) (0.194) (0.439) (0.398) (0.456) (0.359) (0.519)
Industrial Output (log) 0.119 0.254 -0.0003 0.212 -0.020 0.364∗ -0.237 0.278
(0.158) (0.167) (0.152) (0.166) (0.243) (0.202) (0.255) (0.187)
College Graduate (log) 0.093 0.006 0.013 0.019 0.130 0.032 -0.012 0.094
(0.100) (0.169) (0.096) (0.163) (0.165) (0.216) (0.156) (0.202)
Domestic Firm Output (%) -0.036∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
GDP PC (log) 0.784∗∗∗ -0.040 0.589∗∗ -0.124 1.500∗∗∗ 0.124 1.139∗∗ -0.035
(0.271) (0.249) (0.252) (0.245) (0.519) (0.304) (0.457) (0.285)
Post-2012 * GDP PC (log) -0.321∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗ -0.202∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.087) (0.092) (0.098) (0.163) (0.160) (0.142) (0.139)
Post-2012 * Early and Large Protest -0.200∗∗ -0.174∗ -0.252∗∗ -0.215∗
(0.085) (0.092) (0.116) (0.126)
Post-2012 * Baidu Index -0.504∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗∗ -0.943∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.175) (0.250) (0.256)
Obs 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026
R-sq 0.66 0.86 0.66 0.86 0.61 0.89 0.62 0.89
Prov FE Y N Y N Y N Y N
City FE N Y N Y N Y N Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
City, province and year fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Covariates are lagged by one year.
Table A.16: Alternative Model Specification of the Outcome Variable
A-22
A8.4 The effect of nationalism on foreign investment and economic growth
Table A.17 uses FDI statistics from the alternative source, the City Statistical Yearbook.
We also revisit the general economic impact of popular nationalism in terms of GDP growth
in Table A.18. We find no evidence that the upsurge of popular nationalism is in general
detrimental to the local economy, in terms of attracting overall less foreign investment or
reducing the economic growth rate. On the contrary, the coefficients indicate a positive di-
rection, although we refrain from reaching a strong conclusion such that popular nationalism
is beneficial to the local economy based on this single piece of evidence.
DV: log(Utilized Capital) DV: log(No. Contracts + 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP PC (log) 0.209 0.228 0.049 0.045
(0.166) (0.175) (0.188) (0.201)
Population (log) 0.630 0.803∗ 1.828∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.466) (0.623) (0.670)
Domestic Firm Output (%) -0.0003 -0.001 0.001 0.0001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Industrial Output (log) 0.511∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.129 0.181
(0.141) (0.148) (0.129) (0.138)
College Graduate (log) 0.188 0.244 -0.052 -0.016
(0.235) (0.231) (0.249) (0.254)
Post-2012 * Early Large Protest 0.220∗∗ 0.186∗∗
(0.088) (0.094)
Post-2012 * Baidu Index 0.100 0.230∗
(0.132) (0.118)
Obs 1195 1195 1179 1179
R-sq 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
City FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
City, province and year fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Covariates are lagged by one year.
Table A.17: Nationalism and FDI Inflow
(City Statistics Year Books)
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DV: GDP Growth (%)
(1) (2)
GDP PC (log) -4.481∗∗ -4.787∗∗
(1.803) (1.908)
Population (log) -17.778∗∗ -18.457∗∗
(7.776) (7.451)
Domestic Firm Output (%) 0.098 0.082
(0.066) (0.065)
Industrial Output (log) -0.713 0.672
(2.025) (2.175)
College Graduate (log) 0.261 0.741
(1.912) (1.919)
Post-2012 * Early Large Protest 3.061∗∗∗
(0.799)




City FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
City, province and year fixed effects are omitted for simplicity.
Covariates are lagged by one year.
Table A.18: Nationalism and GDP Growth
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